THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 


THE  WAR 
IN  EUROPE 

ITS  CAUSES  AND  RESULTS 


BY 


ALBERT  BUSHNELL  HART 

PROFESSOR  OF  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOVERNMENT 
AT  HARVARD  UNIVERSITY 


NEW  YORK  AND  LONDON 

D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY 

1914 


COPYRIGHT,  1914,  BY 
D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY 


Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 


PREFACE 

No  excuse  will  be  offered  for  the  smallness  of 
this  book  in  comparison  with  the  vastness  of  its 
subject.  The  author  has  felt  a  personal  need  of 
some  knowledge  of  those  conditions  of  Europe 
which  bear  upon  the  origin  of  the  Great  War  of 
1914.  Thence  it  was  a  short  road  to  the  thought 
that  other  Americans  might  be  interested  in  a 
brief  .but  systematic  statement  of  the  resources, 
aims,  and  difficulties  of  the  European  powers ;  the 
manner  in  which  they  became  involved  in  the  war ; 
and  the  probable  results  of  the  struggle  to  Amer- 
ica and  to  the  rest  of  the  world. 

The  book  is  based  first  of  all  on  personal  ac- 
quaintance, either  through  travel  or  residence, 
with  all  the  great  and  small  countries  at  war  or 
threatened  with  war,  except  Russia  and  the  Scan- 
dinavian countries.  Much  in  these  pages  results 
from  studies  begun  thirty  years  ago  in  the  univer- 
sities of  Freiburg  and  Berlin,  and  the  Ecole  des 
Sciences  Politiques  in  Paris.  Additional  data 
have  been  collected  expressly  for  this  volume. 


297614 


vi  PREFACE 

I  cannot  expect  to  be  free  from  errors  of  fact, 
though  I  have  taken  pains  to  verify  statements 
that  seemed  likely  to  be  questioned.  Doubtless 
there  are  also  mistakes  of  inference  and  deduction. 
At  least  it  may  be  claimed  that  such  as  may  be 
found  in  these  pages  do  not  arise  from  prejudice 
for  or  against  any  of  the  contestants ;  for  I  have 
spent  happy  days  and  formed  friendships  alike  in 
Germany,  Austria,  France,  England,  and  Servia. 

The  book  is  intended  to  be  a  study  of  facts, 
conditions  and  probable  results,  and  not  to  be  an 
argument.  Upon  many  critical  questions  relating 
to  the  war,  necessary  evidence  has  not  yet  reached 
the  world.  Upon  many  others,  where  the  facts 
are  established,  there  is  opportunity  for  honest 
differences  of  opinion.  Upon  few  issues  are  the 
materials  so  abundant  that  a  conclusion  may  be 
safely  reached  in  the  thick  of  the  struggle.  What- 
ever the  faults  of  judgment,  they  are  the  author's 
own;  the  book  has  been  written  without  aid  or 
revision  from  others.  The  purpose  is  to  treat  the 
subject  fairly  and  impartially.  While  sympathiz- 
ing with  all  the  peoples  involved,  there  is  one  na- 
tion in  favor  of  which  I  feel  an  unalterable  par- 
tiality :  it  is  the  United  States  of  America,  which 
has  her  anxieties  and  interests  also  in  the  tremen- 
dous struggle. 

ALBERT  BUSHNELL  HART. 

Cambridge,  October  17,  1914. 


CONTENTS 

PART    I.     CONDITIONS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I. — SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  WAR  .         1 
War  in  Our  Time,  1 ;  Approach  and  Ex- 
tent of  the  War,  5;  Effect  on  the  Peace 
Movement,  9?  Significance  to  Americans, 
11. 

II. — MINOR  POWERS  OF  EUROPE      ....       15 
Small    and    Large    Powers,    15;    Scandi- 
navian Group,  17;  Holland  and  Belgium, 
19;  Switzerland,  22;  Spain  and  Portugal, 
23;  Balkan  States,  24. 

III. — THE  Six  GREAT  POWERS 28 

Italy,  28;  France,  30;  Austria-Hungary, 
33;  Great  Britain,  37;  Russia,  40;  Ger- 
many, 44;  Non-European  Elements  in  the 
European  War,  48. 

AV. — NON-POLITICAL  DIVISIONS  OF  EUROPE  .       52 
Industrial  Unities,  52;  Social  Unities,  54; 
Religious  Divisions,  57;  Lack  of  Religious 
Rivalry  in  the  War,  60;  Race  Divisions 
among  Minor  Powers,  63;  Race  Divisions 

vii 


viii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

in  Great  Britain,,  67;  Race  Divisions  in 
Germany,  69;  Race  Divisions  in  Russia, 
70;  Race  Divisions  in  Austria-Hungary, 

73. 

V. — INTERNATIONAL  RIVALRIES  AND  STRAINS       78 
Traditional  National  Hatreds,  78;   Mili- 
tary Rivalries,  82;  Commercial  Rivalries, 
85;   Transportation   Rivalries,  90;    Colo- 
nial Rivalries,  93;  Race  Bitterness,  99. 


PART    II.     WAR 

VI.  —  WAR  IN  THE  BALKANS    ...... 

The  Balkans  to  1878,  104;  Balkan  Trou- 
bles from  1878  to  1912,  107;  Balkan 
Wars  of  1912  and  1913,  HI;  High  Tide 
for  Servia,  113;  Atonement  for  Ferdi- 
nand, 115;  Responsibility  for  the  Ulti- 
matum, 120. 


VII.  —  THE  WAR  BECOMES  EUROPEAN  .  .  .  125 
Attitude  of  Russia,  125;  English  Efforts 
at  Mediation,  128;  Austro-Russian  Con- 
versations, 130;  Mediation  of  Emperor 
William,  133;  Mobilization  and  Diplo- 
macy, 135;  France,  138;  Great  Britain, 
140;  Montenegro  and  Japan,  147;  Bel- 
gium, 149- 


CONTENTS  ix 

•CHAPTER  PAGE 

VIII. — PSYCHOLOGY  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  WAR    .     154 
The  Sovereigns,  154;  The  Ministers,  159; 
The    Military    Men,    161;    Mobilization, 
163;  Public  Sentiment,  165;  Kismet,  166. 


IX. — QUESTIONS  OF  NEUTRALITY      ...          169 
What  is  a  Neutral?  169;  Military  Service, 
172;   Foreign  Trade,   174;  Neutrality  of 
Italy,  177;   Neutrality  of  Belgium,  180. 

X. — METHODS  OF  WARFARE 186 

Recruiting,  186;  Information,  189; 
Atrocities,  193;  Noncombatants,  195; 
Forced  Contributions,  202;  Airships,  203; 
Submarines  and  Mines,  206;  Rigors  of 
War,  209. 

XL — EFFECT  OF  THE  WAR  ON  THE  UNITED 

STATES 212 

National  Sympathies,  212;  Trade  and 
Transportation,  216;  The  American  Army 
and  Navy,  219;  American  Democracy, 
223;  Monroe  Doctrine.  227. 

XII. — OUTCOME  OF  THE  WAR 230 

Numbers  and  Losses,  230;  Transportation 
and  Supplies,  234;  Command  of  the  Sea, 
237;  Varied  Fields  of  Warfare,  240;  For- 
tune of  War,  243;  Possible  Terms  of 
Peace,  246;  Basis  of  a  True  Peace,  251. 


THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

PART  I.     CONDITIONS 

CHAPTER    I 

SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  WAR 

WAR   IN   OUR   TIME 

I 

WAR  is  woe.  War  is  destruction.  War 
is  death.  War  is  hell.  Against  war 
pulls  the  natural  shrinking  of  every 
living  man,  woman,  and  child  from  pain  and  dan- 
ger. War  is  a  denial  of  the  most  elementary  basis 
of  political  economy,  which  assures  us  that  men 
habitually  act  upon  what  they  suppose  to  be  their 
interests.  War  fills  with  consternation  the  great 
owners  of  property  who  see  impending  the  pov- 
erty of  individuals  and  of  nations.  War  is  the 
enemy  of  culture,  art,  education — of  everything 
that  exalts  the  mind.  War  is  contrary  to  the 
Christian  religion,  denying  the  brotherhood  of 
man  and  the  love  of  one's  neighbor.  The  respon- 
sibility of  bringing  about  war  shocks  the  greatest 
statesmen  and  disturbs  the  most  ruthless  soldiers. 

1 


2  THE  WAB  IN  EUROPE 

War  is  obsolete.  War  is  discredited.  For  fifteen 
years  the  Hague  Conferences  have  been  hopefully 
searching  for  a  way  of  preventing  war  and 
thought  the  world  on  the  brink  of  the  millennium. 

Yet  a  few  weeks  ago  suddenly  burst  out  the 
most  terrific  war  ever  known  to  mankind,  the 
largest,  the  farthest  reaching,  the  most  destruc- 
tive of  life.  When  in  1883  the  great  volcano  of 
Krakatoa  blew  itself  into  fragments,  the  sound 
was  heard  ten  thousand  miles  away  on  the  coast 
of  England.  So  the  clamor  of  the  armed  host  in 
Europe  crosses  the  ocean  and  disturbs  the  peace- 
ful life  of  the  whole  western  hemisphere. 

Notwithstanding  its  horror  the  war  seems  re- 
mote ;  it  is  hard  for  Americans  to  realize,  even 
after  weeks  of  undiminished  excitement,  that 
other  countries  are  being  torn,  to  pieces  by  the 
shock,  destruction,  and  terrors  of  furious  fight- 
ing. While  the  reader  in  his  easy  chair  opens 
this  book,  far  away  on  the  other  side  of  the  ocean 
drab-clad  masses  of  troops  are  trudging  wearily 
— company  after  company,  regiment  after  regi- 
ment, division  after  division,  steering  east,  west^ 
north,  south — anywhere,  to  find  their  human 
prey.  At  this  moment  the  bugle  is  sounding  a 
halt.  Tired  soldiers  are  opening  their  haversacks 
and  watching  the  kettle  boil  under  the  tripod  of 
muskets.  At  this  moment  an  aeroplane  is  hover- 
ing over  a  hostile  town,  watching  for  the  chance 
to  drop  a  bomb  which  will  presently  blow  into- 


SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE  WAR          3 

fragments  a  group  of  babies  and  nursemaids  in 
the  park. 

While  we  think  about  it,  a  million  men  are 
straining  every  nerve,  flogging  gun-horses,  curs- 
ing, tugging,  bringing  up  the  transports,  parking 
ammunition  wagons,  setting  out  hospital  material, 
digging  rifle  pits,  exchanging  shots  with  the 
enemy's  pickets ;  they  are  half  dead  with  fatigue, 
yet  only  at  the  beginning  of  their  toil  of  getting 
ready  for  the  coming  great  battle.  A  fourth  of 
them  are  unconsciously  preparing  themselves  for 
the  operating  table  or  the  soldier's  shallow  grave. 

Just  at  this  moment  noncombatants  are  fleeing 
with  shrieks  of  despair  from  their  villages — un- 
armed men,  whitebeards,  women,  cripples,  tod- 
dling children,  rushing  out  of  the  range  of  the  bat- 
tery which  is  beginning  to  drop  shells  among 
them.  They  are  leaving  their  little  all,  the  sav- 
ings of  a  lifetime's  toil,  leaving  it  to  go  up  in 
smoke.  They  cringe  at  the  thought  of  the  fate  of 
the  helpless  peasants  in  the  Balkan  War  of  last 
year,  for  even  civilized  and  Christian  soldiers  do 
queer  things  when  they  have  in  their  power  the 
wives  and  children  of  their  enemies. 

At  this  moment  a  regiment  of  infantry  gives 
way  and  the  cavalry  are  riding  furiously  among 
them,  shooting,  sabering,  breaking  their  skulls. 
At  this  moment  the  horses  are  straining  at  the 
big  siege  guns  which  are  slowly  moving  forward 
to  get  into  range  of  the  church  spire  five  miles 


4  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

away  beyond  the  trees;  and  within  half  an  hour 
the  church  that  has  lasted  through  centuries  of 
battles  and  sieges  and  is  precious  with  the  memor- 
ials of  twenty  generations,  will  be  a  heap  of  ruins. 

Out  at  sea,  in  the  track  of  the  usual  cheerful 
procession  of  steamers,  every  craft  that  thought 
itself  in  danger  has  been  scurrying  to  port — to 
any  port  except  that  of  an  enemy.  The  tick  of  a 
wireless  receiver  brings  alarm  to  a  captain  who 
has  laughed  at  fifty  gales.  Out  on  the  North  Sea 
comes  the  boom  of  heavy  guns,  and  the  periscope 
of  the  submarine  cuts  through  the  water  like  the 
fin  of  a  man-eating  shark.  Perhaps  at  this  very 
second  a  vessel,  German,  Russian,  or  English,  is 
hit  by  the  unseen  projectile  of  the  monster,  and 
is  carrying  a  thousand  brave  sailors  down  to  the 
bottom  of  the  sea. 

Within  the  peaceful  boundaries  of  the  United 
States  the  war  makes  distress  and  fear.  Your 
neighbor  is  frantic  because  he  has  no  news  from 
his  wife  and  children,  last  heard  of  in  Strassburg. 
The  next  man  had  everything  fixed  for  a  profit- 
able shipment  of  grain;  his  wheat  is  sidetracked 
at  Buffalo,  and  it  may  be  months  before  he  can 
get  a  vessel.  Across  the  street  is  a  cloakmaker; 
his  materials  were  to  have  been  shipped  from 
Paris  this  week,  and  now  he  must  discharge  his 
hands.  Another  is  calculating  up  his  share  of 
the  hundred  millions  of  new  taxation  which  the 
Federal  Government  has  laid.  The  next  man  is 


SIGNIFICANCE  OE  THE  WAR         5 

a  Serbo-Croatian,  called  by  the  Hungarian  gov- 
ernment to  go  home  and  fight  his  blood-brethren 
of  Servia;  and  unless  he  goes  he  never  can  show 
his  face  again  in  his  Fatherland.  No  earthquake, 
no  fire,  no  flood,  no  hurricane,  could  cause  a  tenth 
of  the  anguish  and  terror  which  has  befallen  the 
civilized  world. 

APPROACH  AND  EXTENT  OF  THE  WAR 

One  of  the  dreadful  incidents  of  the  war  is  the 
amazing  quickness  with  which  it  has  come  on. 
Most  wars  which  were  not  sudden  inroads  of 
pirates  or  nomad  horsemen  have  bubbled  a  long 
time  before  the  volcano  finally  broke  out.  Even 
Napoleon  had  a  playful  way  of  giving  notice  that 
he  was  about  to  strike  a  neighbor  by  upbraiding 
the  ambassador  of  that  country  on  some  public 
occasion.  The  War  of  the  Revolution  had  been 
gradually  approaching  for  about  a  year  and  a 
half  when  it  finally  broke  out  in  1775 ;  and  even 
then  it  was  more  than  a  year  before  the  colonies 
would  take  the  once-for-all  step  of  declaring  in- 
dependence. In  the  American  crisis  of  1860-61 
there  were  five  months  between  the  secession  of 
South  Carolina  and  the  firing  of  the  first  gun 
against  Fort  Sumter;  and  up  to  the  very  last 
there  were  hopeful  spirits  who  thought  there 
would  be  some  kind  of  compromise.  The  war  of 
Prussia  against  Austria  in  1866  had  been  coming 


6  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

on  visibly  for  a  long  time;  and  almost  three 
months  passed  in  preparations  and  discussions 
before  the  Prussian  troops  actually  moved.  Even 
the  last  war  in  which  Prussia  was  engaged,  in 
1870,  was  preceded  by  several  weeks  of  exchange 
of  views  with  regard  to  the  proposed  choice  of  a 
Hohenzollern  to  be  king  of  Spain.  In  1914,  how- 
ever, Europe  appeared  to  be  in  perfect  peace  on 
the  morning  of  July  £3 ;  but  on  the  evening  of 
August  2  six  powers  were  already  committed 
to  war. 

The  war  is,  or  threatens  to  be,  European  in  its 
geographical  extent,  but  it  is  world-wide  in  its 
immediate  and  future  effect.  The  area  of  terror 
and  damage  reaches  into  every  continent  and 
every  ocean.  The  actual  theater  of  land  war  in- 
cludes such  distant  places  as  Kiao-Chao  on  the 
Chinese  peninsula  of  Shan-Tung;  the  Samoan 
and  Solomon  Islands  in  the  Pacific  Ocean;  and 
the  interior  of  Africa.  The  King  of  the  Tonga 
Islands  blends  his  note  of  opera-bouffe  by  gravely 
announcing  the  neutrality  of  his  kingdom!  The 
cruisers  of  the  various  powers  suddenly  loom  up 
just  outside  the  three-mile  limit  near  any  neutral 
port  of  the  Atlantic,  or  Pacific,  or  Indian  Ocean 
and  then  disappear.  The  majestic  merchant 
ships  of  England,  France,  and  Germany  scuttle 
to  port  or  keep  the  seas  with  apprehension. 
When  before  this  year  have  the  most  powerful 
and  fastest  merchant  vessels  in  the  world  been 


SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE  WAR          7 

compelled  to  put  out  their  lights,  blanket  their 
portholes,  silence  their  wireless,  and  dash  through 
fogs  at  full  speed  without  the  warning  whistle? 
The  world  is  learning  the  meaning  of  Kipling's 
lines : 

"The  Liner  she's  a  lady,  an'   she  never  looks  nor 

'eeds — 
The  Man-o'-War's  'er  'usband,  an'  'e  gives  'er  all  she 

needs." 

Never  since  the  Armada  have  the  narrow  seas 
been  so  full  of  terror,  or  the  broad  seas  so  beset 
with  losses.  Of  the  great  fleet  of  the  Hamburg- 
American  line — two  hundred  and  one  ships  in  all 
— after  about  ten  days  of  war,  not  one  was  afloat 
on  the  ocean.  Of  these  only  a  few  have  been 
actually  captured,  but  the  stoppage  of  transit 
has  affected  the  commerce  of  the  world.  Even 

"The  little  cargo-boats,  .  .  .  the  same  as  you  an'  me" 

are  afraid  of  capture,  and  anywhere  in  the  North 
Sea  are  afraid  of  mines. 

No  country  in  the  world  is  detached  from 
this  struggle.  All  the  small  neutral  powers  of 
northern  and  western  Europe  are  in  daily  fear 
of  being  drawn  into  the  contest.  The  so-called 
neutrals  of  the  Balkan  region  are  watching 
their  opportunity  to  leap  into  the  fray  at  the 


8  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

dramatic  moment.  One  Asiatic  power,  Japan, 
is  already  engaged  in  war  and  China  may 
very  easily  be  brought  in.  For  it  is  the  ten- 
dency of  such  a  war  to  draw  into  its  fearful 
machinery  innocent  and  unwilling  by-standing 
nations. 

Many  wars  have  been  waged  which,  though 
desperate  and  long-continued,  have  little  affected 
the  ordinary  life  of  the  people.  England 
throughout  the  Napoleonic  period  kept  up  her 
manufactures  and  her  trade.  The  North,  during 
our  Civil  War,  grew  more  populous  and  richer 
every  year.  But  the  European  system  of  uni- 
versal military  service  stops  mines,  breaks  up 
factories,  except  those  operated  for  military 
reasons,  depletes  capital,  and  crushes  to  earth  the 
little  business  man.  The  number  of  men  and 
women  who  had  made  a  modest  success  of  their 
workshop  or  agency  or  hotel  and  who  are  already 
ruined  and  never  can  recover,  literally  runs  into 
the  millions.  Where  are  the  flourishing  arts  of 
peace?  What  has  become  of  the  attractive  exhi- 
bition at  Malmo  in  Sweden?  Of  the  great  book 
show  at  Leipsic?  Of  the  art  exhibit  at  Venice? 
Who  buys  pictures,  or  orders  statues,  or  con- 
tracts with  prima  donnas  in  such  a  time  as  this? 
Who  endows  universities,  founds  schools,  builds 
laboratories,  in  the  midst  of  the  stress  and  sacri- 
fice of  war?  Even  the  arts  of  peace  are,  for  the 
time  being,  almost  paralyzed. 


SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE  WAR          9 

EFFECT   ON   THE    PEACE    MOVEMENT 

The  war  affects  the  whole  world  through  its 
fearful  disappointment  to  those  who  hope  for  uni- 
versal peace.  It  is  a  sinister  comment  on  the 
efforts  of  the  first  Hague  Conference  of  1899  and 
the  second  Hague  Conference  of  1907  and  the 
Hague  Tribunal  and  the  Hague  conventions,  that 
in  the  last  fifteen  years  eight  wars  have  broken 
out ;  and  in  not  one  have  the  parties  availed  them- 
selves of  the  opportunity  for  a  rational  discus- 
sion of  the  questions  at  issue.  The  Boer  War, 
the  Russo-Japanese  War,  the  Italo-Turkish  War, 
the  French  War  in  Morocco,  two  Balkan  wars 
and  the  Civil  War  in  Mexico  and  now  this  Euro- 
pean war  all  ignored  the  possibility  of  arbitration 
by  the  new  machinery. 

Still  it  was  hoped  that  controversies  between 
great  European  powers  would  at  least  give  time 
for  discussion  in  the  spirit,  if  not  the  precise 
methods,  of  the  Hague  movement.  The  passions 
of  great  nations  run  too  swiftly.  Sir  Edward 
Grey  in  July  never  hinted  at  Hague  arbitration, 
though  he  did  his  best  to  bring  about  a  kind  of 
arbitral  conference  of  four  powers.  The  war  may 
bring  such  disaster  to  the  nations  that  they  will 
more  effectually  seek  a  way  of  preventing  or  min- 
imizing war  altogether;  but  it  looks  as  though 
the  slow  work  of  the  Hague  conferences  would 
need  to  be  done  all  over  again,  and  even  then 


10  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

would  be  hampered  by  the  fact  that  the  war  has 
introduced  many  new  problems  of  methods  of 
fighting  and  ways  of  treating  neutrals. 

The  war  has  unchained  new  forces  all  over  the 
world.  Unless  Europe  is  beaten  to  a  standstill, 
unless  every  nation  is  so  exhausted  and  miserable 
that  it  is  willing  to  start  again  from  the  point 
where  it  stood  when  the  war  broke  out,  the  strug- 
gle is  bound  to  result  in  great  territorial  changes 
and  new  combinations  of  the  powers.  Austria- 
Hungary,  excepting  for  the  period  of  its  occupa- 
tion of  North  Italy,  has  had  about  the  same  ter- 
ritory for  several  centuries.  France,  except  for 
Alsace  and  Lorraine,  has  about  the  boundaries  of 
1689;  but  now  the  map  of  Europe  is  likely  to 
undergo  adjustments. 

Even  if  it  remains  about  what  it  was  before,  the 
war  has  shown  such  diabolical  progress  in  the  art 
of  destroying  life  that  it  is  a  question  whether 
civilization  can  endure,  unless  airships  and  sub- 
marines are  put  under  some  kind  of  international 
supervision.  Apparently  the  old  science  of  forti- 
fication has  broken  down.  The  land  transporta- 
tion of  men,  supplies,  and  great  guns  has  under- 
gone a  change  through  the  use  of  motors.  Swift 
sea  transport  brings  distant  parts  of  the  globe 
into  the  European  struggle.  The  Mongol,  the 
South  Sea  Islander,  and  the  Afghan  have  a  direct 
interest  in  the  questions  of  this  war  and  future 
wars,  and  may  take  a  hand  in  settling  them. 


SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE  WAR         11 

SIGNIFICANCE   TO   AMERICANS 

To  the  people  of  the  United  States  the  war  has 
the  direct  and  immediate  significance  of  making 
irregular  and  uncertain  many  lines  of  commerce 
and  production.  The  great  wheat  farmer  and  the 
cotton  planter  look  doubtfully  across  the  sea. 
The  banker  who  is  ready  and  anxious  to  finance 
their  shipments  finds  his  capital  dormant  because 
of  the  lack  of  ships.  When  ships  sail  there  is  the 
serious  question  of  guaranteeing  payment  for  the 
cargoes  on  the  other  side.  The  ship-owner  hesi- 
tates to  take  over  foreign  ships  under  the  new 
registry  law  because  he  feels  doubtful  whether  he 
can  keep  them  busy  after  the  war  is  over.  The 
whole  endless  chain  of  personal  and  business  rela- 
tions is  confused  and  demoralized  by  a  war  to 
which  we  are  not  parties. 

This  is  an  opportunity  to  profit  by  the  neces- 
sary changes  in  the  currents  of  trade.  Asia  and 
South  America  are  enormously  valuable  markets, 
but  they  cannot  buy  unless  they  can  sell  their  own 
products  in  exchange ;  and  it  is  uncertain  how  far 
the  United  States  can  either  seize  upon  or  hold 
these  opportunities  for  trade.  The  people  of  this 
country  may  learn  to  do  without  certain  foreign 
articles,  or  may  make  good  substitutes  on  this 
side  of  the  water.  On  the  other  hand  it  is  pos- 
sible that  foreign  countries  will  learn  to  do  with- 
out some  American  exports.  All  we  are  sure  of 


12  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

is  that  the  world's  trade  once  smashed  can  never 
be  put  together  in  the  same  form  again. 

Americans  have  enormous  commercial  and 
social  interests  in  this  war.  The  actual  property 
of  American  individuals,  firms  and  corporations 
abroad  runs  up  to  the  hundreds  of  millions.  The 
potential  profits  on  the  sale  of  American  bread- 
stuffs,  coal,  cotton,  oil,  and  manufactures  are 
measured  by  scores  of  millions.  The  vast  ship- 
ping property  forms  another  link  in  the  chain 
which  binds  Europe  and  America  together.  So- 
cially we  are  interested  in  countries  from  which 
have  immigrated  thirteen  and  a  half  millions  of 
our  own  people.  The  United  States  is  the  largest 
and  most  successful  champion  of  popular  govern- 
ment as  against  autocratic  government,  and  that 
is  another  issue  in  this  war. 

Therefore,  Americans,  of  all  people  in  this 
crisis,  need  a  knowledge  of  the  causes,  conditions, 
and  probable  outcome  of  the  titanic  struggle. 
They  have  less  opportunity  than  Europeans  of 
seeing  the  circumstances  for  themselves.  Few 
American  travelers  penetrate  deeply  into  the 
countries  or  the  character  of  the  people  of 
Europe.  Our  diplomats  are  changeable ;  and  one 
who  has  carefully  observed  the  diplomatic  service 
of  all  nations  declares  that  most  ministers  never 
get  acquainted  with  anybody  except  those  of  their 
own  set  whom  they  meet  at  dinners.  Business 
men  who  trade  on  their  own  account  with  Europe 


SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE  WAR        13 

are  more  apt  to  have  clear  views  of  the  conditions, 
but  they  see  only  a  portion  of  the  decisive  fac- 
tors. 

To  the  best  informed  observers  in  Europe  the 
relations  between  men  and  nations  which  have  at 
last  led  to  war  are  singularly  intermixed ;  and  the 
most  impartial  men  hardly  know  where  to  fix 
blame  and  responsibility.  The  people  of  the 
United  States  have  no  alliances  and  no  national 
prejudices  in  Europe.  During  the  two  recent 
Balkan  wars  the  popular  sympathy  went  toward 
what  seemed  to  be  an  effort  to  get  rid  of  an  obso- 
lete and  offensive  government.  That  sympathy 
has  been  much  disturbed  by  the  rival  claims  of 
the  Turks,  Bulgarians,  Albanians,  Servians,  and 
Greeks.  In  the  present  struggle  the  United 
States  sympathizes  with  the  Austrian  effort  to 
hold  members  of  many  races  in  concord;  with  the 
intellectual  and  scientific  greatness  of  Germany; 
with  the  republican  government  of  France;  with 
the  Russian  desire  to  have  a  clear  entrance  to 
the  world's  seaways;  with  English  freedom  of 
commerce.  Our  desire  is  to  understand  what  the 
European  nations  actually  are,  and  to  realize 
the  interplay  of  those  nations  upon  each  other. 
Still  more  we  need  to  know  what  the  race  elements 
of  Europe  are,  and  how  far  there  is  truth  in  the 
idea  that  a  race  war  is  unavoidable,  and  perhaps 
to  be  desired. 

Each  party  to  the  war  puts  forward  its  own 


14  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

statement  of  the  reasons  which  seemed  to  that 
power  to  make  war  the  better  choice  of  two  evils ; 
each  power  is  convinced  that  its  reasons  are  satis- 
factory. The  ministers  and  priests  of  each  power 
pray  to  the  same  God  for  help  against  each 
other,  and  earmark  the  Almighty  as  infallibly  on 
their  side.  Yet  to  the  average  American  mind  in 
all  this  turmoil  no  one  reason  or  series  of  reasons 
seems  clear  or  coherent  or  sufficient  to  justify  a 
million  painful  deaths.  The  only  way  to  form  a 
judgment  as  to  the  causes,  responsibility,  and 
righteousness  of  the  war  is  to  consider  what  kind 
of  people  they  are  who  have  joined  battle  with 
such  fury  and  on  so  tremendous  a  scale. 


CHAPTER  II 

MINOR  POWERS   OF  EUROPE 

SMALL  AND  LARGE  POWERS 

THE  present  map  of  Europe  is  the  result 
of  many  thousand  years  of  occupation 
by  primitive  people  who  have  left  no 
records ;  and  of  three  thousand  years  of  pressure 
and  counter-pressure  between  organized  political 
groups.  Every  mile  of  European  frontier  has  a 
long  record  of  blood  and  diplomacy,  but  the  gen- 
eral territorial  history  has  gone  through  four 
stages  of  development.  First  there  were  com- 
paratively small  tribal  or  national  groups,  such 
as  the  Norsemen,  the  Gauls,  the  Germans.  Sec- 
ond, Rome  extended  her  power  over  southern 
and  western  Europe,  solidifying  these  elements. 
Third,  the  Empire  broke  up  about  500  A.  D.,  and 
a  multitude  of  fragments  appeared,  some  of  them 
independent  lordships  whose  territory  was  little 
more  than  the  castle  in  which  the  lord  lived. 
Fourth,  the  units  were  slowly  and  with  great  diffi- 
culty brought  together  again,  not  into  one  world 
15 


16  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

power,  but  into  countries  varying  in  size  from 
the  Republic  of  San  Marino,  with  82  square  miles, 
to  Russia  in  Europe  with  2,100,000  square  miles. 

This  process  has  left  marks  upon  every  part 
of  Europe.  The  Roman  walls  in  England,  in 
central  Germany,  and  in  the  Balkans  were  parts 
of  the  outer  boundary  of  Rome.  The  little  kinks 
and  curves  in  the  frontier  between  Switzerland 
and  Italy  indicate  the  results  of  border  wars 
otherwise  long  since  forgotten.  Some  of  the  small 
powers,  like  Holland,  are  pieces  broken  off  of  a 
once  larger  unit.  Some  of  the  larger  countries 
such  as  Austria-Hungary  are  mosaics  of  former 
nations  and  pieces  of  nations. 

During  the  last  three  hundred  years  the  pre- 
vailing tendency  has  been  to  compress  the  remain- 
ing small  units  into  powerful  nations ;  and  that 
process  has  brought  about  what  we  now  call  the 
six  Great  Powers — Great  Britain,  France,  Ger- 
many, Italy,  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia;  and 
there  is  a  tendency  to  create  a  seventh  unit,  by 
combining  the  numerous  Slav  elements  in  the 
Balkans  and  adjacent  countries  into  one  empire. 
Alongside  the  six  powers  are  fifteen  weaker  coun- 
tries, some  of  them  very  small.  In  addition  there 
are  five  nominally  independent  states  which  are 
really  protectorates — Luxemburg,  Liechtenstein, 
Monaco,  Andorra  and  San  Marino. 

The  key  to  the  present  situation  in  Europe 
is  that  the  great  national  units  do  not  in  any 


MINOR  POWERS  OF  EUROPE         17 

country  correspond  to  racial  units.  Great 
Britain  has  two  elements ;  one  of  which,  the 
Anglo-Saxon,  is  a  compound  of  several  races ;  and 
the  other,  the  Celtic,  is  divided  among  Scotch, 
Irish  and  Welsh.  France  includes  a  large  in- 
fusion of  original  German  blood.  Germany 
does  not  include  the  Germans  in  Switzerland, 
Austria-Hungary,  and  Russia,  or  the  Germanic 
Dutch  and  Flemings.  Italy  comes  nearest  the 
ideal  of  one  race  inhabiting  one  country,  though 
northern  Italy,  like  northern  France,  has  a  strong 
infusion  of  German  blood.  Austria-Hungary  and 
Russia  are  inhabited  by  many  races  which  are  by 
no  means  friendly  to  their  fellow  countrymen. 

To  understand  the  war  it  is  therefore  neces- 
sary to  know  what  are  the  national  units  of 
Europe,  and  at  the  same  time  to  realize  what  is 
the  strength  of  each  in  territory,  population, 
wealth,  fighting  men,  and  military  spirit. 

SCANDINAVIAN   GROUP 

The  fifteen  minor  European  powers  are  divided 
into  three  groups.  First  may  be  mentioned  the 
six  prosperous  and  independent  states  of  Sweden, 
Norway,  Denmark,  Holland,  Belgium,  and  Swit- 
zerland. The  three  Scandinavian  countries  have 
been  the  breeding  place  of  one  of  the  toughest 
wand  most  warlike  peoples  that  the  world  has  ever 
known.  The  Norsemen  conquered  England  and 


18  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

left  a  vigorous  strain  in  the  population  of  that 
island.  They  conquered  northern  France,  and 
Normandy  is  full  of  their  sons.  They  set  up  a 
kingdom  in  Sicily;  they  pushed  into  Russia. 
Sweden  for  a  long  time  held  large  territories  on 
the  south  coast  of  the  Baltic.  They  had  the 
enterprise  to  discover  America  in  the  year  1000, 
and  America  has  reciprocated  by  discovering  the 
strength  and  substance  in  those  people,  of  whom 
1,250,000  are  now  a  part  of  our  Commonwealth. 
They  have  lost  most  of  their  former  importance 
in  European  affairs  because  of  the  drift  into 
large  units ;  and  to-day  the  three  kingdoms  with 
313,000  square  miles  have  a  combined  population 
of  10,800,000  (Sweden  5,600,000;  Denmark, 
2,800,000;  Norway,  2,400,000),  and  would  be 
able  in  case  of  emergency  to  put  about  450,000 
men  on  a  war  footing.  Though  renowned  sailors 
for  thousands  of  years,  the  Scandinavian  coun- 
tries now  have  no  navies  which  would  be  a  serious 
makeweight  in  a  general  war;  but  their  coun- 
tries have  a  great  strategic  importance  because 
they  flank  the  Baltic  to  the  west,  and  because 
the  only  international  highway  from  that  great 
sea  out  to  the  greater  ocean  runs  through  a 
narrow  water,  The  Sound,  which  is  commanded 
by  their  batteries.  Hence  Germany  and  Rus- 
sia are  credited  with  coveting  both  Denmark  and 
Sweden;  and  before  this  great  war  broke  out  the 
Swedes  were  arming  against  the  possibility  of 


MINOR  POWERS  OF  EUROPE         19 

an  attack  from  the  eastward.  Though  Teutonic 
in  origin  and  therefore  first  cousins  to  the  Ger- 
mans, the  Norsemen  are  not  Germanic  and  have 
rivaled  and  fought  Germans  for  ages.  As  late 
as  1864  the  Prussians  proved  to  the  Danes  by 
the  resistless  logic  of  bayonets  that  Schleswig- 
Holstein  was  not  Danish  territory. 

HOLLAND   AND   BELGIUM 

Holland  and  Belgium  have  gone  through  an 
interesting  history.  As  the  Italian  cities  were 
the  center  of  the  southern  trade,  wealth,  and 
culture  during  the  Renaissance,  so  the  cities  of 
the  Low  Countries,  Bruges,  Ghent,  Antwerp,  and 
the  rest,  were  the  richest  and  most  intelligent 
and  artistic  part  of  the  north.  Manufactures 
and  commerce  brought  them  wealth.  A  system  of 
schools  open  to  a  considerable  part  of  the  boys, 
appeared  earlier  in  those  regions  than  anywhere 
else  in  Europe.  They  were  parts  of  the  Holy 
Roman  Empire.  The  Low  Dutch  language  was 
just  as  good,  and  for  a  long  time  had  as  much 
claim  as  High  Dutch  to  be  the  German  language. 
These  provinces  passed  to  Spain,  revolted  against 
Philip  II ;  and  seven  of  them,  of  which  Holland 
was  the  most  populous  and  wealthiest,  gathered 
into  a  confederation  (1579)  which  has  become 
the  modern  kingdom  of  Holland.  In  its  little 
area  of  12,600  square  miles  live  6,000,000  peo- 


20  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

pie,  who  have  been  among  the  happiest  folk  on 
earth.  The  country  is  fertile,  the  Dutch  are  good 
sailors;  but  the  secret  of  their  wealth  is  the 
possession  of  736,000  square  miles  of  East  Indian 
islands — Java,  Sumatra,  part  of  Borneo — which 
are  in  a  state  of  vassalage  not  very  far  from 
that  of  slavery. 

Politically  and  commercially  the  importance 
of  Holland  is  that  it  covers  the  mouths  of  the 
River  Rhine.  Rotterdam,  which  has  the  best  and 
most  accessible  harbor  on  the  whole  coast  of  the 
North  Sea,  except  perhaps  Antwerp,  is  an  entre- 
pot of  German  commerce.  Holland  is  a  wall  be- 
tween the  German  interior  and  the  coast,  forcing 
the  Germans  to  betake  themselves  to  the  harbors 
of  Bremen  and  Hamburg,  which  are  less  acces- 
sible from  the  sea  side  and  more  remote  from 
the  land  side,  than  Rotterdam.  The  Dutch,  who 
are  quite  aware  of  the  value  of  their  sea  front 
to  other  people,  have  been  making  an  effort  to 
fortify  their  frontiers  and  keep  up  an  army. 

With  their  war  strength  of  175,000  men  in 
Europe  and  their  little  navy  of  fourteen  second- 
class  vessels  Holland  could  not  defend  herself 
more  than  a  few  weeks  against  any  one  great 
enemy;  and  is  not,  like  Belgium,  protected  by 
treaties  of  neutralization  entered  into  by  the 
Great  Powers. 

Belgium  is  the  only  one  of  the  six  northern 
small  powers  which  has  been  a  party  to  the 


MINOR  POWERS  OF  EUROPE         21 

present  war,  and  its  experience  shows  how  little 
any  single  small  power  counts  in  the  tremendous 
combinations  of  the  twentieth  century.  Belgium, 
with  its  11,000  square  miles  and  its  population 
of  7,400,000,  is  one  of  the  most  thickly  settled 
areas  on  the  globe.  In  the  great  struggle  with 
Spain  three  centuries  ago  the  people  took  the 
Catholic  side  and  were  long  bottled  up  as  Spanish 
and  Austrian  provinces,  but  in  1831  they  were 
allowed  to  form  a  separate  kingdom,  and  since 
that  time  have  flourished.  They  have  quantities 
of  coal  and  are  excellent  iron-makers.  Their 
country  is  a  garden.  Their  late  King  Leopold, 
one  of  the  "undesirables"  of  modern  life,  con- 
trived to  make  himself  sovereign  of  an  enormous 
area  of  900,000  square  miles  on  the  Congo  where 
he  substantially  made  slaves  of  all  the  negro 
population  that  he  could  reach.  The,  Belgian 
nation  in  1908  shook  him  out  of  that  principality 
and  made  the  Congo  a  colony  of  the  kingdom. 
There  are  great  potentialities  in  this  equatorial 
river  region  and  it  would  be  a  lure  to  any  enemy 
of  Belgium. 

Belgium,  as  will  be  seen  further  on,  is  "neu- 
tralized" by  a  general  treaty;  but  it  is  especially 
protected  by  the  manifest  military  interest  of 
Great  Britain.  It  lies  opposite  the  British 
coast  and  is  closely  bound  up  with  Great  Britain 
in  trade  and  business.  The  royal  houses  of  the 
two  countries  are  akin.  The  presence  of  a  hostile 


22  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

or  unfriendly  power  on  that  coast  would  under 
all  circumstances  be  looked  upon  by  England 
as  a  menace,  and  in  1914  led  in  a  few  hours  to  a 
declaration  of  war  by  England.  Like  the  Dutch 
the  Belgians  tried  to  protect  their  frontier  with 
modern  fortifications,  which  proved  too  weak  for 
the  recent  inventions  in  siege  guns.  The  Belgian 
army  has  a  peace  strength  of  54,000  and  a  pos- 
sible war  strength  of  350,000,  and  they  have 
shown  that  though  a  small  country  can  no  longer 
protect  itself  against  the  attack  of  a  large  one,  it 
may  add  considerable  strength  to  an  alliance. 

SWITZERLAND 

The  sixth  little  country,  Switzerland,  is  one 
of  the  wonders  of  our  time.  Here  are  two  races, 
Latin  and  Germanic;  four  languages,  Italian, 
French,  German,  and  Romans  ch ;  twenty-five  little 
states  united  in  a  federation;  a  population  under 
4,000,000  on  an  area  of  16,000  square  miles, 
of  which  about  half  is  broken  mountains.  This  is 
the  most  democratic  of  all  European  countries, 
with  a  tradition  of  six  centuries  of  self-governing 
cantons.  The  Swiss  are  the  best  hotel-keepers  in 
the  world;  carry  on  a  profitable  dairy  industry 
drawn  from  pastures  above  the  snow;  and  are 
beginning  to  manufacture  on  a  large  scale.  No 
country  has  ever  shown  more  appreciation  of  the 
federal  government  of  the  United  States,  many 


MINOR  POWERS  OF  EUROPE         23 

elements   of  which  may  be  found  in  the   Swiss 
federal  constitution. 

The  Swiss  are  models  to  the  world  of  thrift, 
self-respect,  and  also  of  self-protection.  They 
have  devised  a  system  of  military  training  under 
which  every  able-bodied  young  man  serves  at  sev- 
eral intervals,  making  a  total  of  not  less  than 
six  months  under  the  colors.  The  result  is  that 
within  a  few  hours  of  the  outbreak  of  war  between 
Germany  and  France,  the  Swiss  had  200,000  men 
on  their  frontier,  every  one  used  to  marching, 
camping,  and  shooting  at  a  mark.  They  are 
backed  by  a  mountainous  country  which  in  all 
ages  has  been  easy  to  defend  by  a  few  who  knew 
the  ground,  against  an  invading  host;  and  they 
are  likely  to  go  through  the  war  without  sending 
a  man  across  the  border  or  seeing  a  hostile  sol- 
dier inside  their  lines. 

SPAIN   AND   PORTUGAL 

Two  other  small  powers  are  quite  out  of  the 
radius  of  the  war.  Spain  with  190,000  square 
miles,  a  population  of  20,000,000,  and  an  effi- 
cient war  strength  of  300,000,  has  long  since 
dropped  from  the  once  proud  position  of  the 
strongest  power  in  Europe.  Her  sympathies  are 
distinctly  with  France,  and  the  Spaniards  would 
probably  throw  themselves  into  the  fray  if  their 
great  Latin  neighbor  seemed  likely  to  be  downed. 


24  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

The  neighboring  republic  of  Portugal,  with  34,000 
square  miles  and  6,000,000  people,  has  for  sev- 
eral years  been  almost  torn  to  pieces  by  revolu- 
tions and  counter-revolutions.  So  far  as  it  has 
vitality  it  sides  with  England  as  an  ancient  friend. 
The  more  so  because  Portugal  has  nearly  a  mil- 
lion square  miles  in  Africa  and  finds  it  desirable  to 
take  cover  under  the  wing  of  the  British  naval 
power. 

BALKAN  STATES 

The  third  group  of  small  powers  comes  close 
to  the  present  crisis  because  the  alleged  cause 
of  war  arose  within  their  boundaries.  These  are 
the  seven  Balkan  states,  Rumania,  Bulgaria, 
Servia,  Montenegro,  Albania,  Greece,  and  Euro- 
pean Turkey.  Within  twenty-four  months  these 
states  have  been  grouped  in  three  different  com- 
binations and  a  fourth  seems  impending.  It  is 
therefore  not  necessary  to  consider  them  sepa- 
rately, except  to  point  out  some  differences  of 
situation  and  of  relations  with  the  neighboring 
large  powers.  There  is  no  unity  among  them, 
either  of  religion,  nationality  or  race;  and  every 
one  of  them  is  more  or  less  split  up  into  rival 
races.  Their  physical  make-up  is  about  as  given 
in  the  table  on  the  following  page. 

Another  Balkan  area,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina, 
is  Austrian  territory,  and  has  an  area  of  #0,000 
square  miles,  a  population  of  2,000,000 ;  a  normal 


MINOR  POWERS  OF  EUROPE         25 


State 

Area 

Population 

Normal 
War 
Strength 

Rumania  

53,000 

7,500,000 

350,000 

Bulgaria  '.  .  .  . 

43,000 

4,800,000 

300,000 

Servia 

34000 

4  500  000 

270  000 

Montenegro  

6,000 

500,000 

40,000 

Albania  

11,000 

800,000 

40,000 

Greece  . 

42000 

4  400  000 

250  000 

Turkey  

11,000 

2,000,000 

100,000  ' 

Total 

200,000 

24,500,000 

1  350  000 

war  strength  of  100,000;  and  650,000  Slavs  in 
Dalmatia,  which  is  part  of  the  coast  of  the  Balkan 
area. 

Here  are  about  26,000,000  people  occupying 
a  region  which  ought  to  be  a  geographic  unity. 
The  commercial  situation  is  unique,  for  the  Bal- 
kans front  on  the  Black  Sea,  the  ^Egean  Sea, 
the  Adriatic  Sea,  and  the  great  navigable  Danube. 
The  Balkans  are  also  on  the  only  land  route 
between  central  Europe  and  Asia  Minor,  and 
that  is  the  inevitable  line  of  a  continuous  rail- 
way system  stretching  from  the  coast  of  the  North 
Sea  to  the  coast  of  the  Yellow  Sea  in  China. 

The  Rumanians  think  of  themselves  as  a  Latin 
race  and  the  Bulgarians  as  an  Asiatic  race,  al- 
though there  seems  little  doubt  that  the  main 
constituent  in  both  cases  is  Slavic.  In  all  these 


26  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

countries,  taken  together,  the  Turks  are  2,000,- 
000  in  number,  the  Greeks  are  4,000,000,  and 
the  Albanians  some  1,200,000,  leaving  a  total  of 
Balkan  Slavs  (if  all  Bulgarians  and  Rumanians 
are  included)  of  17,000,000. 

The  military  strength  of  this  population  is 
tolerably  well  known  through  the  wars  of  1912 
and  1913  in  which  every  one  of  these  powers  was 
engaged  and  most  of  them  twice  over.  With  the 
exception  of  Rumania,  which  has  valuable  oil 
fields,  they  are  all  agricultural  countries  with  lit- 
tle mining,  manufacturing  or  shipping.  The 
women  are  accustomed  at  all  times  to  work  in  the 
fields,  and  with  the  aid  of  the  children  and  old 
men  can  summon  the  fortitude  to  raise  a  crop  and 
harvest  it.  Hence,  it  is  possible  to  put  into  the 
field  ten  per  cent  of  the  whole  population  for 
short  campaigns.  All  the  armies  actually  en- 
gaged, whether  Servian,  Bulgarian,  Montenegrin, 
or  Greek,  have  shown  a  capacity  for  long 
marches,  hard  sieges  and  tough  fighting.  It  is 
perfectly  clear  that  if  all  the  Balkan  powers,  or 
the  Balkan  powers  south  of  the  Danube,  had 
hung  together  after  the  first  Balkan  War  of 
1912-1913,  that  Austria-Hungary  would  never 
have  dreamed  of  stirring  up  a  hornets'  nest  down 
there.  A  Balkan  confederation  which  could  hang 
together  ten  years  would  have  a  great  effect  on 
European  politics,  by  its  ability  to  defend  itself 
and  settle  its  own  problems. 


MINOR  POWERS  OF  EUROPE         27 

A  special  weakness  in  the  Balkan  situation  is 
the  anarchy  in  Albania,  a  so-called  country  which 
is  no  country.  There  are  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  Albanians,  speaking  one  Albanian  language; 
but  there  never  has  been  an  Albanian  country,  an 
Albanian  government,  an  Albanian  literature,  an 
Albanian  national  spirit.  The  so-called  Albania 
is  filled  with  tribes  as  kindly  to  each  other  as  the 
Highland  clans  of  Scotland  in  old  days.  Albania 
is  a  dead  weight  upon  every  effort  to  settle  the 
Balkans.  Another  weak  spot  is  Turkey,  which 
will  be  considered  further  on  as  an  Asiatic  power. 


CHAPTER    III 

THE    SIX    GREAT    POWERS 
ITALY 

OF  the  six  great  powers  the  smallest  in 
population  and  resources  at  present  is 
Italy,  though  that  country  has  passed 
through  the  most  spectacular  history  in  human 
annals.  In  ancient  conditions  southern  Italy  was 
the  geographical  center  of  the  world  for  trade, 
for  war,  and  for  government.  It  was  occupied 
by  a  great  people  who  maintained  the  Roman 
civilization  and  with  it  encircled  the  Mediterra- 
nean Sea  during  seven  eventful  centuries.  The 
fall  of  the  Roman  Empire  is  a  thing  for  us  mod- 
erns to  take  to  heart,  for  it  meant  that  the 
highest  science  and  most  powerful  organization 
of  those  times  was  unavailing  against  the  crush 
of  crude  but  daring  numbers.  Italy,  which  had 
been  the  richest  and  safest  country  in  the  world 
became  the  prey  of  Western  barbarians  who 
sacked  the  cities,  burned  the  fleets,  threw  down 
the  aqueducts,  uprooted  the  government,  and 

28 


THE  SIX  GREAT  POWERS  29 

killed  a  large  part  of  the  population.  It  took 
fourteen  centuries  to  bring  back  to  the  peninsula 
a  common  Italian  nationality,  and  the  physical 
ability  to  defend  itself. 

That  work  was  finished  only  the  other  day; 
for  it  was  in  1870  when  the  kingdom  of  Italy  was 
completed  and  the  capital  was  removed  to  Rome. 
The  present  .population  of  Italy  is  35,000,000, 
living  on  110,000  square  miles  of  territory  to 
which  should  be  added  the  406,000  square  miles 
of  the  new  colony  of  Tripoli  with  530,000  inhab- 
itants. Italy  has  an  army  based  on  universal 
service  after  the  German  model;  but  it  has  had 
no  recent  test  except  the  conquest  of  Tripoli  in 
1912.  The  normal  war  strength  is  about  700,000. 

In  addition  Italy  has  a  navy  which  twenty-five 
years  ago  was  a  factor  in  international  ques- 
tions, and  on  which  it  has  recently  been  spend- 
ing about  $40,000,000  a  year.  Navies  are  now 
reckoned  in  terms  of  "dreadnoughts,"  after  an 
ironclad  completed  by  England  in  1906  of  a  size 
and  power  never  before  reached.  Vessels  of  that 
type  or  larger  are  "dreadnoughts"  or  "super- 
dreadnoughts."  The  previous  type  of  battleship 
is  a  "pre-dreadnought"  or  a  second-class  ship; 
and  they  are  still  available  for  fleet  operations, 
as  are  new-model  torpedo-boats,  "destroyers"  and 
submarines.  Below  the  pre-dreadnoughts  all  bat- 
tleships are  antiquated  and  worthless  for  fleet 
operations,  and  may  be  left  out  of  account  in 


30  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

taking  stock  of  the  forces  of  the  various  nations. 
When,  therefore,  it  is  said  that  Italy  possesses 
six  dreadnoughts  and  twenty  second-class  cruis- 
ers, it  is  shown  to  be  a  respectable  naval  ally; 
and  the  possession  of  that  navy  made  it  possi- 
ble to  occupy  Tripoli  and  to  compel  Turkey  not 
only  to  yield  her  slender  claims  on  that  province, 
but  to  give  up  the  Greek  Islands. 

Although  without  coal,  Italy  has  considerable 
manufactures  and  the  Italians  have  revived  their 
ancient  shipping  trade.  They  are  good  ship- 
builders and  good  sailors,  and  their  vessels  are 
found  on  every  sea.  It  is  rather  a  poor  country 
in  comparison  with  some  of  its  neighbors,  the 
public  revenue  being  under  $600,000,000,  or  about 
$16  per  capita.  In  addition  there  are  heavy 
provincial  and  municipal  taxes  and  it  is  esti- 
mated that  more  than  a  fourth  of  the  annual  in- 
come of  the  nation  goes  into  the  public  treasury. 
The  debt  of  $2,800,000,000,  or  about  four  and  a 
half  years'  income,  is  out  of  proportion  to  the 
means  of  the  country,  especially  since  Italy  has 
been  engaged  in  no  European  war  since  1866. 

FRANCE 

Next  in  order  of  population  is  France,  the 
very  name  of  which,  curiously  enough,  is  German, 
for  the  Franks  whp  pushed  into  what  is  now 
northern  France  were  first  cousins  of  the  Saxons 


THE  SIX, GREAT  POWERS  81 

and  the  Lombards.  French  novelists  still  like  to 
make  out  that  the  Gascons  of  southern  France 
are  of  a  different  intellectual  strain  from  their 
northern  co-citizens ;  but  there  is  no  country  in 
Europe  in  which  there  are  fewer  visible  race  and 
national  strains  than  in  France.  Gauls,  Romans, 
Teutons,  and  Normans  have  been  fused  into  one 
French  race.  Except  for  a  few  insignificant 
corners  of  the  country,  nothing  but  French  is 
heard.  Proven9al  and  "Felibrism"  are  rather 
gentle  sports,  somewhat  like  composing  modern 
ballads  in  the  Scotch  of  Robert  Burns.  Few  edu- 
cated Frenchmen  readily  speak  any  other  modern 
language. 

The  defeat  of  1870-71  by  the  Prussians  sobered 
and  solidified  the  country.  There  has  been  an 
internal  strife  between  the  Clericals  and  the  gov- 
ernors of  the  Roman  Church;  and  another  be- 
tween Socialists  and  capitalists.  When  it  comes 
to  a  great  crisis  like  the  present  one,  France  is 
a  unit:  there  are  no  longer  parties  or  factions. 
That  defeat  forced  France  to  provide  a  wonder- 
ful system  of  public  schools,  well  ordered,  and 
very  effective:  the  present  illiteracy  is  only  4 
per  cent.  The  defeat  also  led  to  a  military  prepa- 
ration almost  beyond  the  ability  of  the  country 
to  bear.  A  part  of  the  army  has  been  used  in 
colonial  wars  and  for  colonial  garrisons ;  on  the 
other  hand  the  African  provinces  furnish  black 
troops. 


32  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

On  207,000  square  miles  of  territory  lives  a 
population  of  40,000,000.  The  peace  strength 
of  the  army  is  570,000;  its  formal  war  strength 
about  1,400,000;  and  its  uttermost  strength 
probably  about  seven  per  cent  of  the  population, 
which  would  make  3,000,000  soldiers  in  arms  for 
a  short  time.  The  French  navy  was  not  many 
years  ago  second  only  to  the  British  but  it  has 
failed  to  keep  up  with  the  advance  of  other 
countries.  It  includes  nine  super-dreadnoughts 
and  dreadnoughts,  and  about  twenty  second-class 
ships.  France  has  made  a  desperate  effort  to  pro- 
tect the  frontiers  with  heavy  forts ;  but  had  not 
yet  come  to  the  point  of  carrying  the  system 
northward  along  the  frontier  of  Belgium  to  the 
sea. 

Commercially  and  financially  France  is  one 
of  the  strongest  countries  in  the  world.  Besides 
31,000  miles  of  railway  there  are  10,000  miles 
of  canals  and  navigable  rivers.  The  merchant 
marine  has  a  tonnage  of  1,500,000.  The  exports 
are  about  1,200  million  dollars ;  and  the  imports 
1,600  millions,  part  of  the  difference  being  paid 
in  the  form  of  interest  on  French  loans  to  other 
countries.  The  mine  products  are  worth  150 
millions  and  the  total  manufactures  are  not  far 
from  2,000  millions. 

The  French  people  are  notably  thrifty;  and 
a  few  years  after  the  "debacle"  of  the  Prussian 
war  of  1871,  paid  their  war  indemnity  of  1,000 


THE  SIX  GREAT  POWERS  33 

million  dollars,  and  began  to  save  again.  The 
country  is  heavily  taxed — about  700  million  dol- 
lars a  year ;  and  the  debt  is  fearful,  6,576  million 
dollars,  or  ten  years'  national  income,  and  steadily 
increasing  in  time  of  peace  when  this  war  broke 
out.  Against  this  burden  is  placed  the  French 
industry,  inventiveness  and  artistic  taste  which 
give  to  the  country  leadership  in  many  lines  of 
trade,  and  a  most  intense  national  spirit. 

France  possesses  colonies  with  the  prodigious 
area  of  4,500,000  square  miles,  and  a  population 
of  41,000,000,  of  which  only  a  few  thousand  are 
French.  These  colonies  include  Algeria,  Tunis 
and  Morocco;  large  and  not  immediately  valua- 
ble tracts  in  tropical  Africa ;  French  Indo-China ; 
and  a  few  small  posts  and  settlements.  So  far 
more  French  money  has  gone  into  these  colonies 
than  has  come  out. 

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

In  striking  contrast  with  the  two  highly  cen- 
tralized and  unified  countries  just  described  is 
the  Empire  of  Austria-Hungary.  On  paper  it 
bulks  large;  its  territory  is  261,000  square  miles; 
its  population  about  52,000,000.  It  is  a  central 
empire,  for  its  boundaries  touch  those  of  Russia, 
Germany,  Switzerland,  Italy,  Montenegro,  Servia, 
and  Rumania.  It  has  a  proud  history  of  victory 
over  eastern  and  less  civilized  neighbors,  and  has 


34  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

administered  a  great  empire  for  many  centuries. 
Its  capitals,  Vienna  and  Budapest,  are  among  the 
most  splendid  of  modern  cities.  The  Emperor, 
who  is  also  the  Archduke  of  Austria  and  Apos- 
tolic King  of  Hungary,  is  head  of  the  imperial 
family  of  Hapsburg,  which  for  about  five  hun- 
dred years  included  the  Emperor  of  the  Holy 
Roman  Empire,  the  leading  figure  among  all 
German  states,  whether  within  or  without  his 
domains.  Austria  was  repeatedly  the  foe  of  Na- 
poleon, and  was  one  of  the  alliance  which  at  last 
overwhelmed  him.  From  his  fall  in  1815  to  1859, 
Austria,  though  never  at  war  with  any  of  her 
great  neighbors,  was  the  leading  power  in  eastern 
Europe. 

When  the  make-up  of  the  Empire  is  examined, 
its  many  elements  of  weakness  will  at  once  be 
seen.  It  includes  half  a  score  different  races, 
and  four  religious  confessions.  In  intelligence 
and  education  it  is  far  behind  its  western  neigh- 
bors :  the  illiteracy  in  Austria  is  26  per  cent  and 
in  Hungary  41  per  cent.  A  fundamental  weak- 
ness of  the  Empire  is  that  it  is  divided  into 
two  rival  halves,  the  boundary  between  which  is 
the  River  Leitha  which  enters  into  the  Danube 
just  above  Pressburg.  They  are  often  called  Aus- 
tria and  Hungary,  from  the  principal  court  in 
each.  More  correct  terms  are  for  the  western 
half  "Cis-Leithia"  and  for  the  eastern  half 
"Trans-Leithia,"  each  including  all  the  provinces 


THE  SIX  GREAT  POWERS  35 

in  its  part  of  the  Empire,  which  as  a  whole  is  com- 
monly called  The  Dual  Monarchy.  The  western 
half  is  further  subdivided  into  seventeen  provinces, 
each  with  its  Diet,  such  as  Upper  Austria,  the 
Kingdom  of  Bohemia,  the  Duchy  of  Tyrol,  and  so 
on.  Trans-Leithia  is  subdivided  into  two  prov- 
inces of  which  the  Apostolic  Kingdom  of  Hungary 
is  the  most  populous. 

Here  are  all  the  materials  for  a  federal 
government:  a  central  authority  based  on  nine- 
teen provinces  besides  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina, 
each  with  its  own  legislature;  and  a  central  gov- 
ernment. There  is,  however,  no  federal  govern- 
ment; first  because  it  would  break  up  the  dual 
arrangement  which  is  a  concession  to  the  pride 
of  the  Hungarians ;  secondly,  because  it  would 
take  the  numerous  Slav  provinces  out  from  under 
the  control  of  Austria  or  of  Hungary  and  give 
them  an  opportunity  to  combine  their  forces  in 
a  common  congress. 

On  paper  Austria-Hungary  is  rich  and  power- 
ful. The  total  governmental  revenues  for  local, 
provincial,  Hungarian,  Austrian,  and  general  pur- 
poses are  about  1,100  million  dollars  a  year,  a 
per  capita  of  about  $21 ;  the  debt  was,  at  the 
beginning  of  this  war,  3,800  million  dollars,  or 
almost  three  and  a  half  years'  income.  The  steam 
tonnage  was  560,000,  for  Austria  has  a  large 
carrying  trade  in  the  Mediterranean,  to  the 
Orient,  and  to  New  York.  The  Austrians  are 


36  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

great  road  builders,  as  is  shown  by  their  29,000 
miles  of  railroad  and  8,000  miles  of  canals  and 
navigable  rivers.  The  imports  are  about  680  mil- 
lions a  year  and  the  exports  550  millions,  the  dif- 
ference being  partly  freight  money  and  probably 
in  part  an  increase  of  private  debt.  Austria  has 
coal  and  some  iron  and  its  mines  bring  it  in  100 
million  dollars  a  year.  The  Austrians,  especially 
the  Bohemians,  are  excellent  business  men,  com- 
petent to  manage  large  enterprises ;  but  there  is 
a  rift  between  the  two  sections,  because  the  Aus- 
trian side  has  the  only  good  fuel  and  contains 
most  of  the  manufactures,  leaving  the  Hungarian 
side  chiefly  agricultural.  Austria  is  the  only 
great  European  power  which  has  no  colonies. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  army  has  a  nominal 
peace  strength  of  312,000,  which  is  only  about 
half  as  great  as  in  France  and  Germany,  and  a 
formal  war  strength  of  900,000.  The  army 
looks  good  to  the  outsider;  the  men  are  well  set 
up,  the  officers  trim  and  soldierly.  The  Emperor 
is  a  military  figure,  the  spirit  and  traditions  of 
the  people  are  warlike.  Nevertheless  the  Aus- 
trians have  been  beaten  whenever  they  have  gone 
to  war  in  the  last  half -century.  In  1848  the 
Hungarians  successfully  revolted  and  were  only 
subdued  by  the  aid  of  Russian  troops.  In  1859 
the  French  and  Sardinians  defeated  the  Austrians 
at  Solferino  in  North  Italy ;  in  1866  the  Prussians 
took  only  one  month  to  crush  the  Austrians  at 


THE  SIX  GREAT  POWERS  37 

Koniggratz.  In  the  campaigns  of  1914  the  Aus- 
trians,  perhaps  for  reasons  that  cast  no  dis- 
credit on  their  military  spirit  and  organization, 
were  beaten  in  early  battles  by  the  Servians  and 
the  Russians. 

An  element  of  weakness  which  has  affected  all 
these  contests  is  the  make-up  of  an  army  in  which 
there  are  more  Slavs  than  all  other  races  put  to- 
gether. The  Austrian  policy  for  many  years  was 
to  hold  down  Hungary  with  Italian  regiments  and 
Italy  with  Hungarian  regiments;  and  now  the 
forces  are  probably  so  disposed  that  Austro- 
Servians  are  not  set  to  fight  their  blood  brethren 
from  the  Balkans.  As  a  tactical  unit,  however, 
the  Austrian  army  is  much  less  to  be  taken  into 
account  than  the  French,  German,  or  Russian. 
The  navy  is  very  small,  with  only  three  first-class 
ships  and  fifteen  of  the  second  class;  since  the 
only  seaports  are  Trieste  and  Dalmatia  there  is 
little  chance  for  naval  operations  in  the  open 
sea. 

GREAT    BRITAIN 

As  one  of  the  warring  powers,  Great  Britain 
has  had  until  1914  the  double  advantage  of  being 
an  island  and  of  possessing  the  most  powerful 
navy  in  the  world.  Von  Moltke,  the  great  German 
tactician,  is  said  to  have  said  that  he  had  worked 
out  three  different  plans  for  invading  England, 
but  none  for  getting  out  again.  The  distance 


38  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

across  the  channel  is  so  short  that  if  an  army 
could  be  got  on  board  transports  lying  off  the 
Belgian,  French  or  Dutch  coast  at  nine  o'clock 
at  night,  it  could  be  disembarked  on  the  English 
coast  at  daylight  the  next  morning.  What  are 
the  material  resources  which  can  protect  Eng- 
land from  this  danger  of  a  sudden  crushing  in- 
vasion ? 

The  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  is 
smaller  than  any  of  the  Continental  powers  ex- 
cept Italy.  It  contains  only  120,000  square  miles, 
inhabited  by  46,000,000  people.  The  wealth  of 
Great  Britain  is  its  combination  of  manufactures 
and  commerce.  Its  mines  produce  260  million 
dollars  a  year.  It  exports  2,000  millions  a  year 
of  manufactured  goods  and  about  1,500  millions 
more  of  other  products.  The  total  imports  are 
4,200  millions.  To  carry  this  total  commerce  of 
7,700  millions  it  has  11  million  tons  of  steam 
vessels  and  another  million  of  sailing  vessels.  Its 
enormous  capital  is  invested  all  over  the  globe; 
and  though  the  French  are  considered  to  be  the 
richest  European  nation,  the  British  are  the 
busiest  and  the  most  generally  prosperous.  The 
annual  income  of  the  home  government  is  about 
1,000  million  dollars  a  year,  or  about  $21  per 
capita.  The  national  debt  up  to  1914  was  3,500 
millions,  or  three  and  a  half  years'  income. 

In  addition  to  its  home  wealth  England  rules 
the  greatest  colonial  empire  in  the  world,  occupy- 


THE  SIX  GREAT  POWERS  39 

ing  11  million  square  miles  of  the  earth's  surface, 
with  a  population  of  400  million  human  beings, 
of  whom  only  15  millions  are  European.  This 
empire  includes  the  semi-continent  of  Australia, 
the  great  stretch  of  Canada,  and  vast  areas  in 
Asia  and  Africa. 

In  military  strength  Great  Britain  is  far  be- 
hind the  continental  powers.  The  regular  army 
includes  less  than  £00,000  men,  of  whom  half  are 
in  the  colonies ;  its  so-called  war  strength  is  800,- 
000,  the  greater  part  of  which  are,  however,  raw 
levies  entirely  unused  to  war.  At  its  utmost  need 
the  United  Kingdom  could  perhaps  call  out  for 
defense  from  invasion  another  million  of  green 
troops.  In  September,  1914,  the  war  office  inti- 
mated that  it  expected  to  put  1,500,000  men  in 
the  field  within  twelve  months. 

Nevertheless  the  British  navy  makes  Great 
Britain  a  great  and  immediate  military  power. 
Its  first-class  ships,  dreadnoughts  or  better,  were 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war  31,  against  21  similar 
German  ships;  the  second-class  ships  were  90 
against  38  for  the  Germans.  The  naval  war 
strength  is  130,000  men.  Not  only  is  the  navy 
large;  it  has  behind  it  the  traditions  and  experi- 
ence of  centuries  of  sea  power;  and  during  the 
first  weeks  of  the  war  it  almost  bottled  up  the 
Germans.  England  also  succeeded  in  protecting 
her  commerce  through  the  Mediterranean  and 
Suez  Canal  and  across  the  Atlantic,  and  was  able 


40  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

to  bring  thousands  of  native  East  Indian  troops 
to  reinforce  her  army  fighting  in  France. 

RUSSIA 

Russia  has  for  centuries  been  a  reservoir  of 
compressed  political  gas,  pushing  in  every  direc- 
tion for  an  outlet.  When  Peter  the  Great  came 
to  the  throne  two  centuries  ago  the  Germans 
and  Swedes  almost  shut  him  out  of  the  Baltic, 
and  the  Tartars  cut  him  off  from  the  Black  Sea. 
War  after  war  was  necessary  to  gain  free  access 
to  those  waters.  Meanwhile  the  Russians  pushed 
eastward  through  the  almost  unpopulated  area 
of  north  Asia,  until  they  reached  the  Pacific.  The 
Black  Sea  is  only  a  station  on  the  way  to  the 
world's  open  waters,  and  the  obvious  line  of 
approach  for  Russia  is  through  the  Bosphorus 
and  the  ^Egean  Sea  to  the  Mediterranean. 

Notwithstanding  these  geographical  disadvan- 
tages, Russia  is  an  immense  and  growing  Empire. 
The  area  in  Europe  is  2,100,000  square  miles, 
with  a  population  of  144  millions.  Beyond  the 
Urals  Russia  holds  over  6,000,000  square  miles 
with  an  additional  population  of  27,000,000. 
Russia  boasts  control  of  the  largest  number  of 
Europeans  that  have  been  held  under  one  sway 
since  the  fall  of  the  Roman  Empire. 

The  country  is  in  many  ways  poor.  Its  in- 
come of  1,500  million  dollars  is  only  about  $9 


THE  SIX  GREAT  POWERS  41 

per  capita.  The  national  debt  of  4,500  million 
dollars  is  not  far  from  three  years'  income.  These 
immense  sums  are  possible  because  of  the  great 
numbers  of  people,  each  of  whom  can  contribute 
a  little.  European  Russia  is  two-thirds  the 
size  of  the  United  States  and  has  about  38,000 
miles  of  railroad  against  250,000  in  this  country. 
The  imports  have  been  about  650  million  dollars 
and  the  accession  of  Czar  Peter,  who  admired 
a  sixth  of  the  foreign  commerce  of  Great  Britain. 
Mining  and  manufactures  are  little  developed. 
The  steam  tonnage  is  only  500,000. 

As  a  fighting  machine  Russia  is  much  less  effi- 
cient than  most  other  European  countries  because 
the  country  has  relatively  few  railroads  and  good 
highways ;  and  the  people  are  on  a  low  intellectual 
plane,  the  percentage  of  illiteracy  being  at  least 
50  per  cent.  This  is  not  simply  because  they 
are  Slavs,  for  out  of  the  144  millions,  only  about 
108  millions  are  Slavs.  It  is  because  of  a  gen- 
eral low  state  of  social  and  political  development. 
Nevertheless,  the  Russian  army  has  good  fighting 
material,  though  the  officers  are  too  few  for  the 
troops,  and  are  generally  considered  inferior  in 
fiber  and  training  to  the  Germans  and  Austrians.. 

Russian  wars  have  been  very  numerous,  but 
it  is  a  significant  fact  that  since  1762,  when  the 
Russian  army  was  fighting  Frederick  the  Great 
and  the  accession  of  Czar  Peter,  who  admired 
Frederick,  suddenly  changed  Prussia's  enemy  into 


4g  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

an  ally,  there  has  been  no  war  between  Germany 
and  Russia.  They  fought  as  allies  against  Na- 
poleon. Bismarck  contrived  a  three-Emperor 
alliance  in  1872,  in  which  the  various  sorts  of 
eagles  learned  to  nest  together  for  the  time.  Fur- 
ther, previous  to  1914  no  serious  hostilities  ever 
arose  between  Russia  and  Austria,  in  the  whole 
history  of  both  countries. 

The  military  strength  of  the  Empire  is  hard 
to  estimate  because  the  army  has  been  under- 
going changes  since  the  defeat  by  the  Japanese 
in  1905.  The  peace  strength  is  stated  at  1,200,- 
000,  which  is  about  twice  that  of  any  other  nation. 
The  war  strength  is  loosely  set  down  at  5,500,000. 
The  number  of  men  actually  available  is  larger 
than  in  most  countries  because  Russian  levies  for 
war  do  not  break  up  ordinary  occupations. 
When  Germany  or  Austria  mobilizes,  many  in- 
dustries stop  on  a  few  hours'  notice.  In  Russia, 
just  as  in  the  Balkans,  the  fields  can  be  tilled  for 
a  season  or  two  even  though  great  numbers  of 
men  be  taken  away.  Russia  might  for  a  few 
months  turn  ten  per  cent  of  its  population  into 
soldiers,  as  Servia  and  Bulgaria  did  in  1913, 
without  commercial  ruin.  That  would  make  14,- 
000,000  soldiers;  but  nobody  has  ever  devised 
transportation  or  commissariat  for  such  hordes. 
Nevertheless  a  fraction  of  the  population,  aggre- 
gating 6,000,000,  could  be  raised  and  yet  would 
leave  96  per  cent  of  the  people  at  home.  If  an 


THE  SIX  GREAT  POWERS  43 

army  of  a  million  were  destroyed,  another  million 
to  replace  it  would  only  be  about  three  per  cent 
of  the  able-bodied  males.  In  addition  Russia  con- 
tains a  population  of  27,000,000  in  Asia. 

Two  Russian  fleets  were  destroyed  by  the 
Japanese  ten  years  ago.  The  Russian  navy 
was  in  process  of  reconstruction  when  the  war 
came  on  but  had  not  gone  far,  for  Russia  counts 
only  about  four  dreadnoughts  and  sixteen  second- 
class  ships.  Even  a  larger  force  would  be  of  little 
service  bottled  up  in  the  Baltic  or  Black  Sea. 
Though  John  Paul  Jones  was  once  Admiral  in 
the  Russian  navy,  that  arm  of  the  service  has 
never  distinguished  itself. 

In  land  war  Russia  is  the  only  European  coun- 
try that  cannot  be  penetrated  by  any  force  that 
is  likely  to  be  brought  against  it.  Napoleon's 
Grand  Army  of  550,000  men,  probably  the  most 
tremendous  that  up  to  that  time  had  ever  been 
brought  under  one  command,  was  defeated  by  the 
three  great  military  geniuses,  General  Frost,  Gen- 
eral Famine,  and  General  Kutusoff.  The  Allies 
in  the  Crimean  War  never  carried  their  invasion 
out  of  sight  of  salt  water.  In  the  present  war 
the  Germans  and  Austrians  for  a  time  occupied 
part  of  Russian  Poland,  but  were  pushed  back 
when  the  main  Russian  army  came  up.  This 
double  quality  of  a  country  almost  impervious  to 
invasion,  which  at  the  same  time  can  pour  out 
almost  an  indefinite  number  of  men  for  offense, 


44  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

gives  Russia  a  power  in  war  and  a  weight  in 
European  councils  which  has  not  yet  been  put  to 
its  full  proof. 

GERMANY 

By  common  consent  the  greatest  military  power 
in  Europe  is  Germany.  The  area  of  209,000 
square  miles  is  almost  exactly  equal  to  France; 
but  though  Germany  is  inferior  to  France  in 
natural  fertility  it  harbors  a  population  of 
65,000,000.  In  its  colonies,  which  are  chiefly 
African,  the  1,000,000  square  miles  contain 
12,000,000  negroes  and  only  24,000  white  people. 
Germany  by  its  magnificent  system  of  common 
schools  has  banished  illiteracy:  99  per  cent  of 
the  people  above  ten  years  of  age  can  both  read 
and  write.  Probably  as  many  as  two  or  three 
million  Germans  know  some  other  language  than 
their  own.  *  No  country  has  ever  yet  succeeded  like 
Germany  in  adapting  science  to  the  arts  both  of 
peace  and  of  war.  The  Germans  are  wonderful 
chemists,  great  manufacturers,  fine  shipbuilders; 
and  their  Krupp  guns,  their  dirigibles,  their  ex- 
plosives, are  unrivaled. 

The  country  has  a  magnificent  system  of  rail- 
roads and  canals  and  a  splendid  merchant  marine. 
It  contains  38,000  miles  of  railroad  and  over 
8,000  miles  of  canals  and  navigable  rivers.  The 
Kiel  Canal  from  the  Baltic  to  the  North  Sea 
gives  it  a  water  connection  within  its  own  boun- 


THE  SIX  GREAT  POWERS  45 

daries  which  enables  it  to  use  its  fleet  either 
in  the  east  or  the  west  at  its  will.  Prussia  was 
always  a  frugal  nation  and  Germany  has  had  a 
similar  reputation,  but  the  national  expenditure 
is  not  far  from  1,000  millions  a  year,  which  is 
about  $15  per  capita.  The  public  debt  is  for 
the  Empire  about  1,000  million  dollars  and  for 
the  states  and  cities  4,000  millions  more.  Ever 
since  the  war  with  France  in  1871  Germany  has 
kept  a  part  of  the  thousand  million  dollars,  ex- 
acted from  France  as  an  indemnity,  as  a  special 
military  war  chest;  and  it  is  probably  now  in 
use. 

The  foundations  of  Germany's  intellectual 
greatness  go  back  to  the  German  Renaissance 
which  included  the  Reformation,  but  the  country 
suffered  terribly  from  the  Thirty  Years'  War. 
In  1618  there  were  30,000,000  Germans,  who  in- 
habited perhaps  the  most  prosperous  and  en- 
lightened country  in  the  world,  abounding  in 
castles,  monasteries,  cathedrals,  cities,  pictures, 
and  statues.  In  1648  only  12,000,000  Germans 
were  left  from  the  slaughter  of  soldiers,  the  fear- 
ful harrying  of  the  country  people,  and  the  de- 
struction of  proud  cities  such  as  Magdeburg.  It 
was  two  centuries  before  Germany  came  back  to 
a  population  of  30,000,000,  and  out  of  poverty 
and  barrenness  began  to  build  up  a  new  world 
of  thought.  The  Germans  were  the  first  modern 
European  country  to  organize  university  instruc- 


f 


46  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

tion  on  the  basis  of  a  select  and  expert  body  of 
professors  and  freedom  of  choice  of  their  studies 
by  the  students.  Goethe  lamented  that  the  Ger- 
mans should  be  so  strong  in  mind  and  yet  so 
wretched  for  lack  of  a  national  existence. 

Bismarck  and  King  William  I  created  the  na- 
tion by  their  genius,  and  founded  the  German 
Empire  in  1871  on  a  military  system.  There  is 
now  hardly  an  able-bodied  man  in  Germany  old 
enough  to  shoulder  a  musket,  who  has  not  served 
for  a  few  months  or  a  year  or  two  as  a  soldier, 
living  in  barracks,  and  carrying  his  rifle  and 
knapsack,  exercising,  sweating,  marching  and 
maneuvering. 

The  number  of  men  called  up  has  been  in- 
creased till  the  peace  strength  was  officially 
stated  at  790,000  and  the  war  strength  at 
1,900,000.  The  Landwehr,  who  are  men  in  the 
prime  of  life,  at  once  raise  the  available  men 
when  war  breaks  out  to  about  4,000,000,  which 
is  6  per  cent  of  the  total  population.  The 
Landsturm,  of  still  older  men,  would,  in  a  pinch, 
increase  the  force  available  for  defense  against 
invasion  to  5,000,000  or  even  6,000,000,  includ- 
ing volunteers  not  liable  for  service,  and  tem- 
porary levies. 

Those  are  almost  impossible  figures,  because 
Germany  does  not  live  entirely  off  her  own  land, 
but  like  England  has  a  great  manufacturing  pop- 
ulation which  draws  part  of  its  food  supply  from 


THE  SIX  GREAT  POWERS  47 

outside.  To  draft  10  per  cent  of  the  popula- 
tion into  the  army  would  mean  such  a  dislocation 
of  the  whole  social  and  business  system  that,  if 
continued  more  than  a  few  weeks,  it  would  spell 
commercial  ruin.  6,000,000  men  are  not  much 
below  half  the  German  men  between  17  and  45. 

The  intellectual  and  military  development  of 
Germany  is  no  more  wonderful  than  its  extraor- 
dinary development  in  manufactures  and  com- 
merce. In  1913  Germany  was  exporting  2,500 
million  dollars'  worth  of  products  of  which  about 
1,500  million  were  manufactures ;  and  was  im- 
porting nearly  3,000  million  dollars'  worth,  a 
total  foreign  trade  almost  two-thirds  as  large  as 
Great  Britain's.  To  help  carry  this  enormous 
commerce  Germany  owned  3,000,000  tons  of  ship- 
ping, nearly  all  steam  vessels,  which  made  it  the 
second  commercial  power  in  the  world,  next  to, 
although  only  one-fourth  as  large  as,  Great 
Britain.  The  mines  of  Germany  produced  600 
million  dollars  a  year.  The  wealth  from  these 
colossal  transactions  has  flowed  into  banks  and 
financial  institutions  of  every  kind:  it  was  shown 
in  the  rapid  growth  of  beautiful  cities;  in  mag- 
nificent highways;  in  great  railway  stations  and 
bridges  and  tunnels;  in  the  colossal  subscription 
to  government  loans  in  1914.  In  thirty  years  the 
country  has  been  changed  from  an  agricultural 
nation  with  some  manufacturing  and  shipping  in- 
terests, to  a  commercial  nation  which  rivaled  and 


48  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

pushed  Great  Britain  in  all  quarters  of  the  globe. 
The  present  German  Emperor  nearly  twenty 
years  ago  became  a  convert  to  the  idea  that  a 
German  navy  must  be  created  to  protect  and  fos- 
ter German  colonies  and  German  trade.  He 
seems  to  have  been  influenced  by  that  remarkable 
book,  Admiral  Mahan's  "Sea  Power,"  of  which 
the  central  thought  was  that  in  time  of  war  the 
object  of  naval  operations  is  to  destroy  the  main 
fleet  of  the  enemy;  and  then  your  own  fleet  can 
go  where  it  likes,  picking  up  the  colonies  of  the 
other  side.  Germany  began  in  1898  to  make 
great  sacrifices  to  build  a  powerful  navy,  which 
in  1914  reached  21  first-class  and  38  second-class 
ships  of  war,  with  a  multitude  of  smaller  craft 
and  a  force  of  200,000  men. 

NON-EUROPEAN  ELEMENTS  IN  THE  EUROPEAN 
WAR 

It  remains  to  notice  some  parts  of  the  world 
outside  of  Europe  which  are  brought  into  the 
pending  struggle  and  share  the  fortunes  of  one 
or  the  other  group  of  contestants.  First  come 
the  colonies  of  the  various  nations,  so  far  as  they 
are  fighting  units.  Only  one  great  power  can 
and  does  draw  men,  ships,  and  supplies  from  its 
outliers:  Canada,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  the 
Cape  Colonies,  and  India  have  all  proved  in  the 
present  war  that  they  recognize  their  part  in  the 


THE  SIX  GREAT  POWERS  49 

mighty  British  Empire,  and  will  share  the  dangers 
of  the  mother  country  in  a  European  war.  The 
number  of  troops  which  they  can  speedily  add  to 
the  British  forces  is  probably  a  hundred  thou- 
sand; and  in  case  things  should  go  hard  with 
Great  Britain  that  number  might  be  doubled  or 
trebled. 

A  second  power,  France,  has  built  up  in  the 
colonies  in  North  Africa  a  native  army  of  good 
soldiers,  the  so-called  Zouaves  or  Turcos.  A  few 
thousand  of  them  fought  in  1871  and  a  larger 
contingent  has  been  put  into  the  lines  opposite 
the  Germans  in  1914.  In  case  of  a  long  war 
there  is  at  least  a  recruiting  ground  in  Africa 
for  several  hundred  thousand  French  troops. 
The  French  colonies  farther  south  in  Africa, 
Madagascar,  and  French  Indo-China  have  not 
been  organized  to  the  point  where  they  can  give 
aid  to  their  mother  country. 

A  third  power,  Russia,  has  no  colonies  over 
seas,  but  can  draw  upon  her  Asiatic  population 
of  27,000,000  for  from  500,000  to  1,000,000 
troops,  including  such  renowned  fighting  men  as 
the  Circassians,  and  the  men  of  Samarcand  and 
Khiva.  The  new  Italian  colony  of  Tripoli  is  in 
no  position  to  give  effective  aid  to  the  mother 
country.  The  Germans  have  a  few  thousand 
native  troops  in  their  African  colonies,  but  they 
are  too  few  and  too  distant  to  be  drawn  upon. 

Two  independent  Asiatic  countries  have  shared, 


50  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

or  are  likely  to  share,  in  the  fortunes  of  the  war. 
Japan  has  in  its  limits  of  149,000  square  miles  a 
population  of  about  52,000,000;  in  addition  it 
holds  Formosa  with  3,000,000  people  and  Korea 
with  14,000,000.  The  peace  army  is  about 
225,000,  but  within  ten  years  Japan  has  shown 
a  capacity  to  raise,  transport,  and  supply  nearly 
a  million  men.  The  navy,  which  was  strong  in 
1905,  has  now  been  outstripped  by  western  na- 
tions. The  Japanese  have  built  three  dread- 
noughts and  have  perhaps  thirty  second-class 
ships.  The  Japanese  are  excellent  sailors  and 
their  ability  to  place  forces  of  several  hundred 
thousand  men  where  they  will  on  the  eastern  coast 
of  Asia  makes  them  a  power  to  be  reckoned  with. 
In  addition  Japan  is  in  alliance  with  Great 
Britain  and  under  pledge  to  protect  the  British 
interests  in  the  Orient  in  case  of  war,  and  has 
entered  the  contest,  the  first  object  of  attack 
being  the  German  colony  of  Kiao-Chao. 

The  other  Asiatic  power  is  Turkey,  which  till 
1913  held  territory  reaching  up  till  it  touched 
Bosnia,  and  had  still  several  million  European 
subjects.  Through  their  hold  on  Constantinople 
and  both  sides  of  the  Bosphorus  and  Dardanelles, 
the  Turks  control  the  entrance  to  the  Black  Sea; 
and  they  are  in  a  geographical  position  to  throw 
an  army,  if  they  had  one,  northward  through 
Bulgaria  or  northwest  through  Macedonia.  Un- 
fortunately there  is  no  Turkish  army  in  the  mod- 


THE  SIX  GREAT  POWERS  51 

era  sense.  German  officers  undertook  to  recon- 
struct the  army  in  1912 ;  but  in  the  war  of  1913 
the  Turks  were  beaten  in  every  pitched  battle,  and 
forced  to  surrender  every  great  fortress  that  was 
besieged. 

None  of  the  European  Balkan  powers  has  any 
naval  strength,  except  Greece,  which  in  1914 
bought  two  American  ironclads  of  the  second 
class,  intended  to  offset  two  vessels  ordered  by 
Turkey  in  England.  These  latter  ships  have  been 
taken  over  by  England,  but  the  Turks  in  August, 
1914,  acquired  two  powerful  German  ironclads 
which  took  refuge  in  the  Dardanelles.  The  Turks 
are,  however,  neighbors  to  the  Russians  in  Ar- 
menia and  war  is  not  unlikely  to  break  out  on 
that  frontier. 


CHAPTER   IV 

NON-POLITICAL   DIVISIONS    OF   EUROPE 
INDUSTRIAL  UNITIES 

MOST  of  the  nations  described  in  the  pre- 
ceding chapter  are  not  only  territorial 
and  nearly  racial  units,  but  have  one  or 
two  acknowledged  national  lines  of  activity.  For 
instance,  the  Scandinavian  countries  are  large 
producers  of  food  and  are  just  beginning  to  de- 
velop their  water  power  into  manufactures.  None 
of  them  has  colonial  aspirations,  except  for  Ice- 
land, Greenland,  and  the  little  group  of  West 
India  Islands  including  St.  Thomas  and  St.  Croix, 
which  Denmark  has  twice  been  on  the  point  of 
selling  to  the  United  States.  Holland  at  home 
depends  on  a  remarkably  intensive  tillage,  and 
some  manufactures ;  but  lives  chiefly  from  trade. 
The  three  great  interests  of  Switzerland,  hotels, 
dairy  products,  and  manufactures,  merge  easily 
into  each  other.  Belgium  is  preeminently  a  man- 
ufacturing country  with  large  and  profitable  in- 
dustries of  coal,  iron,  and  machinery. 

52 


NON-POLITICAL  DIVISIONS  53 

So  with  the  great  powers.  Italy  is  a  prosper- 
ous agricultural  country  and  in  the  north  has 
large  manufactures,  and  in  all  parts  has  a  lively 
shipping  trade.  England  is  predominantly  a 
manufacturing  and  commercial  country.  Even 
Ireland,  though  a  prosperous  agricultural  region, 
includes  the  great  manufacturing  and  shipbuild- 
ing district  around  Belfast.  France  resembles 
Great  Britain  in  its  commercial  interests,  but  in 
addition  is  a  rich  agricultural  country,  having 
one  monopoly  product,  champagne,  which  is  at- 
tractive both  to  civilians  and  military  men  from 
surrounding  countries.  Germany,  though  it  con- 
tains a  strong  constituency  of  large  land-owners 
who  demand  and  receive  consideration  for  their 
agriculture,  has  become  an  industrial  country 
much  ruled  by  industrial  considerations.  The 
manufacturers,  forwarders,  and  vessel-owners 
have  a  powerful  influence  on  the  government  and 
have  been  able  to  direct  the  policy  of  the  Empire 
toward  foreign  trade  and  colonies.  In  Austria- 
Hungary  agriculture  and  industry  divide  on  very 
nearly  the  line  between  the  two  halves  of  the  Em- 
pire, and  that  causes  a  serious  strain.  The  Bal- 
kans are  an  agricultural  region  exporting  cattle 
and  grain  and  every  one  of  them  wants  its  own 
outports.  Russia  possesses  some  mineral  wealth, 
including  coal,  but  the  greater  part  of  the  people 
are  land-owners  or  land  tillers.  The  nation  is  not 
divided  upon  any  material  issues. 


54  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

SOCIAL   UNITIES 

From  the  point  of  view  of  social  life  every  one 
of  the  European  countries  is  divided  into  clearly 
recognized  upper  and  lower  classes.  The  con- 
trasts between  the  very  wealthy  and  the  very 
poor  are  nowhere  sharper  than  in  many  parts  of 
the  United  States,  but  they  are  harder  to  over- 
come; partly  from  the  tradition  that  a  family 
once  peasant  must  remain  peasant;  partly  from 
the  action  of  the  trades  unions  in  cultivating  a 
class  feeling.  The  stratum  of  wage-earners  is 
much  more  permanent  than  in  America.  The 
likelihood  that  the  child  of  a  poor  family  will 
come  to  be  a  man  of  consequence  is  decidedly  less. 
The  military  system  tends  to  divide  most  of  the 
European  countries  sharply  between  the  social 
class  from  which  officers  are  taken,  and  the  social 
class  of  the  privates. 

These  contrasts  of  material  conditions  are 
strengthened  by  the  existence  in  all  European 
countries,  except  Switzerland  and  the  Balkan 
states,  of  an  hereditary  nobility,  which  includes 
a  large  number  of  the  great  land-owners,  is  re- 
cruited from  the  richest  business  men,  and  enjoys 
a  decided  preference  for  important  and  well-paid 
state  offices,  both  civil  and  military.  In  some 
countries  the  nobility  is  a  tradition  instead  of  an 
actual  factor  in  the  nation's  life.  Thus  in  France 
noble  families,  whether  their  titles  go  back  to  the 


NON-POLITICAL  DIVISIONS  55 

Bourbon  kings  or  the  Bonaparte  emperors,  pos- 
sess only  what  might  be  called  a  trademark  in 
their  titles.  .They  have  a  legal  right  to  use  them 
and  anybody  else  who  assumes  them  can  be  prose- 
cuted; but  they  carry  no  privileges  and  the  list 
of  general  officers  in  the  present  French  army 
shows  that  men  without  even  the  "de"  may  aspire 
to  high  military  station.  Even  in  plain  and  dem- 
ocratic Switzerland  members  of  certain  families 
in  most  of  the  cantons  have  an  unwritten  but 
recognized  preference  when  they  put  themselves 
forward  as  candidates  for  election  to  public  office. 
In  all  the  other  countries,  England,  Austria, 
Hungary,  Russia,  Italy — even  in  Holland,  Den- 
mark and  Sweden — there  is  a  caste  of  nobles  who 
not  only  think  themselves,  but  are  thought  by  the 
lower  class,  to  be  made  of  a  superior  clay.  In 
Germany  the  privileges  of  inherited  rank  are  re- 
duced to  a  system.  Nobody  can  be  a  general  in 
the  army  unless  he  is  a  "von."  If  necessary,  he 
receives  the  distinction  when  he  is  promoted.  The 
German  nobility,  outside  of  the  reigning  families, 
is,  in  general,  not  rich.  The  Emperor  is  fond  of 
speaking  of  "my  poor  nobility"  as  a  class  for 
which  he  must  provide  by  opening  up  a  military 
career  to  its  sons.  These  young  men,  together 
with  the  sons  of  the  industrial  and  middle  class, 
form  the  famous  "officer  class,"  which  is  one  of 
the  chief  buttresses  of  the  German  army.  In  time 
of  peace  they  are  the  hardworking  drill-masters 


56  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

and  administrators  of  their  commands,  the  adored 
heroes  of  the  middle-class  maidens,  the  uniformed 
and  sometimes  proprietary  ornaments  of  the  city 
streets.  In  time  of  war  they  furnish  a  body  of 
highly  skilled  professional  soldiers,  filled  to  the 
brim  with  genuine  patriotism,  devoted  to  their 
work,  furiously  loyal  to  their  Emperor,  prodigal 
of  their  lives,  the  like  of  which  the  world  has 
seldom  seen.  On  the  other  hand  some  Germans 
complain  of  the  current  notion  that  the  officers 
are  superior  in  ability  and  character  to  all  their 
countrymen. 

The  growth  of  democracy  has  brought  about 
severe  strains  within  several  of  the  European 
countries,  strains  which  somewhat  weaken  several 
of  the  contestants  in  the  war.  Even  in  Germany 
the  Social  Democratic  party  casts  over  4,000,000 
votes,  which  is  more  than  a  third  of  the  total 
voters,  some  of  whom  recently  played  a  practical 
joke  by  electing  a  Socialist  member  to  the  Reich- 
stag from  the  district  in  which  His  Imperial 
Majesty  has  his  usual  residence.  Up  to  the  out- 
break of  the  war  there  were  many  declarations 
that  they  would  overwhelm  the  military  party  by 
a  general  strike  of  workmen  in  case  war  should" 
come  on.  In  Norway  the  democratic  spirit  has 
been  so  strong  that  the  country  nine  years  ago 
almost  became  a  republic ;  and  the  people,  like  the 
English  in  1688,  elected  their  own  king.  In  Eng- 
land the  people  at  large,  including  workmen  and 


NON-POLITICAL  DIVISIONS          57 

agricultural  laborers,  have  gradually  got  control 
of  the  government ;  and  their  head  representative, 
the  Prime  Minister,  is  a  parliamentary  king  of 
far  greater  significance  to  the  nation  than  the 
crowned  king  and  his  court. 

None  of  the  countries  now  involved,  however, 
has  in  this  crisis  suffered  from  a  public  opposi- 
tion to  the  war;  partly  because  the  war  broke 
out  in  such  a  manner  as  to  make  every  country 
believe  that  it  must  fight  or  perish;  partly  be- 
cause the  man  subject  to  military  duty  who  ques- 
tions the  righteousness  of  mobilization  is  likely  to 
be  shot;  partly  because  even  the  Social  Demo- 
crats would  not  venture  to  link  with  their  move- 
ment and  its  destinies  the  odium  of  having  weak- 
ened their  nation  at  a  critical  moment.  Whatever 
the  result  of  the  war,  the  democratic  spirit  is 
likely  to  come  up  again  and  there  may  be  social 
revolutions  like  that  of  Russia  only  nine  years 
ago.  Still  the  principle  of  a  privileged  and  titled 
class  is  dear  to  most  Europeans,  and  it  is  not 
likely  soon  to  disappear,  no  matter  what  defeats 
the  military  men  may  suffer  from  others  than 
their  countrymen. 

RELIGIOUS  DIVISIONS 

The  completeness  of  national  spirit  just  now 
in  Europe  is  the  more  striking  because  there  are 
several  systems  of  grouping  on  that  continent 


58  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

which  pay  little  attention  to  national  boundaries. 
Five  churches,  most  of  which  have  a  prodigious 
number  of  members,  are  scattered  through 
Europe,  subdividing  several  countries  into  re- 
ligious groups  which  have  for  ages  been  suspi- 
cious of  each  other.  In  round  numbers  there  are 
in  Europe  110  million  Greek  Catholics,  180  mil- 
lion Roman  Catholics,  98  million  Protestants,  8 
million  Moslems,  9  million  Jews,  a  total  of  405 
million  inhabitants  between  the  Ural  Mountains 
and  Iceland.  In  general  terms  the  Greek  Cath- 
olics and  Moslems  all  live  in  the  east  and  south- 
east; the  Roman  Catholics  in  southern  and  cen- 
tral Europe,  the  Protestants  in  northern  and 
western  Europe ;  the  Jews  are  widely  distributed 
with  large  numbers  concentrated  in  Poland  and 
some  other  districts  of  Russia,  and  in  the  eastern 
provinces  of  Austria. 

If  there  were  five  nations  corresponding  to  these 
five  religious  groups  the  present  war  could  be 
better  understood,  for  from  the  days  of  Con- 
stantine  the  Great,  the  first  Christian  Roman 
Emperor,  to  the  Balkan  Crisis  of  1912,  religion 
has  been  one  of  the  chief  motives  for  European 
wars.  The  fearful  Thirty  Years'  War  was  a 
conscious  effort  of  German  Catholics  and  German 
Protestants  each  to  stamp  out  the  other's  re- 
ligion. There  is  vague  talk  of  proclaiming  a 
Holy  War  of  all  the  Moslems  in  behalf  of  Turkey 
in  this  year  1914.  If  all  the  Protestants  would 


NON-POLITICAL  DIVISIONS  59 

act  together,  the  Scandinavian  countries,  Hol- 
land, North  Germany,  England,  Wales,  and  Scot- 
land, and  parts  of  Switzerland  and  Hungary 
would  be  fighting  side  by  side.  If  all  the  Roman 
Catholics  would  organize,  France,  Italy,  Ireland, 
Spain,  Portugal,  South  Germany,  Austria,  most 
of  Hungary,  German,  Russian,  and  Austrian 
Poland,  and  part  of  Albania  would  be  firing  back 
across  the  Protestant  entrenchments.  If  the 
Greek  Catholics  were  moved  by  one  religious  im- 
pulse, the  greater  part  of  Russia,  almost  all  the 
Balkans,  and  several  million  Austrian  subjects 
would  take  the  field.  If  the  Moslems  pulled  to- 
gether, the  remnant  of  Turkey,  part  of  Albania, 
600,000  Albanians,  600,000  Bulgarians,  and  6,- 
000,000  Russian  subjects  inEurope  would  be  shar- 
pening their  scimitars  around  the  same  crescent. 

Such  wars  would  at  least  have  behind  them 
some  clear  and  positive  rule  of  action;  and  such 
wars  may  conceivably  come  again.  The  Turks 
carried  the  Koran  as  far  as  Vienna  as  late  as 
1683.  The  Prince  Bishop  of  Salzburg  exiled  his 
Protestant  subjects  as  late  as  1730,  and  some  of 
them  came  over  to  Georgia  and  built  another 
Salzburg.  The  Jews  in  Rumania  and  in  Russia 
have  been  put  into  a  kind  of  social  and  political 
inferno,  as  a  non-military  way  of  fighting  them. 
Why  is  it  that  the  religious  motive  has  almost 
no  place  in  the  present  war? 

Chiefly  because,  though  every  nation  involved 


60  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

has  a  state  church,  every  nation  also  admits  the 
right  of  its  subjects  to  choose  and  practice  some 
different  religion;  and  to  sound  the  trumpet  of 
a  religious  .war  would  mean  in  most  countries  to 
begin  a  civil  war.  The  present  policy  of  every 
modern  state,  including  even  Turkey,  is  to  call 
every  one  of  its  subjects  to  the  patriotic  work 
of  war  and  to  avoid  religious  distinctions.  Few 
would  care  to  encounter  the  stigma  of  belonging 
to  a  non-militant  church  in  the  midst  of  a  popu- 
lation otherwise  all  liable  to  military  service. 

LACK    OF    RELIGIOUS    RIVALRY    IN    THE    WAR 

A  few  simple  statistics  will  show  clearly  why 
every  one  of  the  great  powers  carefully  avoids 
religious  issues.  Italy  is  from  the  religious  point 
of  view  the  most  unified  of  the  six  powers.  Pro- 
fessed Roman  Catholics  make  up  about  34,- 
000,000  out  of  the  35,000,000  people.  There  are 
in  the  country  only  40,000  Jews  and  70,000 
Protestants.  Yet  all  the  world  knows  that  at 
least  half  the  men  in  Italy  would  oppose  any 
State  policy  which  tended  to  give  the  Catholic 
Church  greater  power  and  authority  than  it  now 
has.  In  France  the  conditions  are  much  the  same. 
Over  38,000,000  out  of  40,000,000  are  officially 
Catholics,  and  there  are  no  less  than  sixty-seven 
Catholic  bishops  in  the  country.  Nevertheless, 
ever  since  1901  there  has  been  a  political  struggle 


NON-POLITICAL  DIVISIONS          61 

going  on  between  the  majority  in  the  French 
legislative  bodies  and  the  Church  authorities,  in 
which  the  State  has  relentlessly  dissolved  more 
than  five  hundred  Catholic  associations.  The 
French  Protestants  are  1,500,000  in  number,  and 
much  resemble  the  Church  of  England  people  in 
Great  Britain.  They  are  prosperous  and  in  some 
parts  of  Southern  France  are  a  strong  and  vigor- 
ous element,  but  are  intensely  patriotic.  When 
the  war  broke  out,  Catholic  priests  returned  from 
exile  to  join  the  army,  and  Protestant  pastors 
are  fighting  alongside  them. 

Great  Britain  is  far  more  divided  in  a  religious 
point  of  view  than  most  people  realize.  Out  of 
the  46,000,000  inhabitants  of  Great  Britain  and 
Ireland,  6,000,000  are  Catholics,  of  whom  3,- 
250,000  live  in  Ireland,  as  against  600,000  Irish 
Episcopalians  and  450,000  Irish  Presbyterians. 
The  rivalry  between  Catholics  and  Protestants 
agitated  England  from  the  Reformation  in  1534 
to  the  Catholic  Emancipation  Act  of  1829,  but 
not  a  trace  of  it  appears  in  the  attitude  of  the 
British  people  toward  this  war. 

In  Germany  the  situation  is  even  more  striking 
because  in  the  population  of  65,000,000  there  are 
24,000,000  Roman  Catholics  and  600,000  Jews. 
Even  in  Protestant  Prussia  there  are  15,000,000 
Catholics  out  of  40,000,000,  and  in  Alsace-Lor- 
raine, Bavaria,  and  Baden  there  are  more  Catho- 
lics than  Protestants. 


62  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

Germany  has  gone  through  long  religious  quar- 
rels in  the  Imperial  Reichstag  and  especially  in 
the  Prussian  Landtag  where  Bismarck  for  years 
fought  the  claims  of  the  Catholic  Church  and 
supported  the  "Falk  Laws"  of  1880,  intended  to 
curb  that  Church.  Not  a  vestige  of  that  con- 
troversy appears  in  the  German  preparations 
and  campaigns  of  1914. 

Even  in  the  Balkans,  now  that  the  Moslems  are 
turned  out,  there  is  little  religious  controversy 
except  that  the  Greek,  Bulgarian,  and  Servian 
national  churches  each  has  an  organization  which 
is  as  much  political  as  religious.  The  two  coun- 
tries in  which  religious  dissensions  ought  to  play 
the  largest  part  are  Austria  and  Russia.  In 
Austria-Hungary  there  are  84,000,000  Roman 
Catholics,  10,000,000  Greek  Catholics,  4,500,000 
'other  Christians,  including  the  lively  Calvinists 
and  Unitarians  of  Hungary,  and  2,500,000  Jews. 
Here  are  elements  for  endless  difficulty,  particu- 
larly since  the  Hapsburg  imperial  house  is 
strongly  Roman  Catholic.  However,  Austria  long 
since  learned  that  toleration  is  the  only  possible 
system  for  an  Empire  so  loosely  knit  together. 

In  Russia  the  situation  is  peculiar  because  four 
of  the  five  European  churches  have  millions  of 
adherents  in  that  Empire;  and  because  the  gov- 
ernment has  for  many  years  been  distinctly  hos- 
tile to  any  church  or  organization  outside  the 
official  and  highly  centralized  state  Greek  Catho- 


NON-POLITICAL  DIVISIONS  63 

lie  Church  as  established  in  Russia.  Though  the 
Balkans  and  Russians  were  brought  into  the 
Christian  faith  by  missionaries  of  the  Greek  faith 
that  Church  has  for  the  last  thousand  years 
shown  little  missionary  spirit.  Wherever  its  ad- 
herents go  priests  and  bishops  follow  them;  but 
the  Russian  Church  has  never  made  an  effort  to 
convert  either  other  Christians  or  the  heathen 
outside  its  own  dominions.  Perhaps  for  that 
reason  it  has  been  the  more  arrogant  and  intol- 
erant over  its  own  subjects.  Nevertheless  it  has 
been  necessary  to  give  freedom  of  religious  wor- 
ship to  the  14,000,000  Moslems  in  European  and 
Asiatic  Russia.  Poland  was  a  Roman  Catholic 
country  when  divided  in  1775,  and  Russian  Po- 
land continues  Catholic  to  this  day  in  spite  of  all 
efforts  to  break  up  that  church.  There  are  more 
than  12,000,000  of  this  faith.  The  6,000,000 
Jews  have,  in  spite  of  all  obstacles,  maintained 
their  faith  and  there  are  some  prospects  that, 
because  they  have  taken  up  their  military  service 
so  unhesitatingly,  they  may  receive  the  privileges 
of  Russian  subjects.  The  Poles  are  encouraged 
to  fight  the  battles  of  Russia  because  they  will 
thereby  earn  the  right  to  remain  Roman  Catholics. 

RACE   DIVISIONS   AMONG  MINOR   POWERS 

Social  and  religious  subdivisions  clearly  play 
a  small  part  in  the  rivalries  which  have  brought 
on  the  war.  How  far  have  the  differences  of  race 


64  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

been  a  factor?  The  race  map  of  Europe  is  even 
more  confused  and  puzzling  than  the  map  of  re- 
ligions ;  but  it  is  easy  to  trace  the  effect  of  races 
upon  the  grouping  of  the  present  belligerent  na- 
tions. The  405  millions  of  Europeans  are  sub- 
divided into  four  great  groups :  the  Slav ;  the 
Asiatic;  the  Teutonic;  and  the  Latin;  each  of 
which  is  again  subdivided  into  smaller  portions. 
In  round  numbers  the  Slavs  number  140  millions ; 
the  Latin  peoples — that  is,  Spain,  Portugal, 
France,  Belgium,  and  Italy,  together  with  the 
Swiss  and  Austrian  Italians  and  the  kindred 
Greeks — make  up  110  millions.  The  Germanic 
peoples,  including  nearly  all  the  Germans,  the 
Scandinavians,  Dutch,  Flemish  Belgians,  and 
English,  together  with  northern  Switzerland,  are 
127  millions,  and  to  them  may  be  added  the  rem- 
nants of  the  Celtic  race  in  Wales,  Ireland,  and 
Scotland,  making  in  all  135  millions.  The  Asiatic 
races  include  the  Finns,  the  Magyars,  the  Turko- 
Tatars  of  Russia,  and  perhaps  the  Bulgarians, 
and  the  remnants  of  the  Turks  in  the  Balkans, 
together  about  20,000,000. 

These  are  the  gross  figures,  but  they  are  far 
from  representing  the  real  effect  of  race  in  divid- 
ing countries  and  creating  race  antipathies. 
Taking  first  of  all  the  minor  countries,  the  three 
Scandinavian  powers  and  Holland,  Spain,  Portu- 
gal, are  each  of  a  nearly  pure  native  stock  and 
subject  to  no  race  strains  from  within;  still  their 


NON-POLITICAL  DIVISIONS  65 

foreign  policy  is  somewhat  affected  by  relations 
with  neighbors  of  the  same  stock  as  themselves. 
For  example,  the  Dutch  are  probably  suspicious 
of  the  Germans  because  of  the  possible  claim  that 
people  of  substantially  the  same  race  ought  to  be 
in  one  nation.  Belgium  has  a  Flam  and  element, 
which  refuses  to  speak  French,  and  there  has  been 
a  neat  interior  quarrel  between  the  two  languages 
and  the  two  race  elements  that  constitute  them; 
but  the  rift  closed  up  when  the  Germans  came 
across  the  border.  Switzerland  is  divided  between 
the  Germanic  and  German  speaking  cantons  on 
the  north  and  the  Latin  cantons  speaking  French, 
Italian,  and  Romansch  on  the  south  and  west. 
Nevertheless,  no  people  in  the  world  are  more 
united  and  more  determined  to  stand  together  for 
mutual  protection  than  the  Swiss. 

In  the  Balkans  the  race  strains  are  fiercest  and 
most  enduring  because  that  peninsula  has  been 
the  haunt  of  warring  races  ever  since  the  Roman 
Empire;  and  within  its  borders  may  be  found 
Slavs,  Bulgarians,  Turks,  Rumanians,  Greeks, 
and  Albanians,  all  of  whom  look  upon  themselves 
as  separate  races.  In  fact,  the  Bulgarians  not 
only  took  over  the  Slav  language  of  the  Servians 
after  they  had  conquered  their  present  seat,  but 
there  can  be  little  doubt  that  they  took  in  a  large 
amount  of  the  Slav  population ;  so  that  probably 
the  present  Bulgarian  race  is  far  more  Slav  than 
Asiatic.  The  Rumanians  call  themselves  a  Latin 


66  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

people  because  they  have  Latin  words  in  their  lan- 
guage; but  it  is  nearly  fifteen  centuries  since  the 
Roman  people  of  that  district  lost  their  identity 
and  the  Rumanians  are  presumably  in  large  part 
a  Slav  race. 

In  the  24,000,000  of  Balkan  population,  in- 
cluding Rumania,  and  what  is  left  of  European 
Turkey,  the  race  elements  are  about  as  follows: 

Slavs 15,000,000 

Greeks   4,000,000 

Turks    2,100,000 

Albanians    1,200,000 

Jews,  Gipsies,  Russians, 

Magyars,   etc.    .  .       1,700,000 


24,000,000 

But  this  population  is  not  subdivided  into  four 
corresponding  territorial  groups.  About  1,- 
000,000  Bulgarians  are  now  living  in  Servia  or 
Greek  Macedonia.  About  220,000  Greeks  are  in 
Bulgaria  and  Constantinople.  About  100,000 
Rumanians  are  in  Bulgaria  and  Servia.  About 
900,000  Turks  are  left  in  Macedonia  and  Bul- 
garia. The  Albanians  are  an  undoubted  primi- 
tive race,  as  old  as  the  Greeks  or  Etruscans,  but 
they  are  divided  into  400,000  Catholics,  and 
700,000  Moslems  and  100,000  Greek  Catholics. 

It  is  this  mix-up  of  races,  religions,  and  na- 


NON-POLITICAL  DIVISIONS  67 

tions  which  has  caused  the  frightful  wars  in  the 
Balkans.  The  Bulgarians,  Servians,  and  Greeks 
last  year  adopted  and  practiced  to  some  extent 
the  simple  policy  of  putting  an  end  to  the  race 
issue  by  exterminating  the  people  within  their 
boundaries  who  did  not  correspond  to  the  national 
unit.  Greeks  massacred  Bulgarians,  and  Bul- 
garians massacred  Greeks,  and  the  Servians  took 
the  precaution  to  massacre  Albanians  who  were 
beyond  the  Servian  border,  but  even  murderers 
sometimes  lack  thoroughness  and  the  work  of 
destruction  was  left  uncompleted. 

RACE   DIVISIONS   IN   GREAT   BRITAIN 

Among  the  great  powers  several  are  almost  en- 
tirely free  from  race  stresses.  In  Italy  and  France 
there  are  some  Germanic  elements,  but  they  have 
long  since  been  merged  in  the  main  population. 
Neither  of  those  powers  has  the  slightest  fear  of 
a  back-fire  being  lighted  after  the  troops  have 
gone  to  the  front.  Great  Britain  is  nearly  in  the 
same  condition.  The  British  have  for  several 
hundred  years  had  an  Irish  question  which  of  late 
has  taken  the  form  of  a  demand  for  local  self- 
government  in  that  island.  The  German  states- 
men seem  to  have  entirely  misconstrued  the  spirit 
of  the  Irish,  who,  when  war  broke  out,  instantly 
asserted  their  loyalty.  As  an  Empire  Great 
Britain  has  the  responsibility  of  keeping  order 


68  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

and  content  in  the  imperial  dependencies,  partic- 
ularly India.  Here  is  a  practical  opportunity 
for  appealing  to  race  hatreds,  for  the  English 
are  conquerors,  and  as  recently  as  1857  had  to 
fight  for  their  lives.  Even  that  far-distant  land 
of  people  far  more  remote  from  the  English  in 
culture  and  point  of  view  than  the  most  ferocious 
Greek  or  Bulgarian  "comitadjis,"  is  eager  with 
spontaneous  gifts  and  offers  of  men.  Native 
princes  seventy  years  old  demand  the  right  to 
lead  their  forces  to  the  field  in  France,  or  wher- 
ever the  King  of  Great  Britain  and  Emperor  of 
India  may  need  them.  In  South  Africa  the 
supposed  German  sympathies  of  the  Dutchmen, 
their  assumed  gratitude  for  Emperor  William's 
interest  in  their  war  fifteen  years  ago,  has  had 
some  effect;  a  force  of  Boers  has  joined  the 
Germans.  So  far,  most  of  them  seem  to  feel  a 
sense  of  membership  in  the  British  Empire  which 
is  in  danger;  they  have  buried  their  differ- 
ences and  are  ready  to  take  ship  for  the  scene  of 
battle.  The  46,000,000  inhabitants  in  the  British 
Islands  are  the  nucleus  for  300  million  people  of 
varied  races  in  India,  in  Burma,  in  the  Straits 
Settlements,  in  the  Federated  Malay  States,  in 
Egypt  and  Soudan.  To  this  must  be  added 
1,500,000  Europeans  in  the  Union  of  South 
Africa,  8,000,000  Canadians,  5,000,000  Aus- 
tralians, and  1,000,000  New  Zealanders,  many  of 
whom  are  not  of  English  race. 


NON-POLITICAL  DIVISIONS          69 

RACE   DIVISIONS   IN   GERMANY 

Germany  has  some  curious  small  elements 
which  still  adhere  to  their  language  and  are  con- 
sciously non-German.  There  are  over  100,000 
Lithuanians ;  100,000  Cassubians ;  100,000 
Wends,  who  are  the  remnant  of  a  once  dominant 
Slav  people.  Much  more  significant  are  the 
nearly  3,500,000  Poles,  the  greater  part  of  whom 
are  settled  by  themselves  in  the  Prussian  province 
of  Posen  and  speak  no  tongue  but  the  Polish. 
Every  effort  to  Germanize  those  people  has  failed, 
including  the  method  of  settling  German  emigrants 
and  giving  them  special  inducements  to  pros- 
per. The  Poles  simply  adopted  the  same  methods 
and  have  been  even  more  prosperous.  These  peo- 
ple are  Slavs  and  speak  a  Slavic  tongue;  they 
have  held  fast  to  their  language  and  nationality 
through  a  hundred  and  forty  years  of  Prussian 
control.  They  lie  on  the  frontier  of  Russia  and 
are  blood  brothers  of  the  Russian  and  Austrian 
Poles.  Of  course,  they  perform  military  service 
like  other  people  and  their  young  men  are  some- 
where at  the  front.  The  Czar  of  Russia  has 
during  the  war  offered  to  unite  them  with  the 
Poles  in  Russia  and  to  give  them  free  use  of  their 
language  and  religion  and  "autonomy"  under  the 
Russian  crown  (whatever  that  may  mean). 

The  one  uncertain  part  of  Germany  is  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  the  province  which  was  conquered  and 


70  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

annexed  from  France  in  1871.  The  population 
is  about  2,000,000.  In  Lorraine  French  was  the 
habitual  language  in  1871,  and  in  Alsace  Ger- 
man was  spoken  among  the  peasantry  and  in  many 
of  the  towns.  Apparently  the  greater  part  of  the 
population  of  both  districts  at  the  time  deeply 
resented  the  transfer.  Many  thousands  emi- 
grated into  France  and  the  German  government 
so  suspected  the  annexation  that  for  many  years 
they  were  administered  as  "Imperial  Terri- 
tories." There  is  little  doubt  that  though  only 
200,000  people  are  now  officially  reckoned  to  be 
French  speaking,  the  language  and  the  sentiment 
of  devotion  to  France  have  been  cultivated  in  a 
great  number  of  families.  Here  is  the  curious 
spectacle  of  a  people  who  were  part  of  the  Holy 
Roman  Empire  until  about  1680,  and  who  are 
most  of  them  entirely  German  in  descent  yet  who 
include  a  strongly  anti-German  element. 

RACE   DIVISIONS   IN   RUSSIA 

The  extreme  of  race  divisions  and  stresses  is 
felt  by  the  two  great  powers  in  eastern  Europe. 
Russia  is  generally  supposed  to  be  almost  wholly 
Slav,  but  that  is  a  great  mistake.  There  is  no 
recent  census  available,  but  semi-official  estimates 
show  about  the  following  race  proportions:  Out 
of  144  million  people  estimated  for  the  Russian 
Empire  in  Europe  in  1912,  apparently  about  108 


NON-POLITICAL  DIVISIONS          71 

million  were  Slavs,  including  9,000,000  Poles  in 
Poland  and  other  parts  of  the  Empire;  over 
6,000,000  were  Jews;  about  4,000,000  were 
Finns;  8,000,000  to  9,000,000  were  Turko- 
Tatars;  2,000,000  owned  to  being  Germans  (the 
actual  number  is  probably  much  greater),  leaving 
about  17,000,000  of  other  races,  most  of  whom 
were  Europeans  in  origin.  Leaving  out  the  Poles, 
the  Russian  Slavs,  who  are  the  ruling  race  of  the 
Empire,  must  be  a  little  under  100  million  or  not 
much  more  than  two-thirds  of  the  whole  popula- 
tion. 

The  Russians  are  racially  somewhat  different, 
because  many  other  race  elements  have  in  the 
course  of  ages  been  amalgamated  in  the  Russian 
race.  Finns,  Germans,  Poles,  Turks  and  Mongols 
have  intermarried  and  accepted  the  Russian  lan- 
guage and  culture.  There  is  a  little  reason  in 
Kipling's  dictum  that  "Russia  is  not  the  most 
eastern  of  western  nations,  but  the  most  western 
of  eastern  nations."  The  effect  of  domination 
by  the  Mongols  is  still  seen  in  Russian  absolutism, 
and  the  sharp  separation  of  the  ruling  class.  Yet 
no  people  so  easily  acquire  western  languages  and 
manners. 

The  9,000,000  or  so  of  Poles  living  in  Poland 
have  furnished  Russia  with  much  the  same  con- 
troversy as  that  in  Prussian  Poland,  with  the  ad- 
dition of  a  Jewish  population  of  over  a  million, 
and  with  the  aggravation  that  the  Russians  have 


72  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

made  a  much  more  determined  effort  than  the 
Prussians  to  break  the  Polish  national  spirit.  In 
1830  and  again  in  1863  the  Poles  revolted  and 
attempted  to  restore  their  independent  nation. 
They  have  been  suspected,  persecuted,  deprived 
of  privileges;  yet  the  Russian  government  is 
driven  at  last  to  offer  to  loyal  Poles  the  greater 
part  of  that  which  they  have  so  long  demanded. 
The  Poles  have  been  racial  and  Slav  champions; 
they  have  proved  the  possibility  of  a  compara- 
tively small  race  fraction  of  the  Empire  keeping 
its  individuality  and  at  last  achieving  for  itself 
a  local  status.  Not  as  a  reward  for  this  devotion 
to  their  race,  but  in  recognition  of  their  willing- 
ness to  fight  for  their  former  harsh  masters,  the 
Poles  seem  likely  to  secure  for  themselves  some- 
thing like  the  degree  of  self-government  that  is 
possessed  by  every  state  in  our  Union. 

The  Finns  present  a  somewhat  different  prob- 
lem, for  they  were  a  recognized  part  of  Sweden 
from  1323  until  1809;  they  are  of  an  Asiatic 
race,  closely  akin  to  the  Magyars;  they  preserve 
their  own  language;  and  though  the  Czar  of 
Russia  was  their  sovereign,  they  were  for  many 
years  not  included  in  the  Empire.  They  have  had 
their  own  coinage  and,  until  twenty-five  years  ago, 
their  own  postal  system.  Out  of  a  population  of 
3,000,000  there  are  only  about  10,000  Russians. 
The  world  has  looked  on  with  sympathy  at  the 
brave  efforts  of  this  little  people  to  preserve 


NON-POLITICAL  DIVISIONS          73 

rights  which  were  denied  them  simply  because 
they  did  not  fit  in  with  the  general  Russian  sys- 
tem of  a  centralized  government,  carried  on  by  a 
small  Russian  aristocracy.  In  the  present  war 
their  loyalty  has  been  suspected,  but  unless  Rus- 
sia should  suffer  serious  reverses  there  is  no  like- 
lihood of  their  getting  out  from  under  the  Russian 
crown.  If  autonomy  is  granted  to  Poland,  how- 
ever, the  argument  that  all  Russia  must  be  uni- 
form falls  away,  and  the  Finns  may  come  into 
their  own  again. 

RACE   DIVISIONS   IN   AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

The  immediate  cause  of  the  present  war  was 
the  fear  of  the  government  of  Austria-Hungary 
that  race  rivalries  were  about  to  break  up  that 
Empire.  That  this  fear  has  much  reason  may  be 
seen  from  a  brief  statement  of  the  actual  race 
divisions  in  the  Dual  Monarchy.  The  total  popu- 
lation, including  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  is  as 
follows:  Cis-Leithia  (the  Austrian  half),  29,- 
000,000;  Trans-Leithia  (the  Hungarian  half), 
£1,000,000;  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  which  are 
a  sort  of  dependency  of  the  whole  Empire,  2,- 
000,000,  a  total  of  52,000,000.  Among  these 
52,000,000  may  be  found  members  of  every  race 
of  central  and  eastern  Europe.  The  Germans 
are  12,000,000;  Magyars,  10,000,000;  Italians, 
about  1,000,000 ;  various  miscellaneous  races, 


74  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

1,000,000;  Slavs,  28,000,000.  Of  these  last 
5,000,000  are  Poles,  7,000,000  are  Serbs  (Ser- 
vians and  their  blood  brethren,  the  Croatians, 
Slovenians  and  Bosnians)  ;  4,000,000  are  Ruthen- 
ians  (i.  e.,  people  speaking  Russian,  but  living 
within  the  boundary  of  the  Empire)  ;  Bohemians, 
5,000,000;  Moravians,  Slovaks,  and  other  Slav 
people,  7,000,000. 

Not  only  are  the  Slavs  in  the  majority  in  the 
Empire  by  the  proportion  of  28  to  24,  but  they 
are  in  a  majority  in  the  Austrian  half  by  18,- 
000,000  Slavs  against  10,000,000  Germans,  and 
1,000,000  Italians.  In  Hungary  there  are  11,- 
000,000  non-Magyars  against  10,000,000  Mag- 
yars, but  out  of  the  11,000,000  about  3,000,000 
are  Germans  and  other  non-Slavic  people,  and 
3,000,000  more  in  Rumania  who  do  not  consider 
themselves  Slavs. 

Then  how  does  it  come  that  both  on  the  Aus- 
trian side  and  on  the  Hungarian  side  the  Slavs 
are  completely  under  the  dominion  of  the  other 
races?  First  of  all,  because  they  are  subdivided 
into  many  provinces  which  are  not  geographically 
grouped  together.  Bohemia  is  on  the  northwest- 
ern frontier,  close  against  Germany;  Galicia, 
which  is  Austrian  Poland,  is  on  the  northern 
frontier,  close  against  Russia,  and  that  is  the 
reason  that  Lemberg  and  Cracow  were  so  furi- 
ously attacked  by  the  Russians  in  August,  1914. 
The  Slav  mountain  provinces  of  Carniola  and 


NON-POLITICAL  DIVISIONS          75 

Gradiska  are  on  the  west,  almost  alongside  Italy. 
Croatia  and  Slavonia  lie  on  the  south;  and  Bos- 
nia is  next  door  to  Servia.  Thus  the  Slav  prov- 
inces make  a  circle  around  the  great  provinces  of 
Hungary  and  Austria  from  Rumania  back  to 
Montenegro.  The  eastern  Slav  states  are  fast  in 
a  vise  between  Hungary  and  Russia;  the  western 
are  hemmed  in  by  Hungary  and  the  Austrian- 
Germans  on  the  one  side  and  the  German  Empire 
and  Italy  on  the  other.  It  is  politically  impos- 
sible for  those  provinces  ever  to  form  an  empire 
which  shall  not  include  the  Magyar  and  German 
central  states. 

That  patent  difficulty  does  not  in  the  least 
prevent  a  tremendous  race  pressure.  Hungary 
considers  itself  a  separate  kingdom  having  the 
same  sovereign  as  Austria,  and  within  a  few  years 
has  hinted  that  it  might  get  on  as  an  independent 
kingdom.  Nobody  who  has  not  been  in  the  coun- 
try understands  the  intense  feeling  between  the 
Magyar  and  the  German,  based  on  the  fact  that 
in  the  dual  monarchy  there  is  only  one  king  and 
he  is  a.  German,  is  surrounded  by  Germans  and 
is  infused  with  a  policy  of  close  friendship  and 
mutual  enterprise  with  the  Empire  of  Germany. 
There  was  a  time  when  Vienna  nearly  overcame 
the  Hungarians.  Maria  Theresa  a  hundred  and 
fifty  years  ago  drew  the  great  nobles  to  her  court, 
attempted  to  attach  them  as  courtiers  to  the 
capital,  made  them  wear  German  clothes,  swear 


76  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

in  German,  and  even  speak  the  hated  language. 

The  Hungarian  grandees  were  land-owning 
magnates,  who  liked  the  extraordinarily  manly 
and  picturesque  costume  of  their  noble  fathers, 
were  fond  of  making  their  own  decisions,  and  at 
last  broke  away  from  this  de-Magyarizing  influ- 
ence. In  1848  they  came  to  the  point  of  declar- 
ing their  own  independence  and  actually  had  it 
so  far  as  Austria  was  concerned,  till  Russia  oblig- 
ingly sent  troops  to  destroy  the  new  republic  and 
restore  its  people  to  the  Austrian  domination. 
One  result  of  the  defeat  of  the  Austrians  by  the 
Prussians  in  1866  was  a  new  understanding  be- 
tween the  Austrian  and  Hungarian  parts  of  the 
Empire  in  1867  under  which  each  had  its  govern- 
ment and  the  Monarchy  should  act  for  both  sec- 
tions in  foreign  relations,  military  matters,  and 
common  finances. 

This  gave  the  Hungarians  nearly  a  free  hand 
in  an  attempt  to  Magyarize  the  Slavs,  which  has 
gone  on  steadily  until  the  outbreak  of  this  war. 
In  earlier  times  the  Austrian  government  delib- 
erately planted  Germans,  Rumanians,  and  Ser- 
vians on  the  outer  borders  of  Hungary,  as  a  par- 
tial curb  upon  that  proud  people.  The  effort  of 
Hungary  to  break  down  the  racial  feeling  of  those 
units  has  been  a  failure,  as  has  been  the  similar 
effort  of  the  Germans  over  the  Bohemians  and 
Italians  on  their  side  of  the  Empire.  The  success 
of  the  Serbs  in  the  Balkan  wars  of  1912  and  1913 


NON-POLITICAL  DIVISIONS          77 

stiffened  the  courage  of  all  the  Slavic  units,  espe- 
cially on  the  Hungarian  side;  and  led  to  a  belief 
in  the  minds  of  Hungarian  and  German  leaders 
that  some  of  the  Slavs  in  Bosnia  and  Croatia 
were  on  the  point  of  revolt. 


CHAPTER  V 

INTERNATIONAL   RIVALRIES   AND 
STRAINS 

TRADITIONAL   NATIONAL   HATREDS 

THE  political,  religious,  and  racial  divisions 
of  Europe  account  for  a  part  of  the  pas- 
sions which  brought  about  war,  but  when 
the  issue  was  once  joined  many  other  causes  com- 
bined to  bring  one  nation  after  another  into  the 
struggle  and  to  arrange  them  in  two  hostile 
groups.  The  first  of  these  is  a  set  of  rather  ob- 
scure national  hatreds.  For  about  five  hundred 
years  the  English  and  the  French,  though  sep- 
arated by  only  twenty-two  miles  of  water,  cordi- 
ally detested  each  other,  and  with  few  exceptions 
found  themselves  on  opposite  sides  in  any  Euro- 
pean war.  The  Napoleonic  struggle  in  which 
England  remained  the  only  power  which  kept  up 
the  war  year  after  year  (with  the  short  interval 
of  the  Peace  of  Amiens  in  1802)  strengthened 
this  feeling;  but  after  Napoleon's  fall  the  two 
countries  became  reconciled;  then  friendly;  then, 

78 


INTERNATIONAL  RIVALRIES        79 

in  the  Crimean  War  of  1854,  allies.  Later  diffi- 
culties arose  chiefly  out  of  rivalries  for  territory 
in  central  Africa;  but  for  some  time  before  the 
war  the  two  countries  were  not  only  friends  but 
cordially  united  for  common  defense.  Months 
ago,  before  there  was  a  glimmer  of  war,  the 
British  government  made  an  agreement  by  which 
the  French  fleet  was  to  be  concentrated  in  the 
Mediterranean,  and  the  British  fleet  in  the  Chan- 
nel. 

For  several  generations  England  and  Russia 
were  at  swords'  points,  of  late  years  over  the 
territorial  question  of  the  boundaries  in  central 
Asia,  and  it  is  only  sixteen  years  ago  that  Rud- 
yard  Kipling  denounced  the  Russians. 

"When  he  shows  as  seeking  quarter,  with  paws  like 

hands  in  prayer, 
THAT  is  the  time  of  peril — the  time  of  the  Truce  of 

the  Bear!' 

Nevertheless  of  late  years,  the  conviction  which 
has  arisen  in  the  minds  of  both  countries  that 
there  was  nothing  in  the  world  which  they  both 
wanted  to  such  a  degree  that  one  must  yield  or 
the  other  would  fight,  has  removed  that  animosity ; 
and  the  two  countries  are  now  cooperating. 

The  Germans  and  the  French  were  fearfully 
exasperated  with  each  other  through  the  conquests 
of  Napoleon  and  his  harsh  handling  of  conquered 
countries  and  places,  but  Germany,  like  England, 


80  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

had  no  quarrel  with  the  Bourbon  monarchy  that 
was  restored  in  France  after  Napoleon  was  over- 
thrown. The  thing  that  brought  war  in  1870  was 
that  France  under  the  Second  Empire  was  the 
last  obstacle  to  a  German  Empire.  Having  over- 
thrown the  French,  the  Germans  took  away  what 
to  their  minds  seemed  a  mislaid  part  of  their  own 
country,  since  it  had  been  French  only  a  matter 
of  two  hundred  years.  That  detail  adjusted, 
from  that  time  to  the  present  the  Germans  have 
shown  the  gracious  conqueror's  willingness  to  be 
forgiven.  The  French  have  consistently  hated  the 
Germans  and  all  their  works  with  the  same  kind 
of  resentment  that  the  Prussians  felt  when  Na- 
poleon desolated  their  country  in  1806.  Still 
even  in  the  midst  of  terrible  fighting  the  Germans 
have  a  much  kindlier  feeling  for  the  French,  whom 
they  recognize  as  people  with  a  grievance,  than 
against  the  English  who,  to  their  minds,  have 
come  into  the  war  when  they  had  received  no 
injury  to  themselves. 

The  hatred  between  Germany  and  England  is 
a  thing  of  recent  date.  The  King  of  England 
from  1715  to  1760  was  also  Elector  of  Hanover. 
In  the  eighteenth  century  England  was  the  help- 
ful friend  and  ally  of  Prussia,  against  France 
and  Austria.  Indeed  the  war  of  1914  is  the  first 
serious  conflict  in  history  between  the  Anglo- 
Saxons  and  their  dose  racial  kinsmen,  the  Ger- 
mans. The  English  stood  by  and  saw  the 


INTERNATIONAL  RIVALRIES        81 

French  abjectly  defeated  in  1871  without  in- 
terfering. Bismarck  and  Disraeli  acted  to- 
gether cordially  in  the  settlement  of  the  Balkan 
question  in  1878.  The  mother  of  the  present 
German  Emperor  was  a  daughter  of  Queen  Vic- 
toria. Suspicion  between  the  two  powers  which 
ripened  into  hatred  goes  back  to  the  beginning 
of  a  German  navy  about  fifteen  years  ago,  which 
put  the  English  to  the  expensive  task  of  keeping 
up  a  navy  which  should  at  all  times  be  as  large 
as  that  of  Germany,  combined  with  that  of  any 
other  power  in  the  world.  The  English  thought 
that  the  Emperor  William  sympathized  with  the 
Boers  in  the  South  African  War  of  1899.  The 
Germans  felt  that  the  English  were  unwilling  to 
give  them  a  fair  chance  in  Africa  and  took  the 
side  of  France  in  the  complications  over  Morocco 
in  1911.  Somehow  in  both  countries  people  at 
large  caught  the  idea  that  the  other  fellows  meant 
them  harm.  Nevertheless,  we  have  the  best  of 
documentary  evidence  that  for  some  time  up  to 
the  actual  declaration  of  war  the  Germans  were 
trying  hard  to  come  to  an  understanding  with 
England  and  through  England  with  France,  so 
as  to  form  a  "block"  in  western  Europe. 

These  national  dislikes  were  weak  in  compari- 
son with  the  hatred  felt  between  Austria-Hungary 
on  one  side  and  Servia  and  Montenegro  on  the 
other.  Since  the  Servians  had  no  seaport  they 
were  dependent  for  an  outlet  upon  Austria,  which 


82  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

has  long  treated  them  with  rudeness  and  con- 
tempt. The  Austrians  on  the  other  hand,  espe- 
cially since  the  recent  Balkan  wars,  have  consid- 
ered Servia  the  leader  in  an  effort  to  break  up  the 
Empire.  Anyone  who  has  been  in  the  Balkans 
catches  the  evidence  of  this  fierce  and  burning 
race  hatred  between  the  Serb  and  his  powerful 
neighbors,  the  Magyars  and  Germans. 

MILITARY  RIVALRIES 

National  ill-feeling  has  been  very  much  height- 
ened by  the  universal  military  service  which  now 
obtains  throughout  Continental  Europe.  It 
means  that  every  boy,  as  he  grows  up,  looks  for- 
ward to  military  service  and  puts  into  shape 
the  reasons  why  so  many  soldiers  are  needed. 
Frenchmen  or  Germans  are  taught  that  they  are 
serving  their  country  by  getting  ready  to  repel 
the  attack  of  Germans  or  Frenchmen.  Every 
general  staff  takes  pains  to  learn  what  is  going 
on  in  the  neighboring  country  and  what  its  spirit 
is.  The  officers  particularly  feel  it  a  professional 
matter  to  think  ill  both  of  the  character  and  the 
military  preparations  of  their  neighbors.  For 
months  the  officers  of  the  German  navy  are  said 
to  have  been  drinking  a  toast,  "To  the  Day"; 
that  is,  to  the  day  when  their  fleet  would  clash 
with  that  of  the  English.  Doubtless  there  has 
been  a  similar  spirit  among  British  officers. 


INTERNATIONAL  RIVALRIES        83 

Part  of  the  military  preparation  is  the  fortify- 
ing of  cities  and  frontiers.  In  the  Alps  along 
the  boundary  between  Italy  and  Austria  moun- 
tain peaks  have  been  taken,  galleries  have  been 
constructed  behind  cliffs,  forts  have  been  built 
thousands  of  feet  above  the  valleys,  railroads  and 
highways  are  protected  by  batteries  and  forts. 
The  French  about  twenty-five  years  ago  began  to 
construct  a  system  of  powerful  forts  along  their 
frontier  from  Switzerland  to  Luxemburg,  flanked 
by  smaller  forts  and  aided  by  redoubts  and  en- 
trenchments which  made  almost  a  continuous  line. 
The  effect  of  that  system  was  to  hold  the  Germans 
for  many  weeks  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  from 
an  invasion  of  France  by  that  route. 

Great  cities  like  Paris  are  provided  with  a  mod- 
ern system  of  forts,  a  hundred  miles  in  circum- 
ference. Other  cities  like  Vienna  and  Berlin  are 
protected  chiefly  by  the  armies  on  the  frontiers ; 
but  even  in  peace  cities  are  occasionally  put  under 
what  the  Germans  call  a  "secondary  state  of 
siege,"  in  which  the  police  have  unusual  powers 
over  visitors  and  residents.  The  effect  is  to 
create  in  the  public  mind  the  feeling  that  war  is 
inevitable;  that  every  precaution  must  be  taken 
all  the  time ;  that  somebody  beyond  the  border  is 
simply  watching  for  the  opportunity  to  leap  at 
the  throat  of  one's  country. 

Armies  in  time  of  peace  are  kept  within  their 
own  boundaries  except  for  a  few  visits  of  show 


84  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

troops ;  but  navies  go  all  over  the  world.  Whether 
or  no  trade  follows  the  flag,  international  jeal- 
ousies are  likely  to  follow  the  flag.  Sometimes 
light  upon  a  state  of  feeling  is  shed  by  incidents 
of  the  official  courtesies  of  naval  intercourse. 
When  the  United  States,  for  instance,  sent  in 
1908  a  fleet  of  ironclads  to  make  a  friendly  visit 
in  Japan,  the  Japanese  with  punctilious  courtesy 
announced  that  they  would  send  a  fleet  of  an 
equal  number  of  vessels  to  meet  and  escort  the 
Americans  to  their  anchorage  in  Yokohama. 

Nobody  quite  knows  in  Europe  how  many 
soldiers  are  called  into  service,  or  how  many  forts 
are  building,  but  all  military  authorities  with 
eagerness  watch  the  annual  list  of  new  naval  ves- 
sels, and  the  accounts  of  new  types  of  destructive 
craft.  War  feeds  on  war;  every  battle  leaves  be- 
hind it  something  to  avenge.  The  prestige  of 
defeating  an  army ;  the  ambition  of  the  command- 
ing generals ;  the  desire  for  an  opportunity  of 
distinction,  all  play  their  part  in  pushing  a  coun- 
try into  war.  A  new  pace  was  set  in  1913  by  the 
unexpected  success  of  the  Balkan  allies  against 
Turkey.  Emperor  William  at  once  announced 
that  the  results  of  the  war  compelled  him  to  en- 
large the  German  army;  and  he  also  pushed 
through  the  Reichstag  a  special  war  tax  of  1% 
per  cent  on  the  property  of  Germany.  France 
took  alarm  at  what  seemed  to  her  a  disturbance 
of  the  military  balance,  and  in  1913  passed  a  bill 


INTERNATIONAL  RIVALRIES        85 

providing  in  future  for  a  three-year  military  ser- 
vice for  all  able-bodied  young  men.  Instead  of 
making  this  immediately  effective  by  keeping  the 
"class  of  1910,"  which  had  already  served  two 
years,  the  government  called  up  in  the  same  year 
the  class  that  had  reached  the  age  of  20,  and  also 
the  class  that  was  21  years  old,  thus  increasing 
the  army  under  the  colors  by  something  less  than 
one-third.  These  preparations  made  the  Germans 
think  war  was  approaching.  The  air  was  full  of 
a  military  spirit. 

COMMERCIAL  RIVALRIES 

From  the  days  of  the  Carthaginians  and  the 
Punic  Wars  down  to  the  present  time  a  fruitful 
cause  of  war  is  the  desire  of  nations  to  secure  a 
trade  and  the  profits  thereof.  In  the  old  days, 
when  the  seas  were  beset  by  pirates,  no  permanent 
trade  was  possible  that  was  not  protected  by  a 
military  or  naval  force ;  and  when  so  protected  it 
became  a  monopoly.  Our  modern  conditions  are 
different;  civilized  powers  unite  to  clear  the  seas 
of  pirates  and  the  general  tendency  is  to  open  the 
ports  of  every  nation  to  the  vessels  of  every  na- 
tion. The  two  principal  restrictions  are  protec- 
tive tariffs,  which  aim  to  prevent  international 
trade,  and  the  rigid  colonial  system  which  keeps 
colonial  ports  closed  except  to  vessels  of  the  em- 
pire to  which  they  belong.  In  spite  of  tariffs,  all 


86  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

the  contesting  powers  have  been  trading  among 
each  other  and  with  other  powers  which  have  re- 
mained neutral.  The  old-fashioned  colonial  sys- 
tems have  almost  broken  down  except  in  Russia, 
whose  colonies  lie  next  door  to  them  on  the  main- 
land of  Asia.  Never  since  the  world  began  was 
trade  as  broad  and  as  profitable  as  in  the  year 
1913. 

The  evidence  of  this  is  the  tremendous  volume 
of  business  reported  by  statisticians.  The  carry- 
ing trade  between  nations  busied  about  23  ,- 
000,000  tons  of  shipping;  the  new  ships  built  in 
that  year  aggregated  about  8,000,000  tons;  the 
total  value  of  international  commerce  was  42,000 
million  dollars.  Every  one  of  the  six  powers 
shared  in  this  prosperity.  The  total  value  of 
English  imports  and  exports  combined  was  6,900 
million  dollars;  that  of  Germany  was  5,000  mil- 
lion; and  France  3,900  million;  of  Austria  1,250 
million;  of  Italy  1,200  million;  of  Russia  1,450 
million,  making  a  total  of  19,700  million  in  those 
powers  alone.  The  external  commerce,  out  and 
in,  of  the  United  States  in  that  year  was  4,300 
million.  Since  every  export  from  one  country  is 
an  import  into  another,  these  totals  divided  by 
two  give  12,000  million  dollars  as  the  approxi- 
mate value  of  the  commodities  transported  across 
the  boundaries  of  the  six  great  European  powers 
and  the  United  States.  The  profits  upon  that  trade 
could  hardly  have  been  less  than  2,000  millions. 


INTERNATIONAL  RIVALRIES        87 

England  was  the  greatest  carrier  and  had  the 
most  populous  colonies,  but  Germany  was  con- 
stantly raising  the  skill  of  her  manufactures,  the 
enterprise  of  her  merchants,  the  industry  and  at- 
tention to  business  of  her  selling  machinery  in 
other  countries.  Germany's  actual  and  propor- 
tional trade  increased  from  year  to  year.  Ap- 
parently Great  Britain  was  not  anxious  on  that 
score  because  her  trade  was  never  so  great  as 
in  1913  when  England  imported  goods  to  the 
value  of  394  million  dollars  from  Germany  and 
exported  a  value  of  292  million  dollars  to  Ger- 
many. There  is  no  evidence  that  England  had 
formed  any  purpose  of  shutting  German  goods 
out  of  her  colonies  or  excluding  German  ships 
from  any  of  the  high  seas.  On  the  contrary, 
England  looked  on  without  a  protest  at  the  found- 
ing of  the  Germany  colony  of  Kiao-Chao  in  1898, 
which  was  expected  to  grow  into  an  entrepot  of 
Chinese  trade.  In  fact,  the  English  did  not  find 
their  colonial  trade  the  chief  source  of  national 
wealth;  inasmuch  as  the  exports  from  Great 
Britain  to  all  the  British  colonies  were  only  1,024< 
million  dollars  out  of  a  total  export  of  3,112 
million  dollars.  Of  course,  if  England  really  de- 
sired to  destroy  or  to  damage  German  commerce, 
a  war  would  be  the  readiest  way  of  bringing  it 
about,  provided  England  could  keep  control  of 
the  seas. 

For  many  years  there  has  been  a  competition 


88  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

of  nations  in  picking  up  points  of  vantage  for 
future  trade.  The  British,  as  one  of  the  four 
great  colonizing  and  trading  nations  of  the  seven- 
teenth and  eighteenth  centuries,  had  an  oppor- 
tunity to  choose  their  seats  early,  especially  as 
they  fought  and  in  the  end  overcame  the  other 
large  maritime  powers,  the  Dutch,  the  Spaniards, 
and  the  French.  Think  of  the  spots  which  the 
English  soldier  "painted  red"  in  those  early 
times!  Boston,  New  York,  Chesapeake  Bay, 
Charleston,  Jamaica,  Honduras,  Bombay,  Cal- 
cutta, Madras,  Ceylon,  Singapore,  Gibraltar, 
Malta,  Puget  Sound,  Cape  Town,  Melbourne, 
New  Zealand,  and  later  Hong  Kong,  Aden, 
Egypt,  Cyprus.  Pickings  were  good  when  Eng- 
land began.  These  fortified  posts  give  England 
protection  all  the  way  from  London  through  the 
Mediterranean  and  the  Red  Sea,  to  India,  China, 
and  Japan.  The  purchase  of  the  Suez  Canal  in 
1875,  which  has  remained  a  British  public  work, 
completed  this  magnificent  chain. 

Something  was  still  left  for  future  collectors 
of  commercial  points  of  vantage.  The  Dutch 
have  their  East  India  Islands,  which  would,  how- 
ever, be  simply  a  weakness  if  they  entered  into 
this  war.  The  French  have  established  themselves 
in  North  Africa,  Mauritius,  Madagascar,  retain 
Martinique  and  French  Guiana,  and  have  taken 
up  a  convenient  set  of  stations  in  southeastern 
Asia.  The  United  States  has  planted  its  flag  in 


INTERNATIONAL  RIVALRIES        89 

Porto  Rico,  the  naval  stations  of  Cuba,  the  Pan- 
ama Canal  strip,  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  and 
Manila.  Nevertheless  there  was  not  much  avail- 
able for  the  Germans.  Their  African  possessions, 
though  large,  lie  entirely  off  the  great  highways 
of  the  world's  commerce.  Their  Pacific  Islands 
are  of  little  account.  It  was  natural  to  feel  that 
they  were  crowded  out  and  that  war  might  give 
a  chance  to  upset  the  English  chain  of  islands, 
dependencies  and  fortified  places. 

The  Germans  appear  to  be  convinced  that  a 
main  cause  of  the  war  was  the  formal  decision  of 
the  British  government  that  German  trade  and 
German  shipping  must  be  driven  from  the  sea. 
No  steps  were  taken  in  that  direction  by  Parlia- 
ment; none  by  the  British  colonial  governments. 
The  splendid  North  German  Lloyd  line,  by  its 
intelligence  and  courtesy,  became  the  best  from 
Europe  to  Eastern  Asia.  German  goods  were 
sold  in  every  British  market.  The  German  in- 
ference from  this  fact  was  a  deep-laid,  long- 
planned  conspiracy  to  pool  the  British  colonial 
trade  policy  with  the  French  Alsace-Lorraine 
policy  and  the  Russian  pan-Slavic  policy,  all 
watching  for  a  convenient  moment  to  force  Ger- 
many and  her  allies,  Austria-Hungary  and  Italy, 
into  war.  This  was  the  method  of  the  English 
with  the  Spaniards  from  1577  to  1807,  with  the 
Dutch  from  1651  to  1689;  with  the  French  from 
1689  to  1815.  Germany  was  the  fourth  rival 


90  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

commercial  nation,  and  thought  it  logical  that  an 
attempt  should  be  made  to  ruin  her  in  the  same 
way.  The  fact  that  the  Dutch,  the  Spaniards 
and  the  French  have  to-day  a  large  commerce 
in  spite  of  English  opposition  a  century  ago,  may 
or  may  not  affect  this  argument.  The  United 
States  has  an  immense  foreign  trade,  on  every 
sea;  yet  has  not  been  conscious  of  any  purpose 
of  Great  Britain  to  kill  that  trade,  by  laws  or 
by  dreadnoughts.  How  far  Great  Britain  seems 
to  have  sought  to  force  a  quarrel  at  this  time  will 
be  discussed  later  in  this  book.  The  German  con- 
clusion on  the  subject  is  in  the  nature  of  the  case 
not  based  on  documentary  evidence,  for  none 
bearing  on  this  question  of  restriction  of  trade 
has  been  made  public. 

TRANSPORTATION   RIVALRIES 

The  sea  roads  are  open  to  all  nations,  and  will 
be  so  long  as  there  is  a  system  of  civilized  powers ; 
but  the  land  roads  are  monopolies,  and  the  coun- 
tries through  which  they  run  are  likely  to  adhere 
to  the  power  that  controls  the  highway. 

Several  unofficial  statements  by  Germans  of  the 
disabilities  under  which  Germany  has  labored 
argue  that  one  of  the  objects  of  German  policy 
is  to  build  and  control  a  railway  from  western 
Europe  to  southern  Asia.  For  this  purpose  there 
is  only  one  possible  direct  route.  It  goes  down 


INTERNATIONAL  RIVALRIES        91 

the  upper  Danube;  southeastward  through  the 
Balkans  to  Constantinople;  thence  eastward 
through  Asia  Minor,  rounding  the  northeast 
coast  of  the  Mediterranean;  across  to  the  valley 
of  the  Euphrates ;  down  that  river  to  the  Persian 
Gulf;  thence  eastward  through  Persia  till  it 
strikes  the  Indian  Empire. 

The  conception  is  a  magnificent  one,  and  would 
long  ago  have  been  carried  out  in  some  fashion 
but  for  the  masterly  success  of  Turkey  in  pre- 
venting any  radical  improvement  in  the  conditions 
of  its  Empire,  and  the  objection  of  the  English, 
who  had  no  wish  to  let  others  find  a  short  road 
to  India.  Considerable  parts  of  this  line  are  al- 
ready built  or  under  way.  From  Berlin  to 
Vienna,  Budapest,  and  Belgrade  there  is  a  well- 
traveled  route.  From  Belgrade  lines  through 
Servia  and  Bulgaria  and  the  remnants  of  Turkish 
territory  reach  the  Golden  Horn.  Three  miles 
away  across  the  Bosphorus  is  the  handsome  sta- 
tion of  the  German-owned  railway  through  South- 
ern Asia  Minor  to  Eregli.  Thence  the  road  is 
under  construction  eastward,  and  there  is  a  con- 
cession from  the  Turkish  government  all  the  way 
to  Bussorah,  which  was  a  famous  place  three 
thousand  years  ago  when  the  Hebrew  prophet 
asked,  "Who  is  this  that  cometh  from  Edom,  with 
dyed  garments  from  Bozrah ;  this  that  is  glorious 
in  his  apparel,  traveling  in  the  greatness  of  his 
strength?"  Thence  probably  a  line  will  be  con- 


92  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

structed  through  Persia  and  Baluchistan  to  Kur- 
rachee,  where  it  would  connect  with  the  Indian 
system.  Before  many  years  a  line  will  certainly 
be  built  from  the  eastern  end  of  that  system,  in 
Burma,  through  the  mountains  to  Southern  China 
and  Canton. 

There  is  ground  for  the  German  feeling  that 
the  world  has  not  been  fair  to  them  in  their  rela- 
tions with  the  Orient.  The  Russians  have  con- 
tinuous territory  to  the  Pacific,  and  the  Trans- 
Siberian  railway,  which  is  an  international  high- 
way. The  English  are  the  masters  of  the  short 
sea  line  via  the  Suez  Canal,  because  they  possess 
naval  power  against  anybody  else,  because  of 
their  fortresses,  and  because  of  their  ability  to 
block  the  Suez  Canal  against  their  enemies  in 
time  of  war,  whatever  the  Convention  of  1888 
may  say  to  the  contrary.  The  Germans  had  the 
capital,  wanted  to  invest  it  in  a  railroad,  and 
secured  a  concession  from  Turkey.  Failing  an 
official  announcement,  we  are  left  to  guess  how 
far  the  Germans  felt  reasonably  entitled  to  such 
political  control  in  the  Balkans  as  would  be  neces- 
sary to  give  them  a  world-route. 

The  idea  of  making  any  considerable  part  of 
this  line  a  German  enterprise,  backed  up  by  the 
government  as  a  national  work,  conflicts  with 
several  serious  difficulties.  The  first  is  that  Ger- 
many does  not  reach  to  the  Balkans ;  but  Austria- 
Hungary  does,  and  one  of  the  presumed  reasons 


INTERNATIONAL  RIVALRIES        93 

for  the  alliance  between  the  two  Empires  is  to 
keep  open  that  route  as  far  as  Austrian  influence 
goes.  If,  then,  Austria  can  ever  reach  a  long  arm 
down  through  the  Balkans  to  Constantinople,  that 
link  in  the  world-route  will  be  brought  substan- 
tially under  German  influence.  To  accomplish  that 
result  means  the  rousing  up  of  24,000,000  Balkan 
people  who  can  in  case  of  need  put  about  £,- 
000,000  experienced  soldiers  into  the  field;  and 
they  would  all  die  in  their  trenches  before  they 
would  admit  the  Germans  directly  or  through  the 
Austrians  into  their  country.  They  have  been 
under  the  Turkish  yoke  for  five  centuries,  and 
having  had  the  vitality  to  free  themselves  are  (as 
a  matter  of  prediction)  not  likely  to  accept  the 
control  of  a  distant  power  representing  a  differ- 
ent race  and  culture  from  their  own. 

The  next  section  of  the  road  has  also  its  diffi- 
culties, because  though  a  track  can  be  laid  and 
trains  can  be  run  by  a  German  company,  there 
can  be  no  such  thing  as  a  German  national  high- 
way that  does  not  involve  the  conquest  and  hold- 
ing of  a  considerable  part  of  Asia  Minor.  That 
would  cut  the  Turkish  Empire  in  two,  and  neither 
fragment  could  keep  up  a  national  existence. 

COLONIAL   RIVALRIES 

The  war  on  both  sides  is  in  part  a  war  for 
the  acquirement  or  the  protection  of  colonies. 


94  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

Old  as  the  word  and  the  practice  is,  we  do  not 
always  realize  that  in  the  modern  world  the  most 
successful  colonies  are  not  planted  by  any  one 
power.  The  largest  European  colony  in  exist- 
ence is  the  United  States  of  America,  in  which 
every  person  except  the  full-blooded  Indians  is 
a  colonist  or  a  descendant  of  a  colonist.  There 
are  now  living  within  our  boundaries  9,000,000 
people  of  German  or  German-Austrian  parentage ; 
10,000,000  of  English,  Scotch,  Irish,  and  Welsh; 
3,200,000  Slavs,  inclusive  of  1,700,000  Poles- 
3,000,000  Scandinavians ;  2,000,000  Italians ; 
130,000  Greeks.  Similar  colonies,  especially  of 
Italians  and  Germans,  exist  in  the  Argentine  Re- 
public and  in  Brazil.  Germans  in  all  three  coun- 
tries buy  their  share  of  German  goods  and  thus  in- 
crease the  wealth  and  trade  of  the  mother  country. 
There  seems  to  be  an  inherent  feeling  among 
nations  that  there  is  a  special  advantage  and 
profit  in  possessing,  governing,  and  selling  goods 
to  areas  over  which  your  country  shall  have  full 
control.  Plenty  of  money  can  be  made  out  of 
colonies  consisting  of  people  of  the  European 
stock  who  have  complicated  and  expensive  wants. 
Money  can  be  made,  though  less  readily,  from 
trade  with  a  thickly-settled  and  populous  coun- 
try like  India;  the  average  buying  power  of  the 
natives  is  low  but  there  are  many  of  them.  The 
English  have  enjoyed  an  advantageous  trade 
there  for  three  hundred  years. 


INTERNATIONAL  RIVALRIES        95 

The  ultimate  profits  to  be  drawn  from  colonies 
in  equatorial  Africa  are  doubtful  because  the  pur- 
chasing power  of  the  natives  is  small,  and  be- 
cause it  is  hard  to  induce  them  to  labor.  Some 
years  ago  two  live  young  American  business  men 
attempted  to  start  business  in  Venezuela.  They 
were  proceeding  in  a  river  steamer  and  had  on 
board  a  mule.  At  a  landing  they  called  to  a 
man  on  shore  in  Spanish,  "Look  here!  If  you 
will  come  down  and  look  after  our  mule  we  will 
give  you  a  dollar."  To  which  the  answer  was, 
"I  have  a  mule  up  here  in  the  village;  if  you 
will  come  on  shore  and  look  after  my  mule,  I 
will  give  you  a  dollar."  That  is  the  weak  spot 
in  all  attempts  to  plant  European  colonies  among 
savage  or  barbarous  races.  Unless  they  can  be 
stirred  up  by  a  European  desire  for  something 
more  than  shelter  and  daily  food,  they  can  be 
induced  to  work  only  by  some  kind  of  force.  The 
Dutch  have  for  many  years  practised  in  their 
Asiatic  islands  what  they  called  a  "labor  system," 
which  was  a  mild  slavery.  King  Leopold  on  the 
Congo  and  the  rubber  companies  on  the  upper 
Amazon  have  tried  the  most  barbarous  and  de- 
structive methods  of  inducing  the  natives  to  fur- 
nish the  necessary  labor  for  getting  out  the  raw 
products  upon  which  the  white  traders  may  make 
a  profit.  The  Portuguese  colonies,  which  are 
several  centuries  old,  are  almost  a  failure. 

Only  three  of  the  six  European  great  powers 


96  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

have  colonies  which  bring  in  an  income.  Russia 
has  Asiatic  provinces  which  under  the  protective 
tariff  of  the  country  are  to  a  large  degree  re- 
served for  Russian  trade.  France  has  found  a 
field  for  capital  and  also  a  nursery  of  soldiers 
in  Algeria  and  Tunis,  and  is  now  taking  posses- 
sion of  Morocco.  In  addition  France  has  large 
colonies  on  the  Niger  and  Congo  and  the  Island 
of  Madagascar;  and  Tongking,  Anam,  Cam- 
bodia and  Cochin  China,  grouped  under  the  gen- 
eral term  of  French  Indo-China.  In  1898  they 
seized  the  port  of  Kwangchau  Wan  from  the 
Chinese.  France  is  generally  supposed  to  spend 
far  more  than  she  gets  from  her  colonies,  even 
counting  to  the  good  both  the  local  taxes  and  the 
profits  of  French  traders.  It  was  bad  fortune 
for  the  French,  but  a  great  blessing  to  the  United 
States  of  America  that  they  lost  the  Ohio 
Valley  and  subsequently  had  to  part  with  Lou- 
isiana, since  Providence  had  decreed  that  those 
regions  were  to  make  up  part  of  a  western 
republic. 

Great  Britain  is  the  great  colonizing  nation  of 
modern  times — very  early  on  the  ground,  from 
the  first  attacking  the  Spanish  and  the  French 
colonies,  uprooting  the  Dutch  in  New  Nether- 
land,  seizing  many  of  the  West  India  Islands, 
building  up  a  magnificent  empire  in  India  and 
Burma,  planting  colonies  and  ports  all  the  way 
from  England  to  China,  and  in  recent  years  tak- 


INTERNATIONAL  RIVALRIES        97 

ing  Egypt  and  a  considerable  part  of  the  African 
continent. 

The  Italians  have  had  bad  luck  with  their 
colonies.  Their  settlement  at  Eritrea  on  the 
Red  Sea  has  been  a  failure.  The  French  took 
Tunis  out  from  under  their  very  nose  in  1881, 
and  it  is  only  two  years  ago  that  they  wrested 
Tripoli  from  its  slender  connection  with  the 
Turkish  Empire.  Doubtless  they  would  be  glad 
to  receive  a  block  of  anybody  else's  colonies  any- 
where, for  they  are  fine  sailors  and  have  a  large 
merchant  marine. 

Germany  was  three  hundred  years  ago  in  an 
excellent  strategic  position  for  the  possession 
of  colonies.  The  German  Hansa  was  the  largest, 
strongest,  and  best  managed  commercial  enter- 
prise of  the  period,  and  practically  controlled 
the  whole  Baltic  trade.  The  Germans  were  good 
sailors  and  had  a  population  of  farmers  and  arti- 
sans who  would  have  made  the  best  kind  of  colon- 
ists. The  world  was  then  young  and  they  might 
easily  have  planted  themselves  on  the  coast  of 
America  or  in  the  West  Indies.  The  Thirty 
Years'  War  ruined  Germany  and  prevented  her 
taking  advantage  of  this  opportunity.  For  the 
last  hundred  years  the  Germans  have  been  enrich- 
ing other  independent  countries  with  the  labor,  the 
intellectual  forces  and  profits  of  their  immigrants ; 
yet  in  1913  the  Germans  had  only  about  25,000 
of  their  own  people  in  all  their  colonies,  of  whom 


98  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

£,000  were  in  the  German  Pacific  Islands  and  a 
few  hundred  in  Kiao-Chao,  besides  a  military  gar- 
rison of  unknown  strength.  It  seems  clear  that 
few  Germans  are  willing  to  go  to  tropical  or 
Asiatic  coast  settlements,  even  with  the  aid  and 
incentive  of  their  officials. 

Nevertheless  Germany  has  an  increasing  popu- 
lation from  which  it  might  well  spare  several 
hundred  thousand  a  year  to  build  up  a  distant 
colonial  empire.  The  question  is  where  to  find 
the  space.  Parts  of  South  America  are  attrac- 
tive to  the  Germans,  of  whom  some  hundreds 
of  thousands  may  be  found  in  the  La  Plata  Val- 
ley ;  but  the  only  way  that  German  colonies  could 
be  founded  would  be  by  military  conquest,  for  no 
Latin- American  power  would  willingly  admit  so 
powerful  a  neighbor.  Athwart  all  schemes  of 
European  powers  in  South  America  stands  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  as  applied  and  emphasized  by 
President  Roosevelt  in  correspondence  with  Ger- 
many in  1901.  Any  valuable  part  of  Asia  would 
have  to  be  taken  by  force  from  Russia,  France 
or  Great  Britain.  The  Pacific  Islands  are  poor 
picking  so  far  as  colonization  and  trade  go. 
Africa  is  now  completely  subdivided  among  the 
various  European  powers.  The  most  obvious  col- 
lection of  colonies  is  the  British;  and  in  any  fu- 
ture readjustment  on  a  large  scale,  it  would  be 
Great  Britain  who  would  give  up  the  territory, 
if  Germany  could  compel  the  transfer.  Or  the 


INTERNATIONAL  RIVALRIES        99 

French  might  be  deprived  of  North  Africa,  or 
their  Asiatic  colonies,  which  lie  in  a  more  favora- 
ble zone  than  colonial  Africa.  Even  there  the 
question  would  arise  which  perplexes  the  United 
States  in  the  Philippines:  how  to  govern  and 
satisfy  a  population  among  whom  none  of  the 
people  from  home  are  willing  to  pass  their  lives 
and  bring  up  their  children. 

RACE   BITTERNESS 

As  has  been  pointed  out  in  the  previous  chap- 
ter, the  sharpest  antagonism  nowadays  is  between 
race  groups.  The  suspicions  and  prejudice  be- 
tween European  neighbors  is  paralleled  by  the 
state  of  feeling  between  Japan  and  China  and  be- 
tween China  and  the  Western  powers  in  general. 
At  present  the  race  issues  have  been  much  intensi- 
fied by  the  experience  of  the  Balkans  where  for 
five  centuries  there  has  been  the  most  bitter  feel- 
ing between  the  conquering  Turks  and  the  sub- 
ject Christian  races.  Slowly  the  weight  of  the 
Turks  has  been  rolled  off,  almost  disappearing 
after  the  first  Balkan  war  of  1912;  but  that 
brought  into  relief  the  race  hatreds  between  Bul- 
garians, Greeks,  and  Servians,  when  free  to  rage 
without  even  the  small  control  formerly  exer- 
cised by  the  Turkish  government.  So  long  as 
there  are  thousands  of  Bulgarians,  Greeks  and 
Servians  living  outside  their  national  boundaries 


100  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

and  each  group  claiming  a  special  national  status 
within  the  country  in  which  it  lives,  there  will  be 
no  peace  in  the  Balkans. 

Until  there  is  peace  in  the  Balkans  there  will 
be  no  permanent  peace  in  eastern  Europe.  Three 
outside  nations  have  long  worked  upon  the  Balkan 
people :  Turkey,  Russia,  and  Austria.  Turkey 
is  for  the  time  being  out  of  commission,  so  to 
speak,  but  Russia  has  a  genuine  national  inter- 
est in  fellow  Slavs  and  coreligionists,  and,  in 
addition,  a  determination  sooner  or  later  to  take 
Constantinople  by  the  water  route  through  the 
Black  Sea  or  by  the  land  routes  through  Bul- 
garia and  Asia  Minor.  Austria  has  also  a  racial 
interest  in  the  Balkans ;  a  race  antagonism  be- 
tween the  Germans  and  Magyars  on  one  side  and 
the  Balkan  Slavs  and  Bulgarians  on  the  other 
side;  a  race  sympathy  between  the  Croatians, 
Slovenes,  arid  other  Slav  peoples  and  their  breth- 
ren south  of  the  Danube.  In  general  all  the 
Balkan  peoples  cordially  detest  Austria,  partly 
because  that  country  has  not  been  obliging  in 
trade  relations. 

This  race  hatred  was  raised  to  a  high  pitch  by 
the  murder  of  Franz  Ferdinand,  heir  to  the  Aus- 
trian imperial  throne,  at  Sarajevo,  Bosnia,  June 
28,  1914.  The  actual  murderer  and  some  of  his 
accomplices  were  Austrian  subjects;  but  the  Aus- 
trians  laid  the  crime  at  the  door  first,  of  Servians 
who  had  a  hand  in  the  conspiracy;  second,  of 


INTERNATIONAL*  PayARIEg      101 


minor  Servian  officials  who  were  believed  to  have 
been  a  party  to  the  murder;  third,  of  the  Ser- 
vian government  which  had  not  prevented  the 
affair;  and  fourth,  of  the  whole  Servian  people 
who  maintained  that  government. 

This  outbreak  is  only  the  high  tide  of  a  race 
feeling  which  has  been  evident  in  eastern  Europe 
for  many  years.  The  Germans,  both  in  Ger- 
many and  in  Austria,  look  upon  the  Slavs  as  an 
inferior  but  dangerous  people.  All  the  efforts  of 
the  last  century  and  a  half  to  Germanize  them 
have  come  to  naught,  both  within  and  without 
the  German  and  Austrian  Empires.  Many  Slav 
groups  are  doing  well;  for  instance,  the  Bohe- 
mians who  show  an  excellent  capacity  for  business 
and  finance.  The  Slavs  are  in  general  a  less 
active,  pushing  and  planning  race  than  the  Ger- 
mans, and  have  offered  an  india  rubber  resistance 
to  the  attempt  to  lead  them  into  a  culture  which 
they  did  not  desire.  Yet  there  is  no  evidence 
that  the  Slavs  are  incapable  of  building  up  strong 
communities  and  of  developing  republican  forms 
of  government.  So  far  as  equality  of  condi- 
tions go  the  Servians,  with  their  multitude  of 
small  land-holding  farmers,  are  one  of  the  most 
democratic  peoples  in  the  world.  One  of  their 
offenses  is  that  they  show  a  capacity  to  do  well; 
while  they  were  weak  and  -behind  the  rest  of  the 
world,  there  was  little  to  fear.  The  thing  that 
most  aroused  Europe  in  the  Balkan  wars  was 


1QS-  TEtE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

that  Slav  armies  could  take  the  field,  fight  des- 
perate pitched  battles,  and  hold  their  own  against 
a  strong  opponent. 

The  Germans  have  been  aroused  by  the  so- 
called  pan-Slavic  movement,  a  vague  effort,  headed 
by  Russia,  to  bring  all  the  Slavs  in  eastern 
Europe  into  some  kind  of  accord,  which  meant 
of  course  the  drawing  away  of  Slav  subjects  of 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary.  That  movement 
is  undeniably  hostile  to  Germanism,  but  it  has 
already  lost  vitality  for  the  simple  reason  that 
not  a  single  Slav  unit,  either  in  the  Balkans  or  in 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire,  desires  to  be  a 
part  of  Russia  or  a  part  of  any  empire  in  which 
Russia  is  predominant.  The  Servians  are  doubt- 
less grateful  to  Russia  for  backing  them  up  in  the 
present  war,  but  they  would  turn  their  armies 
upon  Russia  and  fight  till  the  last  man  dropped 
rather  than  be  Russianized.  So  far  as  there  is 
any  danger  that  Russia  may  try  to  pick  up  frag- 
ments of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire,  the  prin- 
cipal obstacle  is  that  there  is  apparently  not  a 
single  Austrian  province  that  would  not  think  it- 
self worse  off  on  the  Russian  side  of  the  boundary 
than  on  the  Austrian. 

Nevertheless,  Germans  and  Slavs  believe  mu- 
tually each  that  the  other  race  is  bent  upon  con- 
quest; and  that  if  successful  each  will  try  to 
stamp  out  the  peculiar  ideas  and  culture  of  the 
other  side.  Protestant  and  Roman  Catholic  Ger- 


INTERNATIONAL  RIVALRIES      103 

mans  are  to  be  forced  into  the  Greek  Church,  or, 
per  contra,  the  Servians  and  the  Russians  will 
be  compelled  to  accept  the  Roman  or  a  Protestant 
Church.  The  fierce  and  long-continued  Russian 
effort  to  break  up  the  Finnish  and  Polish  national 
culture  has  been  and  is  a  strong  argument  on  the 
Germanic  side. 

Up  to  1914  it  was  doubtful  whether  Russia  had 
the  slightest  intention  or  wish  to  take  Germans 
or  Magyars  inside  her  boundaries.  It  is  doubt- 
ful whether  even  in  the  case  of  a  great  success 
Russia  will  demand  any  territory  inhabited  by 
Slavs  except  perhaps  Prussian  and  Austrian 
Poland.  The  question  of  the  future  of  mankind 
is  not  to  be  settled  by  the  Slavs  calling  the  Ger- 
mans pig-headed,  obstinate,  and  bent  on  world 
rule;  or  by  the  Germans  calling  the  Russians 
half -barbarous  Asiatics.  The  main  result  of  this 
state  of  things  is,  or  has  been,  that  when  •  the 
crisis  came  the  leading  Slav  power  and  the  lead- 
ing German  power  were  ready  to  believe  the  worst 
of  each  other's  morals  and  intentions. 


PART    II.    WAR 
CHAPTER    VI 

WAR    IN    THE    BALKANS 

THE   BALKANS   TO   1878 

MOST  wars  finally  turn  upon  a  single  inci- 
dent which  may  be  the  culmination  of 
a  long  and  acrid  controversy,  but  is 
accepted  as  the  reason  for  hostilities.  In  1861 
everybody  knew  that  the  war  actually  began  with 
the  firing  on  Fort  Sumter.  In  1870  the  last  of- 
ficial reason  was  the  insistence,  or  supposed  in- 
sistence, of  the  Emperor  of  the  French  upon  a 
pledge  from  the  King  of  Prussia  that  he  would 
not  in  future  allow  any  Hohenzollern  to  occupy 
the  throne  of  Spain.  In  the  present  struggle, 
however,  so  many  powers  are  involved,  so  many 
relations  and  cross-relations  have  to  be  taken 
into  account,  that  the  precise  moment  when  the 
temple  of  Janus  burst  open  is,  and  will  always 
be,  impossible  to  fix.  For  reasons  hereafter  given, 
August  1,  1914  marks  the  extinction  of  the  last 

104 


WAR  IN  THE  BALKANS  105 

possibility  of  peace  and  may  be  considered  the 
date  of  the  beginning  of  the  war. 

Inhabitants  of  a  seasoned  wooden  house  some- 
times smell  smoke,  then  see  little  wreaths  floating 
out  from  the  eaves ;  while  they  are  rushing  to 
and  fro,  calling  for  the  fire  department,  suddenly 
the  flame,  which  has  been  gaining  ground  within, 
shoots  up  through  the  roof,  and  all  you  can  say 
about  it  is,  "Fire!  Fire!"  So  it  is  with  the 
present  conflict.  Eight  nations  were  placing  their 
troops  in  the  field  before  any  one  of  them  could 
give  a  solid  and  substantial  reason  for  the  war, 
other  than  that  they  were  compelled  to  defend 
themselves  against  a  wicked  and  unprovoked 
attack. 

That  the  war  began  in  eastern  Europe  was 
natural  because,  as  has  been  shown  in  earlier 
chapters,  the  tension  in  that  part  of  the  world 
is  greater,  and  on  that  battleground  of  the  ages 
live  a  number  of  race  groups  of  individuals  whose 
fate  is  settled  for  them  by  members  of  a  different 
race  unacceptable  to  them.  Whatever  might  have 
happened  next  year  or  in  the  next  decade,  it  is 
clear  that  the  prime  reason  for  the  war  of  1914< 
is  to  be  found  in  the  abnormal  relations  of  the 
Balkans  to  the  rest  of  the  European  powers. 

The  tale  of  the  present  condition  of  the  Balkans 
may  be  taken  up  in  the  year  1876,  just  when 
Henry  Watterson  was  going  to  raise  one  hundred 
thousand  men  to  march  to  Washington  and  inau- 


106  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

gurate  Tilden  and  did  not.  In  that  year  Turkey 
still  occupied  almost  all  the  territory  north  to  the 
Danube  and  Save  Rivers,  except  for  Greece,  then 
confined  to  the  southern  peninsula ;  and  the  plucky 
little  country  of  Montenegro,  which  was  the  only 
part  of  the  Balkans  that  never  bowed  the  knee  to 
the  Turks. 

The  trouble  was  made  public  by  certain  jour- 
nalists who  discovered  that  the  Turks  were 
sending  certain  irregular  troops  called  Bashi  Ba- 
_zouks  to  harry,  strip,  and  torture  the  Bulgarians. 
With  great  difficulty  these  journalists  got  access 
to  the  English  newspapers ;  that  aroused  Mr. 
Gladstone,  then  Prime  Minister.  When  in  1877 
Russian  and  Rumanian  troops  marched  south- 
ward, freeing  Bulgaria,  England  held  off  and  did 
not  resist.  Then  a  change  came  about :  the  Con- 
servatives came  to  power  in  England,  took  the  side 
of  Turkey  and  for  their  good-nature  received 
the  Island  of  Cyprus.  Austria,  which  was  on  the 
flank  of  Russia,  refrained  from  using  the  mili- 
tary opportunity  of  cutting  the  Russian  com- 
munications and  held  off  while  the  Russians 
penetrated  to  San  Stephano,  within  sight  of  the 
imperial  city  of  Constantinople.  Then  England 
took  affright  and  in  the  Congress  of  Berlin  com- 
pelled the  Russians  to  draw  back  beyond  the 
Danube. 

Austria  was  at  last  rewarded  with  the  two 
provinces  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  which  com- 


WAR  IN  THE  BALKANS  107 

pleted  a  compact  block  of  territory  lying  between 
the  Adriatic  Sea  and  the  Turkish  province  of 
Macedonia.  On  the  other  side  the  Bulgarians  were 
allowed  to  set  up  a  little  principality  like  that 
of  the  Servians.  The  purpose  of  the  Treaty  of 
Berlin,  signed  July  31,  1878,  was  to  give  Austria 
close  contact  with  the  Balkan  states  and  at  the 
same  time  to  prepare  the  Christian  inhabitants  of 
the  rest  of  the  Balkans  for  some  sort  of  govern- 
ments of  their  own.  Russia  was  left  shut  out  from 
the  Danube  by  the  buffer  state  of  Rumania,  which 
looks  on  itself  as  non-Slav.  Anyone  can  see  that 
this  settlement  was  crude  and  temporary,  yet 
when  Disraeli  and  Salisbury  returned  to  London 
from  the  Congress  they  rode  through  the  streets 
in  triumph  and  Disraeli  made  his  brilliant  and 
theatrical  remark,  "I  bring  you  peace  with 
honor."  The  only  wonder  is  that  this  settlement 
endured  for  thirty-six  years. 

BALKAN   TROUBLES    FROM    1878   TO    1919 

It  was  part  of  a  general  disposition  not  to 
look  Oriental  things  squarely  in  the  face  that  the 
Treaty  of  1878  still  kept  up  the  fiction  of  Turkish 
supremacy  over  Bulgaria  and  also  over  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina.  Bulgaria  was  "constituted  an 
Autonomous  and  tributary  Principality  under  the 
suzerainty  of  His  Imperial  Majesty  the  Sultan." 
Part  of  the  present  Bulgaria  was  separately  or- 


108  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

ganized  as  the  province  of  "Eastern  Roumelia." 
As  for  the  western  districts,  it  was  provided  that 
"the  provinces  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  shall 
be  occupied  and  administered  by  Austria-Hun- 
gary." Montenegro  was  held  to  be  independent, 
as  was  also  Servia.  Rumania  gave  up  some  ter- 
ritory on  the  Russian  border  and  received  other 
territory  on  the  delta  of  the  Danube.  This  treaty 
left  Turkey  still  the  strongest  power  in  the  Bal- 
kans ;  and  the  five  little  Slav  or  semi-Slav  states, 
Rumania,  Servia,  Bulgaria,  Montenegro,  and 
Greece,  were  left  to  work  out  their  own  salva- 
tion. Macedonia  and  Albania  continued  integral 
parts  of  the  Turkish  Empire. 

The  Austrians  occupied  in  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina a  region  which  had  never  been  theirs,  in 
which  the  population  was  Serb,  and  in  which 
there  had  been  no  such  things  as  good  order  and 
good  government  for  centuries.  The  two  prov- 
inces were  not  added  to  Trans-Leithia,  though 
they  lay  adjacent,  but  were  administered  by  the 
Imperial  Government  in  Vienna  as  a  kind  of  un- 
official outside  part  of  Cis-Leithia.  It  took  many 
years  to  tranquilize  the  two  provinces  in  which 
about  a  third  of  the  population  was  intensely 
Moslem;  but  the  Austrians  persevered,  built  nar- 
row-gauge railroads,  stopped  the  brigandage,  en- 
couraged farming  and  lumbering,  and  made  a- 
handsome  little  capital  out  of  the  old  Moslem 
town  of  Sarajevo.  When  the  author  visited  that 


WAR  IN  THE  BALKANS  109 

place,  in  1913,  it  seemed  a  peaceful  center  of  a 
prosperous  district. 

Meantime  across  the  border  Macedonia  was 
year  after  year  the  scene  of  the  merciless  forays 
of  the  Comitadjis.  These  were  professional 
brigands,  armed  and  aided  by  committees  or  asso- 
ciations of  Bulgarians  or  Greeks  as  the  case 
might  be,  and  their  main  object  was  to  kill  out 
as  many  Greek  or  Bulgarian  villages  as  pos- 
sible so  as  to  hold  as  much  territory  as  possible 
when  the  break-up  came.  The  Turks  had  no  bet- 
ter^morals,  but  as  lords  of  the  land  their  policy 
was  to  keep  the  peace.  Slowly  the  Turkish  au- 
thority ebbed;  in  1885  the  Bulgarians  annexed 
Eastern  Roumelia  and  set  up  a  kingdom.  In  1885 
the  Servians  descended  on  Bulgaria  and  were 
smashed  in  five  days'  fighting,  leaving  the  belief 
throughout  the  world  that  they  were  worthless  as 
soldiers. 

The  traffic  on  the  River  Danube  has  long  been 
open  to  all  nations,  but  the  Upper  Danube  runs 
wholly  through  Austro-Hungarian  territory,  and 
the  Austrians  were  the  intermediaries  between  the 
Balkan  Slav  powers  and  the  rest  of  Europe. 
They  were  constantly  suspected  of  biding  their 
time  till  they  might  safely  move  down  from  Bos- 
nia through  Macedonia  and  take  possession  of 
Salonica,  thus  giving  them  a  port  on  the  ^Egaean 
and  a  land  route  in  the  direction  of  the  Orient. 

In  1908  the  Young  Turks  revolted  and  deposed 


110  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

Sultan  Abdul  Hamid.  Their  government  every- 
where relaxed  and  the  Austrians,  on  October  5, 
1908,  issued  a  declaration  to  the  effect  that  the 
Emperor  had  made  up  his  mind  "to  exercise  my 
sovereign  rights  upon  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina/' 
promising  the  people  civil  rights,  freedom  of  re- 
ligious belief,  and  freedom  of  the  press,  and  a 
formal  constitution.  To  the  Austrian  mind  this 
was  simply  the  formal  statement  of  what  had 
teen  intended  thirty  years  before  by  the  Treaty 
of  Berlin;  they  looked  upon  it  as  simply  a  decla- 
ration that  Turkey  no  longer  had  any  rights  in 
the  provinces.  Part  of  the  population  considered 
this  action  a  second  and  unrighteous  conquest, 
which  was  intended  to  remove  the  last  hope  of 
combination  with  their  Serb  neighbors  in  Servia 
and  beyond. 

Servia  also  took  it  in  very  ill  part  till  Austria 
used  such  threats  that  on  March  31,  1909,  the 
Servian  government  formally  declared  that  "Ser- 
Tia  recognizes  that  the  Fait  Accompli  regarding 
Bosnia  had  not  affected  her  rights — Servia  under- 
takes to  renounce  from  now  onward  the  attitude 
of  protest  and  opposition — she  undertakes,  more- 
over, to  modify  the  direction  of  her  policy  with 
regard  to  Austria-Hungary  and  to  live  in  future 
on  good,  neighborly  terms  with  the  latter."  Not- 
withstanding this  unwilling  promise,  the  Servians 
were  in  trouble  with  Austria  much  of  the  time. 
The  Austrians  cruelly  hampered  their  exports  of 


WAR  IN  THE  BALKANS  111 

grain,  cattle,  and  timber,  which  were  their  only 
means  of  livelihood.  Belgrade  lies,  as  recent 
experience  shows,  a  short  cannon  shot  from  the 
Hungarian  border  and  the  Austrian  Minister  and 
Cons  ill-General  were  potent  forces  in  Servian 
affairs. 

BALKAN   WARS    OF    1919   AND    1913 

Then  in  1912  the  unexpected  happened.  Tur- 
key had  gone  through  several  stages  of  revolution, 
and,  for  the  moment,  seemed  impotent.  Venizelos, 
the  Greek  Premier  and  the  ablest  statesman  who 
has  appeared  in  southeastern  Europe  for  many 
years,  laid  the  foundation  for  an  understanding 
between  Greece,  Servia,  and  Bulgaria.  There  is 
every  reason  to  suppose  that  von  Hartwig,  Rus- 
sian Minister  to  Servia,  was  the  adviser  of  this 
movement;  he  assured  them  of  the  good  will  of 
Russia  and  perhaps  of  the  intention  of  Russia  to 
keep  Austria  out  if  necessary.  In  October,  1912, 
war  began,  and  by  the  next  June  the  Turkish 
power  in  Europe,  after  six  hundred  years  of  exist- 
ence, was  smashed.  The  city  of  Constantinople 
was  too  large  a  prize  for  any  of  the  allies  and  re- 
mained Turkish,  with  a  narrow  belt  of  territory 
behind  it.  Otherwise  the  whole  of  the  Balkans 
was  apportioned  by  a  treaty  (practically  dictated 
by  the  Great  Powers)  to  the  five  Christian  powers, 
Rumania,  Bulgaria,  Servia,  Montenegro,  and 


112  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

Greece,  and  to  the  mixed  Christian  and  Moslem 
people  of  Albania. 

At  that  moment  the  Balkan  alliance  was  still 
intact.  A  quarrel  arose  as  to  the  portion  of 
Macedonia  which  should  go  to  Bulgaria.  On  that 
issue  a  second  war  began  on  June  30,  1913,  be- 
tween Servia  and  Greece  on  one  side,  aided  by 
Rumania,  and  Bulgaria  on  the  other.  The  result 
was  the  humiliation  of  Bulgaria,  the  loss  of  per- 
haps 200,000  additional  men  and  fearful  excesses 
against  the  non-combatants. 

All  this  time  the  Austrians  were  lying  along 
the  frontier  of  Bosnia  waiting  for  the  opportunity 
to  step  in;  and  some  of  the  ablest  statesmen  in 
the  Empire  thought  the  time  had  then  come  for 
a  step  which  would  in  all  probability  have  brought 
about  the  two  combinations  of  opposing  powers 
which  are  now  fighting  each  other.  It  was  clear 
that  if  Austria  went  into  the  Balkans,  Russia 
would  do  the  same.  The  event  proved  that  either 
the  Austrians  were  not  ready  to  take  the  step,  or 
had  not  the  assurance  of  support  of  Germany 
which  was  necessary  in  such  a  crisis.  War  all  but 
came  over  the  question  whether  the  Montenegrins 
should  hold  Scutari  which  they  had  captured  from 
the  Turks  with  so  much  blood;  but  Montenegro 
and  her  allies  gave  way  on  that  point,  and  the 
Balkan  powers  made  their  own  peace  at  Bucharest 
on  August  10,  1913,  without  a  general  European 
war. 


WAR  IN  THE  BALKANS  113 

"These  Great  Powers  stir  up  trouble  in  the 
Balkans ;  they  make  us  fight,"  said  a  highly  placed 
Bulgarian.  Nobody  will  ever  know  how  far  Rus- 
sia caused  either  of  the  Balkan  wars  nor  how  far 
Russia  recommended  moderation  to  the  allies. 
One  thing  is  certain:  there  is  not  and  never  has 
been  any  evidence  that  any  Balkan  power  de- 
sired or  would  have  accepted  incorporation  with 
Russia,  or  would  have  failed  to  fight  with  all  its 
strength  against  any  arrangement  which  meant 
that  Russia  should  establish  a  protectorate  over 
them.  Probably  Russia  expected  the  good  will  of 
the  Balkan  powers  in  her  designs  on  Constanti- 
nople, and  the  driving  out  of  the  Turks  from 
Europe  altogether,  but  the  world  knows  nothing 
of  any  agreements,  pledges,  or  treaties  upon  that 
subject. 

HIGH   TIDE   FOR   SERVIA 

i 
The  result  of  the  Balkan  War  was  to  give  the 

world  a  new  impression  of  the  national  and  mili- 
tary strength  of  the  Balkan  powers.  They  easily 
defeated  the  Turks,  who,  to  be  sure,  were  dis- 
organized and  amazingly  unprovided.  Think  of 
a  great  modern  army  taking  the  field  absolutely 
without  any  ambulance  or  hospital  service,  and 
leaving  to  die  upon  the  field  all. the  wounded  who 
could  not  crawl  away!  In  the  second  war,  when 
the  Bulgarians  expected  to  repeat  their  triumph 
of  1885,  the  Servian  armies  man  for  man,  regi- 


114  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

ment  for  regiment,  division  for  division,  stood 
day  after  day  and  week  after  week  against  the 
Bulgarians.  The  Servian  people  were  naturally 
elated;  their  sovereign  is  a  figurehead,  the  real 
head  of  the  nation  being  the  Prime  Minister 
Pashitsch,  a  man  of  large  capacity.  Servia  is  a 
peasant  land,  most  of  the  farmers  owning  their 
own  fields ;  it  has  almost  no  city  population.  Yet 
it  had  fought  two  victorious  campaigns  and  its 
area  and  population  were  nearly  doubled  as  a  re- 
sult of  the  war.  It  is  not  strange  that  the  peo- 
ple harked  back  to  the  ancient  Empire  of  Czar 
Stephen  Dushan,  and  that  they  felt  hospitable  and 
receptive  toward  their  blood  brethren,  the  Croa- 
tian, Bosnian,  and  Slovenian  Serbs,  who  were 
their  next  neighbors  to  the  north.  Their  news- 
papers preached  the  likelihood  of  a  new  political 
map  of  southeastern  Europe.  Their  school  chil- 
dren had  long  been  taught  to  sing  about  the 
ancient  glories  of  the  Servians  and  how  their 
country  had  been  kept  down  by  the  barbaric 
Turks. 

But  what  ike  Servians  wished  was  less  sig- 
nificant than  what  the  Serbs  in  Trans-Leithia 
thought.  Naturally  the  Austro-Hungarian  gov- 
ernment has  not  been  generous  in  producing  proof 
that  its  people  were  losing  their  loyalty.  In  case 
of  any  break-up  the  pressure  would  immediately 
come  upon  the  Magyars,  who,  as  has  been  pointed 
out,  are  only  10,000,000  in  an  aggregation  of 


WAR  IN  THE  BALKANS  115 

2 1,000,000.  All  the  circumstances  point  to  the 
certainty  that  the  Magyar  statesmen  informed  the 
German  statesmen  who  were  carrying  on  the 
monarchy  in  Vienna  that  unless  something  were 
done,  the  Trans-Leithian  part  of  the  Empire 
would  crack  in  pieces. 

ATONEMENT  FOR  FERDINAND 

Now  enters  upon  the  scene  a  personality  whose 
name  will  always  be  associated  with  this  war. 
Franz  Ferdinand,  heir  to  the  dual  monarchy,  and 
very  soon  expecting  to  become  Emperor,  was  the 
only  Austrian  statesman  known  to  the  outside 
world  who  favored  meeting  the  grievances  of  the 
Slav  element  by  recombining  the  Empire  into  three 
race  units — German,  Magyar,  and  Slav — instead 
of  two  existing.  He  was  married  to  a  Slav.  He 
naturally  wanted  to  save  his  Empire  and  perhaps 
had  hit  upon  the  only  peaceful  method  by  which 
it  could  have  been  saved.  June  £8,  1914,  Franz 
Ferdinand,  while  visiting  Sarajevo,  was  assassi- 
nated by  a  band  of  conspirators.  It  was  a  ter- 
rible murder,  comparable  to  the  assassination  of 
President  McKinley  in  1901.  The  world  rang 
with  accounts  of  the  tragedy  and  questions  of  its 
effect.  For  four  weeks  little  was  heard  from 
the  Austrian  government.  It  was  vaguely  under- 
stood that  a  judicial  commission  was  examining 
the  case.  Then  on  July  23,  1914,  a  thunderbolt 


116  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

crashed  from  a  clear  sky  in  the  form  of  a  docu- 
ment which  was  intended  to  be  virtually  a  decla- 
ration of  war  on  Servia. 

This  "ultimatum"  was  practically  an  indict- 
ment of  the  whole  Servian  people  and  government 
as  accomplices  in  the  murder  of  Franz  Ferdinand. 
It  declares  in  set  terms  that  "the  murder  at 
Sarajevo  was  conceived  in  Belgrade,  that  the  mur- 
derers received  the  arms  and  bombs  with  which 
they  were  equipped  from  .Servian  officers  and  offi- 
cials, who  belonged  to  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  and 
that,  lastly,  the  transportation  of  the  criminals 
and  their  arms  to  Bosnia  was  arranged  and  car- 
ried out  by  leading  Servian  frontier  officials. " 
It  demanded  from  the  Servian  government  the 
most  humble  and  complete  disavowal  of  further 
unfriendliness  toward  Austria,  and  the  punish- 
ment of  all  persons  who  in  the  judgment  of 
Austrian  officials  were  concerned  in  the  murder, 
in  particular  the  arrest  of  a  Major  Tankosic 
and  of  a  certain  Ciganowic — Servian  officials,  who 
had  been  compromised  as  a  result  of  the  investi- 
gation. 

The  basis  of  this  document  is  the  Austrian 
investigation  on  Bosnian  territory  of  the  circum- 
stances of  the  murder.  That  investigation  was 
held  in  secret  and  the  findings  appeared  to  be 
founded  upon  the  confessions  of  the  two  conspira- 
tors who  were  captured  red-handed  at  the  time 
of  the  murder.  There  is  such  a  thing  as  the 


WAR  IN  THE  BALKANS  117 

Third  Degree  in  the  unwritten  jurisprudence  of 
the  United  States;  and  there  used  to  be  in  most 
European  countries  a  Fourth  Degree  of  physical 
terror,  produced  by  the  fear  or  application  of 
torture. 

The  details  of  the  judicial  proceeding  have  not 
been  made  public  and  probably  never  will  be  made 
public.  All  we  know  is  that  the  Austrian  author- 
ities undoubtedly  believed  that  the  whole  thing 
was  a  Servian  plot.  The  Austrians,  leaving  in 
the  background  the  fact  that  the  two  assassins 
who  were  captured  in  Sarajevo  were  Bosnians, 
and  that  the  Ciganowic,  mentioned  above,  was 
an  Austrian  subject,  insisted  that:  (a)  the  mur- 
der had  been  planned  by  Servians ;  (b)  that  the 
bombs  in  the  hands  of  the  conspirators  "were 
manufactured  for  military  purposes,  and  judg- 
ing from  the  way  they  were  originally  packed 
were  from  the  Servian  arsenal  at  Kragukejwac" ; 
(c)  that  the  conspirators  and  their  arms  were 
aided  across  the  border  by  Servian  officials;  (d) 
that  a  secret  society,  Narodna  Odbrana,  was  at 
the  bottom  of  it. 

That  Servians  had  some  hand  in  the  obscure 
plot  for  killing  Franz  Ferdinand  is  altogether 
likely;  that  the  Servian  government  had  any 
knowledge  or  suspicion  of  it,  is  both  unproved  and 
improbable.  When  this  crisis  came  General  Pot- 
kin,  head  of  the  Servian  army,  was  actually  in 
Budapest;  so  little  did  the  government  expect  a 


118  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

breach  with  Austria.  That  the  Servian  people 
are  morally  responsible  for  the  murder  is  pre- 
posterous, or  would  be  except  for  the  exceedingly 
disagreeable  fact  that  the  present  king  of  Servia, 
Peter,  came  to  the  throne  in  1903  by  the  murder 
of  a  king. 

It  is  a  gruesome  story!  Foreigners  in  Bel- 
grade tell  you  how  a  band  of  Servian  officers, 
sworn  to  fidelity  to  King  Alexander,  suddenly 
broke  into  his  little  palace  at  night.  As  they 
smashed  in  the  door  they  put  the  electric  light 
apparatus  out  of  service;  and  the  King  and 
Queen  Draga,  in  their  terror,  hid  in  a  dark  closet. 
Then  the  conspirators  broke  into  a  neighboring 
shop  and  carried  off  candles  with  which  they 
searched  the  building.  The  Queen,  out  of  a  win- 
dow, saw  officers  in  Servian  uniform  and  called 
upon  them  to  defend  their  sovereign.  That  re- 
vealed the  hiding-place,  and  the  man  and  woman 
were  butchered  like  cattle  in  the  shambles  and 
thrown  out  of  the  window. 

Thus  was  the  way  prepared  for  the  coward 
King  Peter,  who  later  rewarded  these  murderers 
with  medals,  appointments  and  honors.  They 
were  perfectly  well  known,  but  the  Servian  people 
let  it  go  at  that — apparently  on  the  theory  that 
if  you  could  not  remove  both  Alexander  and 
Peter  at  the  same  time,  it  was  still  worth  while 
to  kill  one  of  them. 

Peter  has  long  been  a  figurehead   in  his   own 


WAR  IN  THE  BALKANS 

country.  He  is  sick,  perhaps  dying,  and  lives 
in  fear  of  the  bullet  that  may  cut  short  his  miser- 
able life;  but  the  Servian  statesmen  and  people 
are  not  in  a  position  to  say  that  the  killing  of 
a  lawful  sovereign  is  outside  the  habits  of  the 
Servians.  The  Austrians  have  shrewdly  mixed 
up  the  known  and  proved  Servian  murder  of 
Alexander  with  the  possibly  Servian  murder  of 
Franz  Ferdinand. 

Whoever  wrote  the  Austrian  ultimatum  was 
in  such  a  state  of  rage  and  fury  that  he  did  not 
know  how  to  follow  up  this  advantage,  for  he 
also  charges  the  Servian  people  with  furnishing 
out  of  the  royal  arsenal  the  bomb  that  killed 
Franz  Ferdinand.  Perhaps  the  Austrians  believe 
that  the  Servians  keep  a  supply  of  assorted  bombs 
suited  to  the  climates  of  various  countries.  As 
the  people  of  New  York  too  well  know,  a  bomb 
is  a  very  easy  thing  to  make.  It  is  not  easy  to 
believe  that  Servian  military  authorities  should 
furnish  a  ready-made  bomb,  even  if  it  could  be 
shown  that  they  had  planned  the  assassination. 
The  story  sounds  -like  those  disjointed  confessions 
which  are  wrenched  from  the  mouth  of  a  poor 
wretch  upon  the  rack. 

That  there  are  Serb  societies  having  members 
partly  in  Servia,  and  partly  in  the  neighboring 
Serb-speaking  countries,  is  altogether  likely.  The 
crushing  weight  of  the  Turkish  domination  for 
centuries  drove  men  to  such  secret  and  desperate 


120  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

means.  Perhaps  some  Servian  officers  (possibly 
some  of  King  Peter's  obliging  co-murderers)  were 
in  the  combine.  It  is  likely  also  that  nothing  but 
fear  of  immediate  consequences  would  nerve  the 
Servian  government  up  to  a  searching  investi- 
gation and  punishment  of  such  people.  And  if 
the  Austrian  government  had  any  reasonable 
proof  that  the  Servians  took  part  in  the  murder 
they  were  entitled  to  demand  redress,  quick  and 
drastic. 

Anybody  who  knows  the  Balkan  conditions 
must,  however,  believe  that  the  crime  of  Servia, 
in  the  eyes  of  the  Austrians,  is  not  assassination 
but  success.  Of  all  the  exasperating  things  that 
happened  to  Austria  from  the  outbreak  of  .war  in 
October,  1912,  to  the  partition  of  the  Balkans 
among  the  seven  Balkan  powers  in  July,  1913, 
the  most  exasperating  was  the  appearance  of  a 
strong  and  victorious  Servia.  The  Serb  race  has 
been  looked  upon  as  rather  mild,  not  easy  to 
arouse,  content  with  small  things.  The  Austrians 
had  their  ministers,  their  consuls  and  their  spies 
throughout  the  Balkans  and  yet  never  seem  to 
have  suspected  that  the  spirit  of  the  old  Servian 
heroes  would  show  itself  again. 

RESPONSIBILITY   FOR  THE   ULTIMATUM 

That  Austria  intended  drastic  action  had  been 
for  several  days  rumored  in  diplomatic  circles. 


WAR  IN  THE  BALKANS  121 

On  July  20  Sir  Edward  Grey  wrote  to  Sir 
William  Edward  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at 
Berlin,  that  he  was  informed  that  Austria  was 
about  to  take  some  steps  which  might  prove 
warlike.  Two  days  later  Goschen  reported  that 
the  German  Secretary  of  State  was  aware  that 
Austria  was  about  to  act  and  that  the  German 
government  considered  it  an  affair  in  which  they 
could  not  interfere.  The  German  Ambassador  to 
the  United  States,  Bernstorff,  has  made  the 
public  statement  that  Germany  approved  in  ad- 
vance the  Austrian  ultimatum,  and  gives  the  rea- 
sons therefor ;  but  he  is  clearly  mistaken,  because 
the  German  authorities  in  Berlin  explicitly  deny 
any  such  knowledge  and  the  State  Secretary  of 
Germany  went  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  ultimatum 
left  much  to  be  desired  as  a  diplomatic  docu- 
ment. 

Nevertheless  it  is  perfectly  clear  that  the  Ger- 
man government  had  a  previous  understanding 
that  in  case  the  Austrian  government  felt  that 
there  was  imminent  danger  of  a  break-up  of  the 
Empire,  Germany  would,  if  necessary,  back 
Austria  up,  leaving  to  her  all  the  responsibility 
of  deciding  what  steps  were  necessary  in  order  to 
put  a  stop  to  the  ambition  and  intrigues  of 
Servia.  Furthermore,  on  July  23,  the  Chancellor 
of  the  German  Empire  sent  a  dispatch  to  the 
courts  of  France,  England,  and  Russia  to  say 
that  "the  action  as  well  as  the  demands  of  the 


182  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

Austro-Hungarian  government  can  be  viewed  only 
as  justifiable,"  adding,  "We  anxiously  desire  the 
localization  of  the  conflict  because  every  inter- 
cession of  another  power  on  account  of  the  vari- 
ous treaty-alliances  would  precipitate  inconceiva- 
ble consequences."  In  a  communication  five  days 
later  to  the  German  governments,  the  German 
chancellor  said:  "The  agitation  conducted  by 
the  Pan-Slavs  in  Austria-Hungary  has  for  its 
goal,  with  the  destruction  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian monarchy,  the  scattering  or  weakening  of 
the  triple  alliance  with  a  complete  isolation  of 
the  German  Empire  in  consequence.  Our  own 
interest  therefore  calls  us  to  the  side  of  Austria- 
Hungary." 

Fifty  years  hence,  when  the  history  of  this 
war  can  be  written  from  the  intimate,  official,  and 
private  correspondence  of  this  time,  it  will  prob- 
ably appear  that  the  Hungarian  statesmen  ap- 
pealed to  their  Austrian  brethren  to  come  to  the 
rescue.  There  is  no  suggestion  that  Galicia, 
Bohemia,  and  the  Slav  Alpine  provinces  were  in- 
fected. The  Austrian  government  probably  com- 
municated with  Germany  and  received  general 
assurances  of  support;  and  then  issued  the  ulti- 
matum in  a  form  far  more  caustic  than  the  Ger- 
man Imperial  Government  had  expected.  By  this 
time  Hungary,  Austria,  and  Germany  were  all 
committed  to  administering  a  very  strong  dose 
of  medicine  to  the  Servians. 


WAR  IN  THE  BALKANS  123 

Von  Hartwig,  the  bellicose  Russian  Minister 
to  Servia,  had  been  replaced  by  a  more  moderate 
man,  who  during  the  forty-eight  hours  allowed 
the  Servians  for  an  answer  to  the  Austrian  mes- 
sage, under  instructions  from  St.  Petersburg  used 
all  his  influence  to  induce  the  Servians  to  make 
a  moderate  reply  which  might  obviate  war.  This 
influence  was  strengthened  by  the  English  repre- 
sentative, Crackanthorpe.  Sir  Edward  Grey,  the 
ablest  foreign  minister  in  Europe,  wrote  of  the 
ultimatum:  "I  have  never  before  seen  one  state 
address  to  another  independent  state  a  docu- 
ment of  so  formidable  a  character." 

Under  these  strong  influences,  and  a  sense  of 
their  own  danger  the  Servians  on  July  25  made 
a  reply  which  to  the  outsider  seems  a  complete 
surrender.  The  only  point  which  they  seemed  to 
reserve  was  an  unwillingness  to  allow  delegates  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  government  to  take  part 
in  an  official  Servian  investigation  relating  to  the 
murder  plot.  At  the  end  of  the  reply  the  Servian 
government  offered  to  refer  the  matter  to  the 
arbitration  of  the  great  powers. 

To  the  Austrian  mind  this  reply  was  simply 
"a  play  for  time,"  "disingenuous,"  dishonest, 
evasive,  and  unsatisfactory.  For  instance,  they 
said,  the  Servians  had  used  the  words  "judicial 
inquiry"  instead  of  the  Austrian  term  "investi- 
gation." Again  the  Servian  government  in  its 
apology  "condemns  every  propaganda  which 


THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 


should  be  directed  against  Austria-Hungary." 
Whereas  the  Austrians  demanded  the  phrase 
"condemns  the  propaganda  against  Austria- 
Hungary."  The  conclusion  is  irresistible,  that 
the  Austrians  expected  war,  were  preparing  for 
war,  and  would  have  been  extremely  discomfited 
if  the  Servians  had  accepted  their  demands  to 
the  last  dotting  of  an  i  and  crossing  of  a  t.  At 
any  rate  Sir  Edward  Grey  wrote  that  "the  Ser- 
vian reply  had  already  involved  the  greatest 
humiliation  to  Servia  that  I  had  ever  seen  a 
country  undergo."  July  28  Austria-Hungary 
formally  declared  war  on  Servia,  "in  order  to 
bring  to  an  end  the  subversive  intrigues  origi- 
nating from  Belgrade  and  aimed  at  the  terri- 
torial integrity  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  mon- 
archy." Thus  the  first  formal  hostilities  were 
inaugurated.  In  a  few  hours  skirmishes  began 
on  the  borders  of  the  two  countries. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE   WAR   BECOMES   EUROPEAN 
ATTITUDE   OF   RUSSIA 

FROM  the  first  day  of  the  official  proceed- 
ings, July  23,  1914,  it  was  clear  that  the 
crisis  deeply  affected  Russia.  On  that 
very  day  the  Austrians  attempted  to  soothe  the 
Russians  by  the  statement  that  they  "had  no 
intention  of  bringing  about  a  shifting  of  the  bal- 
ance of  power  in  the  Balkans."  Sir  Edward 
Grey  saw  more  deeply  into  the  matter  and  re- 
marked a  few  days  later:  "If  they  could  make 
war  on  Servia,  and  at  the  same  time  satisfy  Rus- 
sia, well  and  good;  but  if  not,  the  consequences 
would  be  incalculable."  It  is  altogether  probable 
that  Germany  exercised  a  pacific  influence  by 
making  it  clear  to  Austria  that  the  annihilation 
of  Servia  would  certainly  arouse  Russia.  At  any 
rate  as  early  as  July  25  the  Germans  informed 
the  English  representative  that  "Austria-Hun- 
gary had  no  intention  of  seizing  Servian  terri- 
tory," and  apparently  about  the  same  time  the 


126  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

Austrians  informed  Russia  that  "there  is  no  in- 
tention of  acquiring  Servian  territory,  nor  of 
threatening  the  continued  existence  of  the  Ser- 
vian kingdom."  Having  obtained  or  sanctioned 
this  declaration,  the  German  government  from 
that  time  to  the  end  took  the  ground  that  what 
vras  going  on  was  a  local  war  between  two  powers 
in  which  no  other  European  power  had  any  direct 
<concern.  If  a  nation  of  fifty  millions  had  occa- 
sion to  fight  a  nation  of  five  millions,  so  much  the 
worse  for  the  smaller  one. 

The  Russian  government  was  once  more  put 
into  the  anxious  position  which  it  has  occupied  at 
various  times  during  the  two  preceding  years:  to 
the  Russian  mind  the  Austrians  must  have  designs 
beyond  the  mere  thrashing  of  a  saucy  neighbor. 
Was  it  a  revival  of  the  old  intention  to  control  a 
line  down  through  the  Balkans  to  Salonica? 
Whatever  the  purpose  of  Austria,  would  Russia, 
the  greatest  Slav  power  of  the  world,  stand  by 
and  see  a  neighbor  of  the  same  religion  and  race 
invaded  and  thrashed  at  a  probable  loss  of  fifty 
thousand  lives?  The  Servian  offense  of  trying 
to  enlarge  her  boundaries  by  incorporating  Aus- 
trian Slavs  could  hardly  seem  to  the  Russian  gov- 
ernment contrary  to  good  morals. 

"Don't  expect  calico  to  tell  you  her  mind," 
said  the  late  eminent  jurist,  Josh  Billings;  "Cal- 
ico doesn't  know  her  own  mind.  Calico  of  all 
kinds  is  the  child  of  circumstances."  Perhaps 


THE  WAR  BECOMES  EUROPEAN   127 

the  Russian  government  did  not  know  its  own 
mind  and  was  the  child  of  circumstances,  but  it 
was  clear  that  Christendom  would  look  upon  Rus- 
sia as  unable  or  unwilling  to  protect  those  of  her 
own  household  if  Servia  were  delivered  up  to  Aus- 
tria. The  Teutonic  interpretation  of  Russia's 
attitude  is  that  the  Russians  were  afraid  that 
they  would  lose  a  chance  of  incorporating  Servia 
into  their  Empire.  A  glance  at  the  map  will  show 
that  to  annex  Servia,  or  to  make  it  a  serviceable 
dependency,  would  require  the  previous  annexa- 
tion of  Rumania  and  Bulgaria  and  war  with 
Greece.  Here  is  the  critical  point  in  the  whole 
development  of  the  war:  every  one  of  those  five 
Balkan  powers  would  fight  Russia  with  the  same 
intense  patriotism  that  they  fought  Turkey  or 
would  fight  Austria,  if  necessary  to  keep  their 
independence.  Whatever  the  motives  of  Russia, 
they  did  not  include  destroying  the  independence 
of  Servia  in  the  process  of  preventing  destruction 
of  that  independence  by  Austria. 

Nor  is  it  clear  that  the  Russians  were  set  in 
motion  by  a  desire  to  take  either  Slav  or  German 
territory  from  Austria  and  Germany.  The  only 
Slavs  so  situated  that  they  could  be  conveniently 
pried  off  were  the  Austrian  Poles  in  Galicia  and 
the  Prussian  Poles  in  Posen,  both  of  which  groups 
would  probably  rather  stay  where  they  are  than 
take  the  chances  which  the  Russian  Poles  have 
endured.  For  a  week  Russia  "hung  in  stays," 


128  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

and,  as  will  be  seen  later,  at  the  very  last  moment 
seemed  on  the  brink  of  an  arrangement  with  Aus- 
tria that  would  stop  the  war  altogether. 

ENGLISH    EFFORTS    AT    MEDIATION 

During  the  dark  days  of  the  Balkan  wars  when 
the  rivalry  between  Austria  and  Russia  time  after 
time  threatened  to  bring  on  a  general  European 
war,  by  common  consent  Europe  looked  to  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  Foreign  Minister  of  Great  Britain, 
as  a  sort  of  clearing  house  of  diplomatic  opinion, 
and  as  a  source  of  midway  measures  which  in 
every  case  prevented  the  breach.  If,  as  many 
people  believed,  England  wanted  war  and  had 
carefully  prepared  for  this  moment,  it  is  clear 
that  Sir  Edward  Grey,  the  accredited  spokesman 
of  the  English  government,  did  not  want  war,  and 
did  everything  that  was  humanly  possible  to 
bring  the  two  principal  parties,  Austria  and  Rus- 
sia, to  an  agreement.  The  time  was  fearfully 
brief,  chiefly  because  of  the  impatience  of  Aus- 
tria to  wring  the  neck  of  her  little  enemy,  Servia. 
From  the  first  it  was  perceived  that  Germany  and 
France  and  Italy  were  inseparable  parts  of  the 
problem ;  and  it  was  necessary  to  collect  informa- 
tion and  apply  diplomatic  pressure  by  each 
power  concerned  in  half  a  dozen  different  courts. 
Grey  was  ably  served  by  the  ambassadors  of 
Great  Britain,  and  by  none  more  faithfully  and 


THE  WAR  BECOMES  EUROPEAN   129 

energetically  than  by  the  Ambassador  to  Berlin, 
Goschen,  and  the  Ambassador  to  Vienna,  De  Bun- 
sen,  both  of  German  extraction.  It  is  one  of  the 
curiosities  of  the  controversy  that  the  German 
Ambassadors  to  London,  Prince  Lichnowsky,  and 
to  Vienna,  von  Tschirschky  und  Bogendorff  both 
bear  Slavic  names ;  and  that  the  late  Professor 
von  Treitschke,  the  apostle  of  Germanism  against 
the  Slav,  also  bore  an  unmistakable  Slav  name. 

The  first  effort  of  Germany  was  to  persuade 
England  to  "localize  the  war  by  inducing  Russia 
to  stay  her  hand" ;  but  Grey's  point  of  view  was 
that  if  Russia  felt  inclined  to  go  into  the  fray 
England  would  neither  interpose  nor  agree  to 
support  Russia.  On  July  24  Grey  telegraphed 
that  "in  view  of  the  extraordinary  stiff  character 
of  the  Austrian  note,  the  shortness  of  the  time 
limit,  I  felt  helpless  as  far  as  Russia  was  con- 
cerned." On  the  same  day  he  proposed  a  con- 
ference of  the  four  great  powers  who  were  not 
yet  drawn  in,  Germany,  France,  England,  and 
Italy.  Italy  and  France  accepted.  At  one  mo- 
ment, July  27,  the  German  government  ac- 
cepted in  principle  "mediation  between  Russia 
and  Austria  by  the  four  powers" ;  but  after  a 
few  hours'  reflection  held  off,  first,  because  the 
"conference  suggested  would  practically  amount 
to  a  court  of  arbitration" ;  and  second,  for  the 
cogent  reason  that  in  such  a  conference  France 
would  be  a  sort  of  representative  of  Russia,  and 


130  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

Germany  of  Austria,  leaving  the  decision  to  be 
made  practically  by  England  and  Italy.  The 
real  objection  was  the  feeling  that  Austria  was 
making  war  on  an  issue  of  national  honor  and 
interest — the  same  reason  that  long  influenced 
the  United  States  Senate  against  arbitration 
treaties. 

Grey  now  transferred  his  energies  to  two  other 
plans :  mediation  by  the  German  Emperor  in  per- 
son; and  an  agreement  on  the  Servian  question1 
between  Austria  and  Russia  through  "conversa- 
tions" in  St.  Petersburg  and  Vienna.  To  the  very 
last  Grey  still  tried  to  propose  anything  that 
would  call  a  halt.  As  late  as  July  81  he  sug- 
gested to  Germany  that  the  four  outside  powers 
unite  in  offering  to  Austria  that  "they  would 
undertake  to  see  that  she  obtained  full  satisfac- 
tion of  her  demands  on  Servia,  provided  that  they 
did  not  impair  Servian  sovereignty  and  the  in- 
tegrity of  Servian  territory" ;  and  on  the  critical 
day  of  August  1  he  wrote  to  Goschen,  "I  still 
believe  that  it  might  be  possible  to  secure  peace 
if  only  a  little  respite  in  time  can  be  gained  be- 
fore any  great  power  begins  war." 

AUSTRO-RUSSIAN   CONVERSATIONS 

The  breach  between  Russia  and  Austria  had 
been  foreseen  for  several  years  and  relations  were 
repeatedly  strained  during  the  Balkan  wars  of 


THE  WAR  BECOMES  EUROPEAN  131 

1912  and  1913.  The  result  of  these  threats  of 
wars  which  did  not  come  about  was  that  each 
side  seems  to  have  been  pretty  sure  that  if  the 
other  were  pushed  to  an  extremity  it  would  yield 
on  any  minor  question,  rather  than  go  to  war. 
Only  the  archives  of  the  Austrian  War  Depart- 
ment could  settle  the  question  whether  the  Aus- 
trians  had  correct  information  of  the  state  of  the 
Russian  army,  or  of  the  condition  of  the  Russian 
diplomatic  mind.  On  the  day  after  the  Austrian 
ultimatum,  Sazonof,  the  Russian  Foreign  Minis- 
ter, told  the  British  Ambassador  in  St.  Peters- 
burg that  the  "Austrian  step  clearly  meant  war 
was  imminent  .  .  .  Russian  mobilization,  at  any 
rate,  will  have  to  be  carried  out."  July  27  when 
it  was  clear  that  the  Austrians  were  on  the 
point  of  invading  Servia,  Sazonof  proposed  to 
talk  things  over  with  Austria  to  see  if  the  Aus- 
trian ultimatum  could  not  be  modified.  For  these 
negotiations  the  word  "conversation"  was  used, 
apparently  to  avoid  the  admission  that  either 
power  was  willing  to  negotiate  or  to  make  any 
diplomatic  concessions.  Sazonof  added  that  if 
that  method  should  fail,  "I  am  ready  to  accept  the 
British  proposal,  or  any  other  proposal  that 
would  bring  about  a  favorable  solution  of  the 
conflict." 

Here  comes  in  the  question  of  the  proposed 
guaranty  of  the  integrity  of  Servia,  which  the 
German  government  urged  with  some  authority 


132  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

upon  Austria.  The  Austrians  publicly  announced 
that  they  did  not  intend  to  destroy  Servia.  On 
July  28  the  question  seemed  to  have  come  down 
to  the  issue  whether  Austria  would  promise  to 
respect  not  only  the  "integrity"  but  the  "inde- 
pendence" and  "sovereignty"  of  Servia.  When 
matters  were  moving  to  a  crisis  in  St.  Petersburg 
on  July  31,  Sazonof  drew  up  a  so-called  form- 
ula, in  the  words : 

"If  Austria  will  agree  to  check  the  advance  of 
her  troops  on  Servian  territory;  if  recognizing 
that  the  dispute  between  Austria  and  Servia  has 
assumed  a  character  of  European  interest,  she 
will  allow  the  Great  Powers  to  look  into  the  mat- 
ter and  determine  whether  Servia  could  satisfy 
the  Austro-Hungarian  government  without  im- 
pairing her  rights  as  a  sovereign  State  or  her  in- 
dependence, Russia  will  undertake  to  maintain  her 
waiting  attitude." 

Next  day  a  modification  of  this  formula  was 
sent  out  by  Sazonof  to  all  the  powers : 

"(Urgent)  Formula  amended  in  accordance 
with  the  English  proposal:  'If  Austria  consents 
to  stay  the  march  of  her  troops  on  Servian  terri- 
tory, and  if,  recognizing  that  the  Austro-Servian 
conflict  has  assumed  the  character  of  a  question  of 
European  interest,  she  admits  that  the  Great 
Powers  may  examine  the  satisfaction  which  Ser- 
via can  accord  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  govern- 
ment without  injury  to  her  sovereign  rights  as  a 


THE  WAR  BECOMES  EUROPEAN  133 

State  and  to  her  independence,  Russia  undertakes 
to  preserve  her  waiting  attitude  P  ' 

Nevertheless  on  that  very  day  complete  mobil- 
ization of  the  Austrian  forces  was  ordered, 
though  war  was  not  formally  declared  by  Austria 
on  Russia  till  August  6  and  then  Austrian  troops 
crossed  the  Russian  border. 

MEDIATION   OF   EMPEROR   WILLIAM 

So  far  as  notes  and  conversations  of  which  we 
now  have  record  are  concerned,  Russia  appears 
to  have  endeavored  to  avoid  the  war ;  but  the  true 
story  of  her  purposes  is  to  be  inferred  from 
the  course  of  the  last  possible  means  of  prevent- 
ing a  general  war — the  mediation  of  the  German 
Emperor.  In  the  present  spirit  of  Europe,  where 
every  power  looks  upon  every  other  power  as  in- 
sincere, bellicose,  and  devilish,  it  is  the  fashion 
to  assert  that  Germany  and  the  German  Emperor 
desired  war  and  brought  it  on.  To  offset  this 
charge  a  so-called  German  White-Book  has  been 
issued  by  the  German  Foreign  Office,  in  which  are 
printed  some  of  the  telegrams  and  dispatches. 
Another  side  we  know  through  the  similar  English 
White-Book;  the  two  sets  supplementing  each 
other.  That  Emperor  William  did  not  expect 
war  is  clear  from  the  fact  that  when  the  ulti- 
matum was  sent  out  by  Austria  he  was  in  Norway. 
Clearly  Germany  was  the  key  to  the  whole  situa- 


134*  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

tion :  as  the  ally  of  Austria ;  as  the  strongest  mili- 
tary power  in  Europe;  and  as  the  power  which, 
during  the  controversy  over  Morocco  in  1911, 
the  Balkan  wars,  and  other  international  strains, 
had  distinctly  given  powerful  aid  to  keep  the 
peace. 

It  is  impossible  not  to  believe  that  the  German 
Emperor  as  well  as  the  German  government  was 
aware  of  the  fix  of  Austria-Hungary,  and  of  the 
purpose  to  give  a  bad  fall  to  Servia.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  is  impossible  not  to  believe  that  the 
Emperor  was  behind  the  successful  effort  of 
Germany  to  lead  Austria  to  give  some  sort  of 
guaranty  of  the  integrity  of  Servia.  On  their 
side,  the  English  representatives  and  apparently 
other  people  believed  that  the  German  Ambassa-j 
dor  to  Vienna,  von  Tschirschky  und  Bogendorff, 
was  a  bitter  foe  of  Russia  and  aggravated  the 
matter;  and  that  the  German  Ambassador  at  St. 
Petersburg,  Count  Pourtales,  persuaded  his  gov- 
ernment that  the  Russians  could  not  be  induced 
to  fight. 

Grey  turned  to  Germany  as  the  only  hope  of 
peace.  July  28,  while  the  conference  of  the  four 
powers  was  still  under  discussion,  he  wrote: 
"I  am  ready  to  propose  that  the  German  Secre- 
tary of  State  should  suggest  the  lines  on  which 
those  principles  should  be  applied." 

The  day  after  William's  return  to  his  capital, 
July  27,  he  telegraphed  to  Czar  Nicholas,  set- 


THE  WAR  BECOMES  EUROPEAN   135 

ting  forth  the  necessity  of  some  punishment  for 
the  Servians,  but  adding,  "I  am  therefore  exert- 
ing all  my  influence  to  induce  Austria-Hungary 
to  come  to  an  open  and  satisfying  understanding 
with  Russia."  The  next  day  the  Czar  replied, 
asking  the  Emperor's  help:  "A  disgraceful  war 
has  been  declared  on  a  weak  nation.  The  indig- 
nation at  this,  which  I  fully  share,  is  immense  in 
Russia.  I  foresee  that  soon  I  can  no  longer  with- 
stand the  pressure — and  that  I  shall  be  forced  to 
adopt  measures  which  will  lead  to  war."  William 
replied  suggesting  that  "Russia  remain  in  the 
role  of  spectator  toward  the  Austrian-Servian 
war,"  and  urging  that  "no  military  measures  be 
taken  by  Russia  which  Austria-Hungary  would 
think  threatening."  This  correspondence  is  re- 
plete with  sincerity  and  clearly  shows  the  Ger- 
man Emperor  trying  to  hold  back  the  tide  till 
Austria  and  Russia  should  be  able  to  agree  upon 
a  form  of  accommodation. 

MOBILIZATION   AND   DIPLOMACY 

That  this  attempt  failed  seems  due  chiefly  to 
militarism  both  in  Russia  and  in  Germany.  Un- 
der modern  systems  of  warfare  military  men  lay 
great  stress  upon  the  advantage  of  a  few  hours 
in  getting  their  troops  to  the  front  in  case  war 
comes  on.  The  German  army  was  distributed 
throughout  the  Empire  and  there  were  probably 


136  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

300,000  men  east  of  Berlin.  Perhaps,  though 
there  is  no  information  at  present  on  that  sub- 
ject, troops  of  the  regular  army  had  been  sent 
toward  the  Russian  frontier  for  several  days ;  but 
a  formal  order  of  general  "mobilization"  up  to  the 
end  of  July  was  not  issued  by  any  of  the  powers 
involved  except  Servia.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
controversy,  Buchanan,  the  British  Minister  at 
St.  Petersburg,  warned  the  Russian  government 
not  to  mobilize;  but  on  July  25  orders  were 
given,  which  though  not  technically  mobilization, 
amounted  to  calling  in  men  who  were  not  a  part  of 
the  regular  army  then  under  the  colors;  and  later 
military  developments  show  that  many  thousands 
must  have  been  pushed  westward.  As  early  as 
July  29  William  strongly  protested  against  the 
Russian  mobilization  and  Nicholas  replied  that 
"for  technical  reasons"  the  orders  given  could 
not  be  revoked.  On  the  29th  official  orders  were 
given  for  Russian  mobilization  in  the  southern 
provinces,  which  Austria  accepted  as  an  evidence 
of  a  warlike  purpose.  On  August  1  the  Austrians 
mobilized. 

The  crisis  with  Germany  came  two  days  later. 
July  31  the  German  Chancellor  notified  his  Am- 
bassador to  Russia  that  "Russia  has  mobilized 
her  entire  army  and  navy ;  in  other  words,  mobil- 
ized against  us  also" ;  and  that  Germany  has  been 
obliged  "to  announce  that  danger  of  war  threat- 
ens us,  which  does  not  mean  mobilization.  Mobil- 


THE  WAR  BECOMES  EUROPEAN   137 

ization,  however,  must  follow  unless  Russia  ceases 
within  1£  hours  all  warlike  measures  against  us 
and  Austria-Hungary,  and  gives  us  definite  assur- 
ance thereof." 

At  the  last  moment  (August  1)  the  Czar  tele- 
graphed: "It  is  technically  impossible  to  discon- 
tinue our  military  operation,  which  has  been  ren- 
dered necessary  by  Austrian  mobilization.  We 
are  far  from  wishing  for  war,  and  so  long  as 
negotiations  with  Austria  regarding  Servia  con- 
tinue my  troops  will  not  undertake  any  provoca- 
tive action."  The  Kaiser  replied:  "In  my  en- 
deavors for  the  maintenance  of  the  peace  of  the 
world,  I  have  gone  to  the  extreme  limit  possible. 
It  is  not  I  that  shall  bear  the  responsibility  .  .  . 
no  one  menaces  the  honor  and  right  of  Russia, 
which  well  might  have  waited  upon  the  result  of 
my  mediation.  The  peace  of  Europe  can  yet  be 
conserved  by  thee  if  Russia  desires  to  discontinue 
her  military  measures  which  threaten  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary."  The  same  day  Emperor 
William  telegraphed  to  King  George  of  England: 
"Nicky  has  ordered  the  mobilization  of  his  whole 
army  and  fleet.  He  has  not  even  awaited  the  re- 
sults of  the  mediation  I  am  working  at  and  left 
me  without  any  news.  I  am  off  for  Berlin  to  take 
measures  for  insuring  safety  of  my  eastern  fron- 
tiers." Next  day,  August  £,  Russian  troops 
crossed  the  German  frontier  and  war  broke  out. 

So   far   as   the   published   dispatches    and   our 


138  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

imperfect  knowledge  of  the  circumstances  go,  it 
is  proved  that  Emperor  William  would  have  held 
his  hand  for  a  few  days  if  Russian  mobilization 
had  not  seemed  to  him  a  warlike  act  directed 
against  Germany.  Whether  Austria  would  in 
those  few  days  have  come  to  an  understanding 
which  would  practically  have  nullified  her  ulti- 
matum against  Servia  is  a  question  to  which  no 
answer  is  written,  even  in  the  books  of  the  Fates. 

FRANCE 

Every  power  in  Europe  knew  beforehand  that 
if  Russia  went  to  war  with  Germany,  France 
would  infallibly  attack  on  the  west.  Otherwise 
it  would  have  been  suicidal  for  Russia  to  chal- 
lenge or  to  accept  a  challenge  or  to  drift  into 
war  with  both  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary. 
As  has  been  seen,  Russia  tried  vainly  to  extract 
a  promise  of  support  from  England.  Without 
any  question  she  had  such  an  assurance  from 
France,  not  only  through  the  long-standing  se- 
cret agreement  of  about  1895,  but  by  positive 
assurance  at  the  time.  France  also  tried  to  get 
Grey  to  promise  English  aid.  The  French,  fore- 
seeing the  danger  that  war  might  break  out  with 
Germany,  beginning  with  outposts  acting  without 
orders,  removed  all  her  troops  ten  kilometers  back 
from  the  frontier.  On  August  1,  the  Germans  de- 
manded of  France  a  statement  of  her  intentions 


THE  WAR  BECOMES  EUROPEAN   139 

and  gave  eighteen  hours  for  an  answer,  at  the 
end  of  which  time  the  French  simply  replied  that 
they  would  do  whatever  they  thought  to  their 
interest.  Practically  at  the  end  of  the  eighteen 
hours  there  was  a  state  of  war  between  the  two 
countries  (August  2). 

How  far  the  French  desired  war  is  hard  to 
estimate.  Only  a  few  months  ago  they  voted  for 
a  three-year  military  system,  compulsory  on  all 
able-bodied  Frenchmen.  It  is  fair  to  infer  that 
they  expected  war  within  a  year  or  two  at  long- 
est ;  but  of  all  the  Great  Powers  involved,  France 
had  the  least  to  do  with  the  Austrian  ultimatum. 
It  is  hard  to  see  how  a  combination  between 
France  and  other  powers  to  bring  on  war  against 
Germany  on  the  first  day  of  August,  1914,  could 
have  prophetically  foreseen  the  action  of  Aus- 
tria. The  French  have  been  ready  for  war  with 
Germany  whenever  they  saw  a  good  opportunity 
for  the  last  forty  years,  and  the  whole  nation  as 
one  mass  accepted  the  opportunity  when  it  came 
without  hesitation  and  with  very  little  effort  to 
avert  it.  France's  only  share  in  the  peace  nego- 
tiations seems  to  have  been  her  acceptance  of  the 
invitation  to  a  conference  of  the  four  powers. 
France,  however,  could  not  fight  without  Russia, 
nor  Russia  without  France.  Together  they 
hoped  to  be  the  two  jaws  of  the  vise  with 
which  to  crush  both  Germany  and  Austria-Hun- 
gary. 


140  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

GREAT   BRITAIN 

The  most  complicated  situation  on  the  Euro- 
pean chessboard  was  that  of  Great  Britain,  for 
she  had  great  interests  in  the  Mediterranean  that 
would  be  affected  by  war  in  southeastern  Europe ; 
she  was  deeply  interested  in  any  naval  war;  and 
she  was  in  some  degree  committed  by  the  previous 
engagement  with  France  and  Russia.  When  the 
crisis  came  Italy  declined  to  consider  herself 
bound  to  aid  her  two  allies  in  the  Triple  Alliance 
because  her  engagements  applied  only  to  a  de- 
fensive war,  and,  in  the  judgment  of  the  Italians, 
this  was  an  offensive  war.  In  the  same  manner, 
though  on  different  grounds,  England  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  fierce  hours  of  negotiation  that 
preceded  war  made  it  clear  that  she  did  not  feel 
bound  to  aid  either  Russia  or  France,  simply  be- 
cause of  the  Triple  Entente;  and  (as  has  been 
seen)  declined  to  give  pledges  to  either  of  those 
two  powers. 

Grey  did  drop  a  warning  on  July  87  that  the 
British  fleet  happened  to  be  assembled  for  a  naval 
review  and  for  the  time  being  would  remain  assem- 
bled ;  but  he  took  pains  to  emphasize  the  fact  that 
England  was  entering  in  the  whole  matter  not 
with  a  view  to  save  Servia  but  to  save  the  rest  of 
Europe.  July  81  he  wrote:  "Nobody  here  feels 
that  in  this  dispute,  so  far  as  it  has  yet  gone, 
British  treaties  or  obligations  are  involved."  But 


THE  WAR  BECOMES  EUROPEAN  141 

at  the  same  time  he  wrote:  "I  had  not  only 
definitely  declined  to  say  that  we  would  remain 
neutral,  I  had  even  gone  so  far  this  morning  as 
to  say  to  the  German  Ambassador  that  if  France 
and  Germany  became  involved  in  war  we  should 
be  drawn  into  it."  This  is  simply  a  way  of  say- 
ing that  England  was  not  bound  to  go  to  war 
because  of  previous  pledges,  but  was  very  likely 
to  go  to  war  to  protect  her  own  interests. 

Nothing  can  be  clearer  than  that  the  German 
government  was  confident  that  Great  Britain 
would  keep  out  of  the  war.  In  the  first  place 
both  the  Chancellor,  von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  and 
the  Secretary  of  the  Foreign  Office,  von  Jagow, 
had  for  months  been  working  upon  a  scheme, 
which,  of  course,  must  have  been  approved  by  the 
Emperor,  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  Great 
Britain  and  through  Great  Britain  with  France, 
under  which  those  three  powers  (presumably  in 
association  with  Austria)  should  become  the  ar- 
biters of  Europe  and  thereby  of  Asia  and  of 
Africa.  There  is  no  evidence  of  a  crisis  in  the 
ill-feeling  between  the  people  of  the  two  nations 
previous  to  July  23.  That  Germany  did  not  expect 
war  with  Great  Britain  is  almost  decisively  proven 
by  the  fact  that  no  hint  was  given  to  the  two  great 
German  steamship  lines,  the  Hamburg  and  the 
North  German  Lloyd.  How  far  this  belief  rested 
upon  the  supposed  unwillingness  of  the  British  to 
fight  any  strong  power;  how  far  upon  the  con- 


142  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

viction  that  the  English  would  see  it  contrary  to 
their  interest  to  fight;  and  how  far  upon  the 
assumption  of  the  Germans  that  the  English 
would  think  like  Germans  upon  such  an  issue  is 
impossible  to  determine. 

In  all  probability  Great  Britain  would  speedily 
have  been  drawn  into  the  conflict  through  mere 
nearness  to  the  scene  of  it  in  every  ocean;  but 
there  were  two  direct  reasons  which  led  England 
into  the  war  instantly  and  irrevocably.  The  first 
was  the  geographical  fact  that  the  English  Chan- 
nel, command  of  which  means  command  of  the 
British  Islands,  narrows  down  to  twenty- two 
miles  at  Dover;  and  a  naval  war  between  Ger- 
many and  France  would  mean  the  passing  of 
German  fleets  within  a  cannon  shot  of  the 
British  shores,  and  the  bombardment  of  the 
French  coast  within  hearing  of  British  sea- 
ports. That  contingency  had  so  far  been  fore- 
seen that  in  1912  a  formal  agreement  was  made 
that  the  British  would  withdraw  their  Mediter- 
ranean fleet  and  the  French  would  withdraw 
their  Channel  fleet  to  the  Mediterranean.  This 
could  mean  nothing  but  a  guaranty  by  Great 
Britain  of  the  French  Atlantic  coast  in  case  of 
war. 

That  question  was  brought  up  sharply  by  a 
proposition  from  the  German  government  that 
England  should  remain  neutral  provided  the  Ger- 
mans would  engage  not  to  annex  any  of  the  terri- 


THE  WAR  BECOMES  EUROPEAN   143 

tory  of  Continental  France.  Grey  replied,  July 
30:  "What  he  asks  us  in  effect  is  to  engage  to 
stand  by  while  French  colonies  are  taken  and 
France  is  beaten,  so  long  as  Germany  does  not 
take  French  territory  as  distinct  from  the  col- 
onies. From  the  material  point  of  view  such  a 
proposal  is  unacceptable,  for  France  without 
further  territory  in  Europe  being  taken  from 
her,  could  be  so  crushed  as  to  lose  her  position 
as  a  Great  Power  and  become  subordinate  to  Ger- 
man policy.  Altogether  apart  from  that,  it 
would  be  a  disgrace  for  us  to  make  this  bargain 
with  Germany  at  the  expense  of  France,  a  dis- 
grace, from  which  the  good  name  of  this  country 
would  never  recover." 

Two  days  later  Prince  Lichnowsky  notified  his 
government  that  Earl  Grey  had  telephoned  him 
suggesting  that  if  Germany  would  agree  not  to 
attack  France,  France  might  remain  neutral. 
Emperor  William  at  once  replied:  "If  France 
offers  me  neutrality,  which  must  be  guaranteed 
by  the  British  fleet  and  army,  I  shall,  of  course, 
refrain  from  attacking  France  and  employ  my 
troops  elsewhere."  King  George  at  once  an- 
swered that  Lichnowsky  must  have  misunderstood 
the  proposition;  if  the  idea  of  confining  the  war 
to  Austria,  Germany,  and  Russia  found  lodgment 
in  Sir  Edward  Grey's  mind,  it  would  appear  from 
the  correspondence  that  France  would  enter  into 
no  such  engagement,  and  Grey  afterward  ex- 


THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

plained  that  his  idea  included  the  neutrality  of 
Germany. 

Germany  was  still  so  desirous  for  English  neu- 
trality that,  according  to  Grey,  Lichnowsky  on 
August  1  "pressed  me  as  to  whether  I  could  not 
formulate  conditions  on  which  we  would  remain 
neutral.  He  even  suggested  that  the  integrity 
of  France  and  her  colonies  might  be  guaranteed." 
Nothing  more  was  heard  of  French  neutrality. 
On  the  contrary,  on  August  %  Grey  gave  to 
France  the  following  memorandum: 

"I  am  authorized  to  give  an  assurance  that,  if 
the  German  fleet  comes  into  the  Channel  or 
through  the  North  Sea  to  undertake  hostile  opera- 
tions against  French  coasts  or  shipping,  the 
British  fleet  will  give  all  the  protection  in  its 
power. 

"This  assurance  is,  of  course,  subject  to  the 
policy  of  his  Majesty's  Government  receiving  the 
support  of  Parliament,  and  must  not  be  taken  as 
binding  his  Majesty's  Government  to  take  any 
action  until  the  above  contingency  of  action  by 
the  German  fleet  takes  place." 

The  second  impetus  to  England  was  given  by 
the  German  entry  into  Belgium.  On  July  30  the 
German  government  appears  to  have  offered  to 
respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  provided  Eng- 
land would  agree  for  that  consideration  to  remain 
neutral.  During  the  next  two  days  Grey  at- 
tempted to  secure  a  promise  from  Germany  not 


THE  WAR  BECOMES  EUROPEAN  145 

to  begin  hostilities  in  Belgium;  and  secured  from 
France  a  positive  statement  that  France  would 
respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  unless  some 
other  power  violated  it.  On  August  £  Luxem- 
burg was  entered  by  German  troops,  the  German 
government  taking  pains  to  notify  the  Luxem- 
burg Minister  of  State  that: 

"The  military  measures  taken  in  Luxemburg 
do  not  constitute  a  hostile  act  against  Luxem- 
burg, but  are  only  intended  to  insure  against  a 
possible  attack  of  a  French  army.  Full  compen- 
sation will  be  paid  to  Luxemburg  for  any  damage 
caused  by  using  the  railways,  which  are  leased 
to  the  Empire." 

On  August  3  the  German  troops  entered  Bel- 
gium in  defiance  of  the  protests  of  the  Belgian 
government;  and,  on  the  refusal  of  the  German 
government  to  withdraw,  the  British  Minister  de- 
manded his  passports.  At  7  P.  M.  August  4  Ger- 
many formally  declared  war  on  England,  and  at 
11  P.  M.  England  reciprocated. 

The  last  chance  of  peace  between  Germany  and 
Russia  disappeared  on  August  1,  and  in  the 
course  of  the  next  three  days  Great  Britain  came 
to  the  point  of  joining  France  and  Russia.  If 
the  German  charge  is  justified,  that  it  was  the 
previous  purpose  of  those  three  powers  to  act 
together  in  a  conspiracy  against  Germany,  Great 
Britain  had  not  played  fair  with  her  allies;  for 
she  had  assured  Russia  and  France  as  well  as 


146  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

Germany  that  she  was  not  under  obligations  to 
unite  with  them.  She  had  made  several  efforts 
to  secure  neutrality  for  herself  and  apparently 
for  France;  and  up  to  the  occupation  of  Bel- 
gium no  English  interest  had  been  seriously 
menaced. 

The  trusted  and  accredited  representative  of 
Great  Britain  is  Sir  Edward  Grey,  and  the  charge 
that  he  hoodwinked  Austria  and  Germany  in- 
volves the  belief  that  he  is  capable  of  leading  the 
statesmen  of  the  other  European  powers  a  dance 
for  twelve  days;  and  of  persuading  the  German 
Chancellor  and  Emperor  that  his  formal  dis- 
patches did  not  mean  what  they  said.  If  Grey 
thus  subtly  induced  Germany  to  go  into  war,  with 
the  confidence  that  she  would  have  one  ally  and 
only  two  adversaries,  and  then  at  the  last  moment 
threw  off  the  mask  when  Germany  could  no  longer 
withdraw,  then  the  world  is  confronted  by  a 
greater  danger  than  any  Slav  Empire  or  Yellow 
Peril.  For  Sir  Edward  Grey  would  be  established 
as  a  statesman  with  the  morals  of  Metternich,  the 
abandon  of  Napoleon,  and  the  intellectual  power 
of  Bismarck.  The  only  defense  for  Europe 
against  such  a  Machiavelli  would  be  another  St. 
Helena ! 

All  the  circumstances  seem  to  show  that  the 
Germans  confidently  expected  Great  Britain  to 
stand  neutral,  but  they  expected  it  on  grounds 
of  the  probable  policy  and  interest  of  Great 


THE  WAR  BECOMES  EUROPEAN   147 

Britain  and  not  upon  any  words  of  Britain's  re- 
sponsible statesman.  The  English  public  was  de- 
lighted with  war,  partly  from  an  accumulated 
patriotism,  partly  from  a  sense  of  power  in  their 
fleet,  and  partly  from  a  desire  to  show  that  they 
were  still  an  indispensable  factor  in  the  world's 
affairs;  and  doubtless  behind  all  that,  was  the 
feeling  that  the  time  had  come  to  put  an  end  to 
German  commercial  and  seafaring  rivalry. 

MONTENEGRO   AND   JAPAN 

Montenegro,  which  is  identical  with  Servia  in 
language,  race,  and  religion,  had  for  several  years 
been  a  cockboat  in  the  wake  of  a  steam  launch 
that  was  fearlessly  moving  about  among  iron- 
clads; and  on  August  7  declared  war  on  Aus- 
tria in  sympathy  and  alliance  with  Servia.  Japan 
at  the  other  end  of  the  world  seemed  not  deeply 
involved  in  this  controversy,  but  Japan  was 
closely  bound  to  Great  Britain  by  two  treaties. 
By  the  first,  January  30,  1902,  it  was  agreed  with 
regard  to  China  and  Korea  that: 

"If  either  Great  Britain  or  Japan,  in  the  de- 
fense of  their  respective  interests  as  above  de- 
scribed, should  become  involved  in  war  with  an- 
other power,  ...  in  the  above  event  any  other 
power  or  powers  should  join  in  hostilities  against 
that  ally,  the  other  high  contracting  party  will 
come  to  its  assistance  and  will  conduct  the  war 


148  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

in  common,  and  make  peace  in  mutual  agreement 
with  it." 

By  the  second  agreement  of  August  12,  1905, 
it  was  provided  that: 

"If  by  reason  of  unprovoked  attack  or  aggres- 
sive action,  wherever  arising,  on  the  part  of  any 
other  power  or  powers,  either  contracting  party 
should  be  involved  in  war  in  defense  of  its  terri- 
torial rights  or  special  interests  mentioned  in  the 
preamble  of  this  agreement,  the  other  contract- 
ing party  will  at  once  come  to  the  assistance 
of  its  ally  and  will  conduct  the  war  in  com- 
mon and  make  peace  in  mutual  agreement  with 
it." 

The  English  and  Japanese  governments  ex- 
changed views,  and  on  August  £3  Japan  de- 
clared war  upon  Germany.  At  first  the  few  Aus- 
trian interests  in  eastern  Asia  were  excepted  by 
the  Japanese,  but  the  Austrian  government  ex- 
plained that  it  shared  with  its  ally  in  the  war  thus 
declared.  The  Japanese  in  their  declaration 
spoke  of  the  uncertainty  of  commerce  and  the 
number  of  steamers  that  were  lying  in  port,  not 
daring  to  go  to  sea.  There  seems,  however,  no 
reason  to  doubt  that  if  Japan  had  declared  her 
neutrality  it  would  have  been  respected  by  Ger- 
many, which  had  no  wish  to  create  new  enemies 
at  that  distance.  The  real  motive  of  the  Japanese 
is  to  impress  upon' the  world  their  vitality  as  a 
Western  Power,  resident  in  the  East,  as  a  power 


THE  WAR  BECOMES  EUROPEAN   149 

which  shares  in  the  dangers  and  destinies  of  the 
Western  world. 

BELGIUM 

The  case  of  Belgium  is  peculiar.  It  is  the  only 
one  of  the  eight  participating  powers  which  had 
no  quarrel  with  anybody.  Belgium  was  in  no 
danger  from  a  wave  of  Slavic  barbarism.  Bel- 
gium, though  prosperous,  was  not  envied  by  other 
commercial  powers ;  though  the  possessor  of  an 
immense  area  in  Africa,  nobody  was  trying  to  get 
her  territory.  The  Belgian  ports,  particularly 
Antwerp,  were  freely  and  profitably  used  by  Ger- 
man trade.  There  was  no  boundary  squabble,  no 
special  military  spirit.  No  people  in  Europe 
were  less  involved  in  questions  of  Triple  Alliance 
and  Triple  Entente  and  Balance  of  Power.  They 
were  literally  minding  their  own  business  up  to 
the  day  when  war  broke  out  between  France  and 
Germany. 

The  peculiar  position  of  Belgium  as  a  specially 
neutralized  power  will  be  considered  later,  to- 
gether with  the  question  whether  the  Belgians  had 
departed  from  their  neutrality.  For  the  present 
the  question  is  only  how  Belgium  got  into  the 
war.  On  July  30  Grey  notified  Goschen  that  in 
his  opinion  the  Chancellor  of  the  German  Em- 
pire "in  effect  asks  us  to  bargain  away  whatever 
obligation  or  interest  we  have  as  regards  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium.  We  could  not  entertain  that 


150  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

bargain  either."  Next  day  he  inquired  of  both 
French  and  German  governments  whether  they 
were  "prepared  to  engage  to  respect  neutrality 
of  Belgium,  so  long  as  no  other  power  violates  it." 
The  next  day  he  notified  Belgium  that  he  as- 
sumed she  would  "maintain  to  the  utmost  of 
her  power  her  neutrality,  which  I  desire  and  ex- 
pect other  powers  to  uphold  and  observe." 
France  gave  the  required  assurance  at  once. 

Goschen  reported,  July  31,  "that  German 
government  consider  that  certain  hostile  acts 
have  already  been  committed  by  Belgium.  As  an 
instance  of  this,  he  alleged  that  a  consignment  of 
corn  for  Germany  had  been  placed  under  an  em- 
bargo already."  On  August  3  the  French  gor- 
ernment  offered  five  army  corps  to  the  Belgians 
in  case  they  should  be  invaded,  but  the  Belgians 
intimated  that  they  thought  they  could  take  care 
of  themselves.  Meanwhile  the  German  government 
offered  the  Belgian  government  "friendly  neu- 
trality entailing  free  passage  through  Belgian 
territory,  and  promising  to  maintain  the  inde- 
pendence and  integrity  of  the  kingdom  and  its 
possessions  at  the  conclusion  of  peace,  threaten- 
ing in  case  of  refusal  to  treat  Belgium  as  an 
enemy.  An  answer  was  requested  in  twelve 
hours." 

Next  day,  August  4,  and  three  days  after 
the  beginning  of  German  mobilization,  the  Ger- 
man government  notified  the  Belgian  government 


THE  WAR  BECOMES  EUROPEAN   151 

that  since  they  "have  declined  the  well-intentioned 
proposals  submitted  to  them  by  the  Imperial 
Government,  the  latter  will,  deeply  to  their  re- 
gret, be  compelled  to  carry  out,  if  necessary  by 
force  of  arms,  the  measures  considered  indispen- 
sable in  view  of  the  French  menaces."  Where- 
upon the  Germans  crossed  the  border  and  hos- 
tilities at  once  began. 

The  Germans  still  sought  to  hold  back  Great 
Britain  from  declaring  war,  by  the  formal  assur- 
ance that  "even  in  the  case  of  armed  conflict  with 
Belgium,  Germany  will,  under  no  pretense  what- 
ever, annex  Belgium  territory.  Sincerity  of  this 
declaration  is  borne  out  by  the  fact  that  we 
solemnly  pledged  our  word  to  Holland  strictly  to 
respect  her  neutrality.  It  is  obvious  that  we 
could  not  profitably  annex  Belgian  territory 
without  making  at  the  same  time  territorial  ac- 
quisitions at  expense  of  Holland.  Please  impress 
upon  Sir  E.  Grey  that  the  German  army  could 
not  be  exposed  to  French  attack  across  Belgium, 
which  was  planned  according  to  absolutely  unim- 
peachable information.  Germany  had  conse- 
quently to  disregard  Belgian  neutrality,  it  being 
for  her  a  question  of  life  or  death  to  prevent 
French  advance." 

Leaving  aside  for  the  moment  the  question 
whether  Germany  was  under  a  special  pledge  not 
to  disturb  Belgium,  the  question  of  responsibility 
is  perfectly  simple.  Four  suggestions  were  made 


152  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

that  Belgium  had  incurred  invasion  by  hostile 
acts:  (1)  by  holding  up  a  grain  cargo;  (2)  by 
permitting  her  forts  to  be  designed  by  a  French 
engineer;  (3)  by  building  forts  on  the  German 
frontier,  which  was  an  evidence  of  hostile  feeling; 
(4)  by  the  passage  of  a  number  of  French  officers 
in  automobiles  across  Belgium  on  the  second  or 
third  of  August;  (5)  by  negotiations  with  Eng- 
land several  years  previous  for  English  defense 
and  use  of  Belgium  in  case  of  war.  This  is  said 
to  be  based  on  documents  discovered  after  the  fall 
of  Antwerp.  Every  observer  and  reader  may  de- 
cide for  himself  how  far  those  complaints  are  sus- 
tained by  the  evidence  that  is  adduced. 

In  any  case  all  the  world  knows  that  they  were 
not  the  determining  factors  in  the  action  of  Ger- 
many. Belgium  was  attacked  because  it  lay 
across  a  roundabout,  but  supposedly  easy,  road 
to  Paris,  and  might  eventually  come  into  the  circle 
of  the  Allies.  The  German  military  engineers  had 
decided  that  the  French  fortified  frontier  from 
Switzerland  to  Luxemburg  was  too  strong  to  be 
forced  in  any  brief  time.  Hence,  the  Germans 
entered  by  the  Belgian  frontier,  south  of  which 
the  only  strong  French  fortress  was  Maubeuge. 
The  French  expected  to  stand  on  the  defensive; 
and  "life  or  death"  to  the  Germans  meant  the 
success  or  failure  of  the  plan  to  break  down  that 
defense  and  capture  Paris  before  the  Russians 
could  get  up  in  force  on  the  eastern  frontier. 


THE  WAR  BECOMES  EUROPEAN   153 

The  consequences  of  this  act  must  be  to  impress 
all  the  small  European  powers  with  apprehension. 
Switzerland  appreciated  the  circumstances  and 
instantly  called  out  her  army  and  lined  her  north- 
ern frontiers.  Nothing  but  a  conviction  of  im- 
perious and  military  necessity  would  have  driven 
Germany  to  an  act  which  was  bound  to  create 
consternation  among  small  powers  and  surprise 
among  neutrals  throughout  the  world. 


CHAPTER   VIII 

PSYCHOLOGY  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  WAR 

THE   SOVEREIGNS 

TO  read  some  of  the  utterances  of  the  day 
one  would  think  that  the  European  war 
that  is  now  raging  is  being  fought  by 
automatons.     We  picture  to  ourselves  "We  Wil- 
liam" or  "We  Nicholas"  busily  unpacking  card- 
board boxes  of  soldiers  and  winding  up  the  spring 
in  the  back  of  each  one,  and  setting  him  march- 
ing toward  Paris,  or  toward  Berlin.     It  is  a  con- 
Tenient  way  of  simplifying  the  problem  to  look 
upon  it  as  a  war  of  dynasties,  due  to  the  ambition 
of  a  little  group  of  men,  who  have  nothing  per- 
sonally to  lose,  and  stand  a  good  chance  of  get- 
ting on  the  front  page  of  the  metropolitan  dailies. 
Nothing  could  be  further  from  the  truth  than 
the  idea  that  ten  million  men  are  tearing  each 
other   to  pieces  because  their   sovereigns   so  bid 
them  do.     The  days  are  long  gone  by  when  some 
German  princes  sold  their  subjects  in  batches  to 
serve  in  far-off  America  at  a  bonus  of  $35  per 
154 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  THE  WAR        155 

man,  and  more  if  they  were  killed.  Not  in  a 
thousand  years  has  Europe  been  so  free  from  the 
professional  mercenary,  selling  his  sword  to  the 
highest  bidder.  And  though  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands of  men  would  joyfully  risk  their  lives  in 
defense  of  Emperor  or  King  or  Grand  Duke,  the 
only  king  in  Europe  who  has  a  close  touch,  and 
the  personal  friendship  of  his  subjects,  is  King 
Nicholas  of  Montenegro.  That  is  not  so  difficult, 
because  he  could  gather  most  of  his  loving  sub- 
jects within  the  area  of  Madison  Square. 

The  personality  of  the  sovereigns  is  an  impor- 
tant factor  in  the  conflict,  but  simply  as  Kings 
only  one  of  them  occupies  the  center  of  the  stage. 
Kaiser  Francis  Joseph  cannot  possibly  have 
made  the  decision  to  send  to  Servia  the  ultimatum 
that  was  a  spark  to  the  powder.  King  Peter  of 
Servia  is  a  worthless  figurehead,  who  has  hardly 
been  mentioned  in  the  proceedings.  The  Kings 
of  Bulgaria  and  Rumania  are  both  imported  Ger- 
mans. Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria  seems  to  have  been 
overridden  by  the  military  men  in  the  second 
Balkan  war  of  July,  1913.  Charles  of  Rumania 
was  a  remarkably  handsome  and  courtly  man,  who 
was  at  best  one  of  a  group  of  guiding  statesmen  in 
his  country.  The  Sultan  of  Turkey  is  a  signa- 
ture machine,  who  does  what  he  is  told  by  the 
combination  of  men,  who  for  the  time  being  have 
taken  upon  themselves  the  responsibilities  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire.  King  Albert  of  Belgium  is  new 


156  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

to  the  throne,  and  though  he  has  shown  himself 
a  bold  and  manly  sovereign,  the  last  thing  for 
which  he  would  claim  authority  is  the  coming  on 
of  war  with  Germany.  As  for  France,  there  is 
not  even  the  shadow  of  a  Bourbon  or  Bonaparte 
cast  athwart  the  public  sentiment  of  the  country ; 
and  the  President  of  the  Republic  is  in  reality 
only  the  chairman  of  a  national  committee  of 
defense. 

The  three  sovereigns  who  stand  out  in  relief 
against  the  dark  background  of  the  war  are  King 
George,  and  his  two  cousins,  Emperor  William 
and  Czar  Nicholas.  As  for  George  V,  the  Eng- 
lish people  exercise  the  inalienable  right  of  gos- 
siping about  royalty.  One  set  tells  the  visitor 
that  the  King's  sense  and  carefully  modulated  in- 
fluence over  English  statesmen  make  him  a  power 
in  the  realm.  Another  set,  equally  well  unin- 
formed, assure  you  that  he  only  puts  things  in  a 
mess,  and  undoes  the  work  of  his  father.  The 
weight  of  evidence  is  that  King  George  is  a  man 
who  possesses  the  manly  virtues  of  sense  and 
steadfastness.  In  the  correspondence  between  the 
courts  in  the  crisis  of  July,  1914,  we  find  a  per- 
sonal letter  to  Cousin  William;  but  nobody  for  a 
moment  supposes  that  it  contains  a  syllable  which 
had  not  been  read  and  approved  by  Asquith,  the 
responsible  head  of  the  British  government.  No 
personal  desire  of  the  King  for  war  or  to  prevent 
war  deflected  the  decisions  of  the  British  cabinet. 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  THE  WAR       157 

George  V  cannot  take  the  field  in  command,  as 
did  the  great  William  of  Orange  in  1689.  He 
cannot  construct  a  majority  in  the  House  of 
Commons,  as  did  George  III,  and  thus  keep  alive 
a  war  even  after  it  became  repugnant  to  the  peo- 
ple of  the  realm.  The  only  ambition  which  he  can 
cherish  is  to  hand  down  his  crown  undiminished ; 
and  the  war  somewhat  endangers  that  modest 
hope. 

The  Czar  Nicholas  much  resembles  his  cousin 
George  in  person  and  in  character;  but  by  the 
laws  of  Russia  he  is  endowed  with  tremendous 
power  in  time  of  peace,  and  still  more  in  time  of 
war.  "Autocrat  of  all  the  Russias,"  "Great 
White  Czar,"  supreme  and  unquestioned  monarch 
of  the  largest  and  most  populous  European  coun- 
try, his  word  is  law,  his  ministers  are  his  ser- 
vants, the  people  are  his  serfs !  All  this  sounds 
magnificent;  but  has  Czar  Nicholas  actually  ex- 
ercised any  of  these  pyramidal  prerogatives  in 
the  present  crisis? 

Read  the  telegrams  which  he  exchanged  with 
Emperor  William,  and  see  whether  you  can  dis- 
cover there  this  imperial  and  unquestionable  will. 
Instead,  between  the  lines  appears  the  evidence 
that  if  Nicholas  could  have  bent  the  resolution 
of  those  who  stood  nearest  to  him,  he  would  have 
held  up  the  mobilization  of  Russia  till  there  was 
time  to  discover  whether  Austria  would  give  way 
on  the  Servian  question  sufficiently  to  reassure 


158  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

Russia.  That  might  not  have  stopped  the  war, 
but  it  would  have  relieved  the  Czar  from  the  re- 
proaches of  William,  when  he  solemnly  held  him 
up  before  God  and  man  as  responsible  for  the 
breach.  The  truth  is  that  the  Czar  of  Russia  is 
inclosed  in  a  palisade  of  officials  every  one  of 
whom  is  nominally  his  servitor;  but  he  is  only  a 
reservoir  of ^ power;  they  control  all  the  distribu- 
tion pipes ;  and  it  is  they,  and  not  the  Czar,  who 
decided  that  war  was  better  for  Russia  than  the 
previous  state  of  things. 

The  Emperor  William  is  the  one  genuinely 
commanding  royal  figure  in  Europe.  He  lives 
under  the  same  political  roof  as  the  Reichstag, 
which  makes  laws  and  votes  men  and  money  for 
military  purposes,  but  under  the  German  Con- 
stitution he  has  immense  sovereign  powers.  He 
directs  the  seventeen  votes  of  Prussia  in  the 
Bundesrath,  and  unofficially  controls  enough  more 
votes  to  make  up  the  majority  of  the  votes  of  the 
Bundesrath  which  are  necessary  for  formal  action. 
He  is  a  military  monarch  inured  to  camp  and  sad- 
dle, familiar  with  the  deep-laid  plans  of  the  mili- 
tary experts.  In  the  negotiations  and  cross-corre- 
spondence of  that  age-long  and  fearfully  brief 
eight  days,  from  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  the 
German  declaration  of  war  on  Russia,  he  appears 
as  the  one  independent  statesman  who  might  per- 
haps speak  the  restraining  word  to  the  Austrians, 
and  who  did  counsel  moderation  to  that  power. 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  THE  WAR        159 

THE   MINISTERS 

William  II,  German  Emperor,  cannot  act 
without  the  support  and  aid  of  the  Chancellor 
and  other  statesmen  who  summarize  and  inter- 
pret the  national  will.  He  could  not  control  the 
course  of  events  which,  as  the  publications  of  the 
dispatches  show,  swept  him  and  his  Chancellor 
away  from  the  policy  which  they  had  been  culti- 
vating of  friendship  and  perhaps  eventual  alliance 
with  England  and  then  with  France.  There  is  a 
voice  of  the  German  nation  which  is  more  power- 
ful than  that  of  all  the  Hohenz oiler ns.  The  Em- 
peror leads  Germany  in  the  direction  towards 
which  the  current  flows.  He  has  not  the  power, 
if  he  had  the  will,  either  to  make  war  or  to  keep 
the  peace  against  the  decided  sweep  of  German 
public  opinion. 

Yet  the  final  decisions  have  undoubtedly  been 
made  by  small  groups  of  statesmen  in  each  coun- 
try. Not  a  single  parliament,  assembly,  diet, 
duma,  or  skuptshina  decided  the  action  of  any  one 
of  the  countries  involved.  The  English  Parlia- 
ment and  the  German  Reichstag  accepted  and 
approved  what  each  understood  to  be  an  inevit- 
able state  of  facts.  France  took  the  ground  that 
the  war  was  defensive,  and  needed  no  declaration 
of  war  by  the  Chamber.  In  England  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  was  the  dominant  figure,  and  the 
dispatches  reveal  him  as  calm,  patient  and  re- 


160  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

sourceful.  To  the  very  last  moment  he  strove  to 
find  some  influence,  or  combination,  or  personality 
which  would  stay  the  flood.  He  pleaded  for  the 
few  little  hours  of  delay  that  would  perhaps  make 
possible  an  understanding  between  Russia  and 
Austria.  Though  he  once  referred  to  the  fact 
that  his  decisions  were  subject  to  the  will  of 
Parliament,  he  announced  the  position  of  his 
country,  and  committed  Great  Britain  to  a  point 
of  view  which  led  that  country  to  the  side  of  the 
Allies,  without  a  previous  vote  of  Parliament. 

The  two  other  foreign  ministers  who  affected 
the  decision  were  Sazonof,  the  Russian,  and  Beth- 
mann-Hollweg,  Chancellor  of  the  German  Empire. 
Both  of  them  preferred  peace,  if  they  could  reach 
their  ends  without  war.  Another  individual 
stands  out  from  the  group  of  diplomats  and  am- 
bassadors because  of  the  tragic  responsibilities 
of  presenting  the  ultimatum  of  Germany  to  Rus- 
sia. This  was  De  Pourtales,  German  Ambas- 
sador to  Russia.  The  dispatches  tell  us  that 
when  the  fatal  moment  arrived  he  broke  down, 
as  the  mighty  Bismarck  once  broke  down  when 
the  military  men  had  almost  persuaded  the  old 
Emperor  William  to  take  territory  from  Austria 
after  the  war  of  1866.  Almost  heart-broken  he 
pleaded  with  Sazonof  to  give  him  a  "formula" — 
that  is,  a  condensed  statement  of  what  would 
satisfy  Russia.  As  has  been  described  above,  a 
memorandum  was  handed  to  him,  and  subse- 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  THE  WAR        161 

quently  modified,  which  came  near  preventing  the 
war.  The  German  foreign  minister  also  with 
anguish  spoke  to  the  English  minister  to  Berlin 
of  the  wrecking  of  his  hopes  for  an  understand- 
ing with  England. 


THE   MILITARY  MEN 

To  accuse  these  statesmen  and  the  other  diplo- 
mats who  loyally  strove  to  prevent  the  conflict, 
of  being  influenced  by  personal  or  dynastic  mo- 
tives would  be  a  great  injustice.  The  natural 
disposition  of  diplomats  is  to  adjust  matters. 
The  ministers  and  ambassadors  who  in  every 
country  finally  urged  or  agreed  with  a  declara- 
tion of  war,  had  around  them,  and  behind  them, 
another  ring  of  persons  exercising  influence  upon 
them.  Here  comes  in  the  tremendous  weight  of 
the  military  men. 

Almost  any  soldier  whom  you  meet  will  tell 
you  that  the  object  of  his  life  is  to  prevent  war, 
but  the  soldier  is  an  immense  political  force 
throughout  every  European  country.  Great 
Britain  has  the  social  custom,  followed  by  the 
United  States,  that  it  is  unsuitable  for  a  military 
or  a  naval  man  to  appear  in  uniform,  unless  he 
is  on  duty.  Everywhere  on  the  Continent  a  man 
almost  lives  in  his  uniform;  a  favorite  subject 
for  the  German  comic  papers  is  the  young  officer 


162  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

who  tries  to  sneak  out  of  barracks  in  "mufti." 
The  Continental  military  element  is  not  only  al- 
ways before  the  public  eye,  it  is  deep  in  the  coun- 
cils of  state.  The  ministers  of  military  and  naval 
affairs  are  almost  always  men  who  have  seen 
military  or  naval  service,  or  who  are  actually  in 
service.  In  the  modern  armies  the  high  officer  is 
not  simply  the  recipient  of  honors  and  titles,  gold 
braid  and  medals,  but  is  an  essential  part  of  the 
machinery  of  state.  Every  officer  from  lieutenant 
to  field-marshal  (except  in  England)  is  a  daily 
sharer  in  the  hard  work  of  drill  and  administra- 
tion. 

Militarism  has  been  a  tremendous  force  in  this 
crisis,  partly  by  a  steady  emphasis  put  on  war 
as  a  means  of  settling  disputes,  which  accustoms 
a  whole  community  to  think  in  terms  of  Krupp 
guns  and  Zeppelins ;  partly  because  the  high  mili- 
tary officers  are  a  part,  and  often  the  strongest 
part,  of  the  combination  of  those  who  make  de- 
cisions. We  are  accustomed  to  think  of  Germany 
as  a  country  saturated  with  militarism,  but  it  is 
much  the  same  in  every  European  country  down 
to  little  Montenegro.  The  present  war  only  ac- 
cents the  general  belief  that  any  nation  and  any 
of  its  citizens  may  be  called  upon  to  fight  for 
the  nation's  right  to  live.  Everybody  is  taught 
that  the  only  rational  method  of  self-defense  is 
to  hit  the  other  fellow  before  he  can  get  his  fists 
doubled. 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  THE  WAR        163 

MOBILIZATION 

Hence  in  the  crisis  which  terminated  in  war 
"mobilization"  has  been  a  frequent  word.  The 
term  hardly  came  into  being  till  the  Prussian- 
Austrian  war  of  1866,  for  it  means  the  frantically 
rapid  calling  together  of  men  liable  for  service, 
and  putting  them  on  the  enemy's  frontier.  Every 
American  knows  that  when  two  football  rush  lines 
oppose  each  other,  the  one  that  is  first  in  motion 
is  more  likely  to  break  through  the  other  line. 
The  amazing  success  of  the  Germans  in  1870  in 
concentrating  their  army  on  the  border  before 
the  French  could  organize  their  forces,  has  led 
to  a  fetish  worship  of  mobilization.  It  is  like  a 
football  trick  tried  for  the  first  time:  in  the 
next  game  the  other  side  is  practising  the  same 
trick.  The  first  great  lesson  of  the  present  war 
at  Liege  was  that  a  comparatively  small  force 
behind  fortifications  can  "break  up  the  forma- 
tion" of  the  charging  forwards,  and  even  halt 
their  rush,  no  matter  how  swift  their  mobiliza- 
tion. 

Behind  mobilization  is  the  effect  of  the  fear  of 
mobilization  on  the  other  side,  which  played  a 
great  part  in  the  diplomatic  preliminaries  of  the 
war.  The  Austrians  followed  up  their  ultimatum 
on  Servia  with  their  armies  within  three  days 
after  it  expired,  expecting  to  catch  the  Slavs  nap- 
ping; and  were  furious  because  the  Servians  mob- 


164  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

ilized  at  the  same  time  that  they  were  preparing 
the  apology  which  Austria  ignored.  Emperor 
William,  occupying  the  powerful  place  of  the 
mediator  who  alone  could  dispose  the  hard  hearts 
of  the  Austrians  and  Russians  to  an  accommoda- 
tion, telegraphed  with  passionate  earnestness  to 
the  Czar  that  if  the  Russians  mobilized,  his  mis- 
sion was  at  an  end.  His  point  was  that  mobiliza- 
tion disturbed  the  delicate  balance  of  military 
force,  and  that  he  could  not  permit  the  Russians 
the  slightest  tactical  advantage.  The  Russians 
on  their  side  doubtless  felt  that  the  Germans 
were  in  a  position  to  throw  troops  on  the  bor- 
der in  forty-eight  hours,  while  it  would  take 
them  seven  times  as  long,  and  they  would  give  no 
advantage. 

Another  of  the  psychical  elements  of  the  prob- 
lem is  that  all  the  great  countries  felt  compelled 
to  prove  that  they  were  ready  to  fight;  and  that 
probably  accounts  for  the  Russian  mobilization 
in  the  midst  of  the  Emperor's  mediation.  The 
question  whether  Russia  would  intervene  in  case 
Austria  attacked  a  Balkan  power  had  been  many 
times  raised,  and  came  to  a  test  last  year,  when 
the  Austrians  were  ready  to  go  to  war  to  drive 
the  Montenegrins  out  of  Scutari.  Russia  held 
off  at  that  time,  and  it  probably  was  the  belief 
or  the  Austrians  in  1914  that  Russia  was  either 
not  ready  or  not  willing  to  confront  the  Dual 
Monarchy.  There  was  a  general  exhibition  of 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  THE  WAR        165 

mouthfuls  of  sharp  teeth.  Even  the  English 
pointedly  called  the  attention  of  the  other  powers 
to  the  fact  that  their  most  powerful  fleet  hap- 
pened to  be  assembled,  and  would  remain  assem- 
bled. 

PUBLIC   SENTIMENT 

The  newspapers  played  a  smaller  role  than 
usual  in  such  controversies ;  the  crisis  came  too 
swift,  too  concentrated.  Intimations  were  given 
out  from  time  to  time  of  the  series  of  attempts 
either  to  stop  or  to  "localize"  the  strife.  But 
nobody  was  sufficiently  informed  of  the  play  of 
international  forces  to  arouse  public  sentiment 
upon  them.  Questions  of  men  and  ships  and  forts 
were  withheld  from  the  press.  Even  government 
organs,  such  as  some  of  the  great  German  news- 
papers, were  muffled.  From  the  secession  of 
South  Carolina,  in  December,  1860,  to  the  break- 
ing out  of  Civil  War  the  next  April,  there  were 
four  months  of  discussion  and  exchange  of  views. 
In  Europe,  from  the  time  the  public  realized  the 
danger  of  great  war  till  the  great  war  began,  was 
less  than  five  days. 

It  had  been  confidently  supposed  that  should 
such  a  danger  arise,  the  great  money  powers  of 
Europe  would  deflect  it.  We  have  been  told  that 
they  really  put  an  end  to  the  war  between  Russia 
and  Japan,  by  refusing  to  lend  any  more  money. 
Capital  was  international;  the  enormous  com- 


166  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

mercial  interests  would  never  allow  a  war.  In 
fact  the  business  interests  of  Europe  were  either 
not  consulted  or  not  heeded.  Of  nothing  has  Ger- 
many been  more  justly  proud  than  of  its  two  rich 
and  powerful  steamship  companies — the  Ham- 
burg and  the  North  German  Lloyd,  but  so  little 
did  the  astute  semi-official  managers  of  this  line 
expect  war,  that  some  of  their  greatest  liners 
were  saved  from  capture  only  by  heading  away 
from  their  ports  of  destination. 

In  this  country  the  small  business  men  would 
have  a  great  influence  over  such  a  question,  be- 
cause they  could  see  ruin  staring  them  in  the  face, 
but  the  Austrian  manufacturer,  the  German 
chemist,  the  Russian  landowner,  the  English  ship- 
owner, have  been  swept  away  by  a  tide  against 
which  they  have  hardly  seemed  to  struggle.  The 
small  investors,  the  depositors  in  post  offices  and 
banks  in  every  country  accept  and  passionately 
support  a  war  which  is  likely  to  sweep  away  their 
savings. 

KISMET 

The  conclusion  is  irresistible  that  practically 
every  nation  interested  accepts  the  war  as  a  thing 
for  which  it  was  not  responsible,  and  which  it 
could  no  more  avoid  than  it  could  avoid  an  ava- 
lanche. The  Austrians,  without  the  slightest 
doubt,  believed  that  their  empire  would  fall  to 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  THE  WAR        167 

pieces  unless  they  once  for  all  stopped  the  growth 
of  Servia.  The  Servians  saw  no  escape  except  to 
call  out  their  army  for  the  third  time  in  two 
years.  The  Russians  were  genuinely  convinced 
that  the  crushing  of  Servia  would  mean  the  con- 
trol of  the  Balkans  by  Germany  and  Austria. 
The  Germans  were  sure  that  the  Russians  in  at- 
tacking Austria  were  attacking  Germanism,  and 
that  they  must  take  up  the  challenge.  The 
French  had  less  direct  cause  than  other  powers 
for  offensive  action,  but  had  been  waiting  for 
forty  years  for  the  opportunity  to  get  back  their 
lost  provinces.  The  Belgians  lay  in  the  most  di- 
rect path  of  a  great  power,  and  had  no  choice  but 
to  expiate  their  geography  with  blood.  The  Eng- 
lish kept  up  the  greatest  navy  in  the  world  in  or- 
der that  they  might  be  ready  to  prevent  the  lodg- 
ment of  any  rival  power  on  their  shores  or  on  the 
coast  opposite  them.  Everybody,  thinking  and 
unthinking,  seemed  absolutely  certain  that  his 
state  must  fight  or  be  destroyed. 

Not  everybody — the  peasantry,  the  helpless 
noncombatants,  the  foreigners  caught  in  the 
cogs  of  the  infernal  machine  of  war,  have  been 
strongly  for  peace.  Little  wayside  villages, 
country  churches,  orphan  asylums,  at  an  hour's 
notice  found  themselves  between  fiercely  battling 
and  enraged  armies.  Whatever  the  national  con- 
victions of  the  necessity  of  this  war,  there  are 
still  pathetic  protestors  who  cannot  be  silenced^ 


168  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

who  in  anguish  wonder  whether  some  way  out  of 
the  labyrinth  might  not  have  been  found.  But 
they  appear  to  be  the  only  active  members  in 
Europe  of  the  universal  World  Peace  Society. 


CHAPTER   IX 

QUESTIONS   OF  NEUTRALITY 
WHAT   IS   A   NEUTRAL? 

SINCE  the  Napoleonic  times  there  has  been 
no  war  in  central  Europe  which  involved 
more  than  two  or  at  most  three  Great 
Powers.  In  1854  it  was  two  small  French  and 
English  armies  rather  than  France  and  England 
that  attacked  the  small  Russian  post  of  Sebasto- 
pol  rather  than  Russia.  In  1849  it  was  a  Russian 
army,  not  the  Russian  nation,  which  aided  the 
Austrians  to  overcome  the  Hungarians.  The 
Prussian  wars  of  1864,  1866,  and  1870  were  each 
directed  against  one  antagonist,  except  that  in 
1866  the  Prussians  had  to  fight  the  South  Ger- 
mans at  the  same  time  as  the  Austrians.  In  the 
war  of  1877  the  main  antagonists  were  Russia 
and  Turkey.  The  old  practice  of  a  body  of  allies 
clustering  together  against  another  group  or 
power  was  realized  in  the  two  recent  Balkan  wars, 
which  at  the  same  time  brought  out  the  difficulty 
of  keeping  allies  side  by  side  throughout  a  war 
and  still  more  throughout  a  peace. 

169 


170  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

In  every  war  after  1815  there  was  a  large 
group  of  countries  which  took  no  part  in  the  hos- 
tilities, but  which  maintained  so  far  as  was  pos- 
sible while  war  was  going  on  their  previous  rela- 
tions of  trade  and  intercourse  with  the  belliger- 
ents. Gradually  by  custom,  by  treaties  which 
involved  neutral  and  belligerent  powers,  and  by 
treaties  made  beforehand  between  later  belliger- 
ents, the  rights  and  duties  of  neutrals  were  laid 
down.  In  the  two  Hague  Conferences  of  1899 
and  1908  numerous  conventions  were  drawn  up, 
many  of  which  have  been  signed  by  a  large  number 
of  powers,  clearly  setting  forth  these  rights  and 
duties.  The  penalty  of  deliberately  aiding  one 
of  the  belligerents  is  for  the  other  side  to  treat 
the  offender  as  a  party  to  the  war.  The  reward 
of  standing  by  the  duties  of  neutrals  is  to  enjoy 
trade  and  intercourse  with  all  the  belligerents. 
One  of  the  most  important  privileges  is  to  re- 
main in  a  foreign  country  after  it  goes  to  war, 
but  that  right  is  subject  to  many  limitations. 
Every  government  in  time  of  peace  as  well  as  in 
time  of  war  has  the  right  to  decide  whether  any 
foreigner  or  any  kind  of  foreigner  shall  be  allowed 
to  come  into  the  country,  or  having  come,  shall 
be  allowed  to  stay  there.  Nevertheless  the  ex- 
pulsion of  well-behaved  foreigners  for  any  but 
grave  reasons  is  usually  taken  up  as  a  grievance 
by  any  self-respecting  government  of  which  the 
exile  was  a  national.  The  present  war  broke  out 


QUESTIONS  OF  NEUTRALITY      171 

so  suddenly  that  great  numbers  of  people  were 
caught  unawares,  particularly  Americans,  who 
are  a  traveling  people;  on  August  1,  1914,  about 
100,000  of  them  were  on  the  Continent  of  Europe. 
The  knowing  ones  took  early  trains,  for  the  mo- 
ment mobilization  was  proclaimed  every  govern- 
ment seized  the  railroad  system  and  civilians  were 
allowed  to  ride  only  on  sufferance.  Many  Ger- 
mans, Frenchmen,  or  Austrians  were  caught  away 
from  home  in  their  own  country.  At  the  same 
moment  the  system  of  travelers'  credits  broke 
down,  and  when  trains  began  to  run  again  irreg- 
ularly, many  travelers  could  not  raise  the  money 
to  get  out.  The  United  States  government  took 
an  unprecedented  step  in  appropriating  £,- 
750,000  dollars  for  the  relief  of  "marooned" 
Americans ;  by  undertaking  to  forward  deposits 
made  in  the  State  Department  to  persons  abroad, 
and  by  sending  a  ship  of  war  to  carry  the  money 
and  give  assistance.  As  a  matter  of  fact  not  one 
in  ten  of  the  Americans  thus  caught  was  left 
entirely  without  means. 

Hundreds  of  these  returning  participants  in 
the  fringes  of  the  war  have  published  their  ex- 
periences. Few  of  them  seem  to  have  had  much 
trouble  in  France,  for  it  was  easy  to  get  to  Eng- 
land from  that  country.  In  Russia,  Austria,  and 
Germany,  however,  many  people  went  through 
hardships,  aggravated  sometimes  by  the  fact  that 
they  spoke  English  and  were  taken  for  English; 


172  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

that  is,  for  nationals  of  an  enemy  power.  As  al- 
ways happens  in  such  confusion  and  excitement, 
and  as  happened  frequently  in  our  Civil  War, 
some  people  were  harshly  and  brutally  treated, 
but  that  is  not  to  be  laid  to  any  nation  or  to 
any  government.  No  systematic  hostility  to 
Americans  was  shown  in  any  country;  and  in 
individual  cases  of  oppression  or  abuse  it  must 
be  presumed  that  after  the  war  proper  indemnity 
will  be  secured  by  the  United  States  government. 
Some  automobiles  were  "impressed,"  subject  to 
later  payment;  thousands  of  trunks  were  strand- 
ed ;  but  no  authentic  case  has  been  reported  of  an 
American  losing  life  or  being  put  in  peril  because 
he  was  a  neutral. 

MILITARY   SERVICE 

A  clear  neutral  personal  right  is  to  be  free  un- 
der all  circumstances  from  service  in  a  foreign 
army.  Some  cases  have  been  reported  where 
chauffeurs  who  claimed  to  be  American  have  been 
commissioned  with  their  machines,  either  because 
it  was  handy  to  have  the  keeper  with  the  beast, 
or  because  he  looked  like  material  for  a  soldier. 
The  general  drag-net  of  the  army  includes  three 
classes:  (1)  citizens  of  the  belligerent  coun- 
tries; (&)  former  citizens  who  have  lived  else- 
where but  cannot  make  out  a  clear  case  of  nat- 
uralization in  a  foreign  country  and  happen  to 


QUESTIONS  OF  NEUTRALITY      173 

be  in  their  old  homes;  (3)  residents  in  other 
countries  (particularly  the  United  States)  who 
are  entirely  out  of  the  physical  power  of  their 
government.  Neutrals  will  make  no  attempt  to 
protect  a  man  not  their  citizen  who  is  in  his 
native  country  when  war  breaks  out.  The  few 
instances  of  Americans  born  who  are  forced  into 
service  will  undoubtedly  be  disposed  of  as  soon 
as  the  overburdened  military  offices  can  be 
prodded  to  investigating  the  cases.  Naturalized 
citizens  who  have  a  clear  case  would  also  be 
set  free,  but  a  mere  claim  to  naturalization  with- 
out any  papers  or  other  proof  will  probably  be 
dismissed  until  the  war  is  over,  which  in  hundreds 
of  cases  is  certain  to  be  too  late  for  them — poor 
fellows!  By  special  treaties  with  Germany  and 
some  other  powers,  beginning  in  1868  the  United 
States  has  secured  the  principle  that  a  foreigner 
who  remains  in  the  United  States  five  years  loses 
that  foreign  citizenship  by  naturalization.  If, 
however,  he  returns  to  reside  in  his  original  coun- 
try, he  thereby  loses  his  American  citizenship.  In 
such  instances  the  military  governments  will  prob- 
ably take  the  benefit  of  the  doubt  if  the  man  has 
once  been  a  French,  German,  or  Russian  citizen. 
The  pressure  upon  nationals  of  other  coun- 
tries living  in  the  United  States  during  the  last 
three  years  has  been  terrible.  Servians,  Bul- 
garians, Montenegrins,  Albanians,  Turks,  and 
Greeks  went  home  in  masses  in  1912  to  take 


174  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

advantage  of  the  remarkable  opportunity  to  get 
killed  in  defense  of  their  country.  The  sea  road 
was  open  to  them  and  the  total  number  of  these 
volunteers  who  traveled  five  thousand  miles  is 
probably  over  a  hundred  thousand.  In  1914 
similar  calls  produced  a  less  result  because  it 
was  almost  impossible  for  men  to  get  home  to 
any  countries  except  England,  France,  and  Italy. 
The  point  is  a  very  serious  one  for  thousands  of 
these  men;  because  if  their  country  is  engaged  in 
war  and  they  fail  to  respond  to  a  call  they  are  lia- 
ble to  be  posted  as  deserters,  branded  in  public  es- 
timation as  cowards,  and  subject  to  punishment 
or  exclusion  if  in  the  future  they  try  to  go  home. 
On  the  other  hand  the  laws  of  the  United 
States  are  very  explicit  that  no  American  shall 
become  an  officer  or  soldier  in  a  foreign  army 
and  that  no  troops  for  any  foreign  army  shall 
be  recruited  within  the  United  States.  In  the 
Boer  War  there  was  a  small  contingent  of  Ameri- 
cans who  braved  the  penalties  of  this  law  and 
it  is  said  that  large  numbers  have  gone  to  Canada 
and  enlisted  there  on  their  own  statement  that 
they  were  Canadians,  for  the  love  of  adventure 
and  the  glamour  of  a  soldier's  life. 

FOREIGN   TRADE 

The  general  principle  that  a  neutral  is  not 
precluded  by  war  from  carrying  on  regular  trade 
with  a  belligerent  power  is  subject  to  many  limi- 


QUESTIONS  OF  NEUTRALITY      175 

tations.  In  the  first  place  any  belligerent  has 
the  right  to  fortify  the  coast  by  submarine  mines 
within  his  own  territorial  three-mile  limit;  and 
merchant  ships  attempting  to  enter  such  ports 
do  so  at  their  own  peril.  In  the  second  place 
when  a  neutral  vessel  attempts  to  enter  a  port 
outside  of  which  there  are  blockading  vessels,  it 
may  be  captured  and  confiscated.  In  the  third 
place,  a  vessel  which  carries  contraband  of  war 
bound  to  one  belligerent  port  may  be  captured 
by  the  cruisers  of  any  enemy  belligerent.  No 
neutral  is  bound  to  prevent  the  shipment  of  con- 
traband goods,  even  guns  and  ammunition,  but 
the  vessel  owner  takes  his  own  risk  of  capture ;  his 
government  will  do  nothing  for  him. 

By  modern  practice  this  doctrine  of  contra- 
band has  been  extended  in  two  ways.  First,  pro- 
visions are  "conditional  contraband"  if  the  like- 
lihood is  that  they  will  be  used  to  feed  soldiers 
in  the  field.  Furthermore,  goods,  including  food, 
which  are  to  be  landed  at  a  neutral  port  but  are 
intended  to  pass  from  that  neutral  port  to  a 
belligerent  are  contraband,  and  may  be  seized 
on  the  high  seas.  This  principle  is  very  impor- 
tant in  the  present  war  because  grain  shipments 
to  Holland  can  be  seized  before  they  reach  that 
country  if  they  are  destined  for  the  German 
army.  The  Dutch  government  has  made  itself 
safe  by  providing  that  such  shipments  shall  not 
be  forwarded  to  Germany  at  all.  Inasmuch  as 


176  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

the  whole  German  coast  from  the  Dutch  boundary 
to  the  Danish  is  practically  under  blockade  by 
the  British  fleet  and  the  route  through  the  Skaga- 
rack  and  the  Sound  into  the  Baltic  is  also 
blocked  to  hostile  vessels,  Germany  can  at  pres- 
ent receive  no  food  shipments  from  outside  of 
Europe,  a  factor  which  may  have  a  great  weight 
in  the  war. 

This  situation  has  greatly  interfered  with 
American  shipments  of  grain  because  of  the  un- 
certainty of  cargoes  reaching  port  and  therefore 
the  difficulty  of  assuring  payment  for  the  cargo 
on  delivery.  The  forwarding  of  cotton  also  is 
hampered  by  much  the  same  causes. 

Some  of  the  belligerent  powers,  especially  Ger- 
many, have  applied  very  strict  rules  to  the  mails. 
No  letter  is  mailable  in  the  German  post  office 
unless  written  in  German  and  postmasters  have 
the  right  to  satisfy  themselves  that  it  is  written 
in  German.  Even  letters  directed  in  English  to 
German  civil  officials  from  the  United  States  ap- 
pear in  some  cases  to  have  been  held  back.  No- 
body can  complain  of  a  precaution  which  applies 
to  Germans  as  well  as  to  foreigners. 

Similar  restrictions  have  been  applied  to  sub- 
marine cable  lines.  The  Germans  made  the  just 
complaint  that  cablegrams  were  sent  to  the  United 
States  and  re-telegraphed  to  Canada  from  Great 
Britain,  while  the  Germans  had  no  direct  cables 
in  operation.  The  result  was  a  general  rule 


QUESTIONS  OF  NEUTRALITY      177 

that  no  cablegram  should  be  sent  in  cipher  and 
none  in  any  form  which  would  convey  military  in- 
telligence to  the  representatives  of  belligerent 
powers.  Some  submarine  cables  have  been  cut, 
which  is  a  recognized  right  of  war;  but  down  to 
October  most  of  the  cables  to  Europe  were  in 
operation. 

The  wireless  telegraph  presented  novel  difficul- 
ties as  to  neutral  rights.  One  system  worked  from 
the  eastern  United  States  to  Great  Britain;  an- 
other from  Long  Island  to  Germany.  Marconi- 
grams  could  be  received  or  transmitted  not  only 
across  the  sea  but  to  the  cruisers  and  merchant 
ships  of  the  various  belligerent  powers.  The 
United  States  finally  took  the  bold  but  reasonable 
step  of  putting  government  inspectors  into  all 
the  wireless  stations  and  refusing  to  allow  the 
transmission  of  anything  that  would  be  useful 
to  ships  of  war.  The  Germans  have  keenly  felt 
their  lack  of  direct  and  unrestricted  communica- 
tion from  Germany  to  the  United  States,  because 
it  deprives  them,  as  they  feel,  of  the  chance  to 
present  their  case  and  their  cause  to  the  American 
people. 

NEUTRALITY   OF   ITALY 

All  the  circumstances  point  to  the  conclusion 
that  neither  Germany  nor  Austria  put  much  de- 
pendence on  the  position  of  Italy  as  the  third 
member  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  So  long  as  he 


1.78  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

could,  Bismarck  adhered  to  the  old  Three  Em- 
peror Alliance  of  Russia,  Germany,  and  Austria, 
and  he  turned  to  Italy  and  admitted  that  new 
power  in  188£  because  Russia  was  no  longer  cor- 
dial and  Italy  could  offer  a  considerable  army, 
a  small,  but  at  that  time  effective,  navy,  and 
great  commercial  advantages.  By  the  completion 
of  the  Gotthard  Tunnel  in  1882,  Genoa  became 
an  important  collecting  point  for  the  Mediterra- 
nean and  the  Oriental  trade  on  one  side  and  for 
Germany  on  the  other  side. 

This  admission  into  the  highest  society  of  na- 
tions was  a  great  feather  in  the  cap  of  Italy 
which  had  so  recently  become  a  nation;  and  at 
that  time  the  Italians  were  on  bad  terms  with  the 
French,  partly  for  commercial  reasons  and  partly 
because  the  French  blocked  the  ambitions  of  Italy 
in  North  Africa.  The  Austrians  had  beaten  the 
Italians  at  the  sea  fight  of  Lissa  in  1866,  and 
had  at  least  broken  even  in  the  land  battles.  Un- 
fortunately for  good  feeling  between  those  two 
powers  the  language  boundary,  which  in  the  East- 
ern Alps  is  almost  the  same  as  the  race  boundary, 
does  not  coincide  with  the  political  boundary. 
The  so-called  Trentino,  a  southern  district  of 
the  Tyrol,  including  the  city  of  Trent,  is  almost 
entirely  Italian  in  speech,  and  Trieste  is  in  popu- 
lation, and  apparently  in  sympathy,  overwhelm- 
ingly Italian.  Hence  there  have  been  many  pop- 
ular demonstrations  against  the  Austrians  in 


QUESTIONS  OF  NEUTRALITY      179 

Italy,  and  this  feeling  was  much  heightened  by 
rivalries  between  the  two  powers  at  the  time 
of  the  Balkan  wars  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Adriatic. 

When  war  broke  out,  therefore,  the  Italian 
government  on  August  1  declared  that  Italy  was 
not  bound  to  assist  her  allies  in  an  "offensive 
war,"  and  that  Italy  would  remain  neutral. 
Nevertheless  the  regular  army  of  700,000  was 
directed  toward  the  northern  frontier,  and  was 
probably  reinforced,  though  up  to  the  middle  of 
October  the  reserves  had  not  been  called  out  in 
full  and  there  was,  as  yet,  no  formal  mobiliza- 
tion. 

The  Germans  were  very  anxious  that  Italy 
should  join  the  two  powers  and  it  is  the  current 
belief  that  offers  were  made  of  territorial  advan- 
tages to  Italy,  probably  out  of  the  colonies  of 
France  and  England.  Italy  refused  the  offer 
and  appears  to  have  maintained  neutrality  in 
honorable  fashion.  Italy,  however,  has  large  am- 
bitions in  the  eastern  Balkans  and  in  Africa,  and 
since  the  people  are  apparently  very  hostile  in 
spirit  toward  the  Austrians,  it  is  likely  that  that 
country  will  be  drawn  into  the  war  sooner  or 
later.  At  present  Italy  is  the  only  European 
commercial  power  that  has  a  large  army  and  navy 
which  is  not  engaged  in  hostilities. 


180  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

NEUTRALITY   OF    BELGIUM 

Switzerland  was  neutralized  by  the  Treaty  of 
Vienna  in  1815 ;  which  has  so  far  been  respected. 
Holland  has  no  special  protection  by  European 
treaties,  but  her  neighbor  Belgium  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war  was  able  to  show  three  documents 
guaranteeing  her  freedom  from  disturbance  by  the 
belligerent  powers.  The  first  of  these  treaties  was 
a  result  of  revolution.  In  1815  the  Powers  at 
Vienna  made  an  artificial  combination  of  the  for- 
mer Dutch  Confederation  (commonly  called  Hol- 
land by  the  English)  and  the  former  Austrian 
provinces,  both  of  which  had  for  a  time  been  in- 
corporated in  France  by  Napoleon.  These  two 
elements  differed  in  religion,  and  had  no  common 
interest  in  the  sovereign  who  was  given  to  them. 
In  1830,  when  the  French  Bourbon  monarchy  was 
overthrown  by  a  revolution,  the  southern  part 
of  Holland  also  revolted,  and  by  hard  fighting 
made  it  clear  that  it  could  not  be  kept  down  by 
the  Dutch  part  of  the  kingdom. 

Hence,  after  the  revolution,  by  the  treaty  of 
November  15,  1831,  Great  Britain,  Austria-Hun- 
gary, France,  Prussia,  Russia,  and  Belgium 
united  in  a  treaty  establishing  the  boundaries 
of  the  present  Belgium  and  providing  that  "Bel- 
gium shall  form  an  independent  and  perpet- 
ually neutral  state,  which  shall  be  bound  to  ob- 
serve such  neutrality  toward  all  other  states.5' 


QUESTIONS  OF  NEUTRALITY      181 

April  19,  1889,  the  same  powers,  with  the  addi- 
tion of  Holland,  again  put  their  signatures  to  a 
treaty  setting  forth  in  the  same  words  that  "Bel- 
gium shall  form  an  independent  and  perpetually 
neutral  state.  It  shall  be  bound  to  observe  such 
neutrality  toward  all  other  states."  For  a  third 
time,  on  August  9,  1870,  three  weeks  after  the 
beginning  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  Great 
Britain  and  Prussia  united  in  a  treaty  which 
set  forth  that  "His  Majesty,  the  King  of  Prussia, 
having  declared  that  notwithstanding  the  hos- 
tilities in  which  the  North  German  Confederation 
is  engaged  with  France,  it  is  his  fixed  determina- 
tion to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  so  long 
as  the  same  shall  be  respected  by  France."  Great 
Britain  pledged  herself  to  defend  Belgium  against 
any  infringement  by  the  French.  Two  days  later 
a  treaty  in  almost  identical  terms  was  signed 
with  France,  engaging  to  respect  the  neutrality 
so  long  as  it  was  observed  by  Prussia  and  her 
allies.  In  both  cases  the  special  treaties  were  to 
expire  a  year  after  the  end  of  the  war,  but  "on 
the  expiration  of  that  time  the  independence  and 
neutrality  of  Belgium  will  so  far  as  the  High 
Contracting  Parties  are  respectively  concerned 
continue  to  rest  as  heretofore  on  Article  I  of  the 
Principal  Treaty  of  the  nineteenth  of  April, 
1839." 

Switzerland,  by  special  provision  of  the  Treaty 
of  Vienna  of  1815,  and  some  other  small  powers 


182  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

in  Europe  enjoy — or  up  to  August  4,  1914,  did 
enjoy — the  same  presumption  that  they  would 
not  be  drawn  into  war  against  their  national  will. 
Switzerland  has  a  commanding  military  situation 
toward  all  four  of  her  great  surrounding  neigh- 
bors, noiue  of  which  could  permit  either  of  the 
other  three  to  take  possession  of  this  magnificent 
natural  fortress. 

Belgium  is  a  country  without  natural  defenses 
and  in  more  than  a  score  of  wars  has  been  a 
battleground  for  other  people,  because  it  lies 
between  the  German  and  French  centers  of  pop- 
ulation. It  is  not  an  accident  that  Waterloo  and 
Liege  are  almost  in  sight  of  each  other:  be- 
cause of  Waterloo  and  fifty  earlier  battles  the 
Belgians  desired  to  have  the  five  nations  which 
were  most  likely  to  go  to  war  exempt  her 
from  their  contests ;  and  Belgium  has  therefore 
had  a  longer  stretch  of  peace  than  any  other 
nation  of  Europe.  This  freedom  from  alarms 
has  made  it  possible  to  devote  the  energies  of 
the  people  to  making  themselves  one  of  the  most 
prosperous  states  in  the  world.  Nevertheless  of 
late  years  Belgium  has  grown  uneasy,  has  or- 
ganized a  system  of  citizen  soldiery  and  has 
built  the  powerful  fortresses  of  Liege,  Namur, 
and  Antwerp. 

When  on  August  4  Goschen  had  his  last  in- 
terview with  Chancellor  Bethmann-Hollweg,  he 
conveyed  the  direction  of  the  British  government 


QUESTIONS  OF  NEUTRALITY      188 

that  he  should  offer  war  to  Germany  if  Belgium 
were  to  be  invaded ;  and  the  Chancellor  "expressed 
his  poignant  regret  at  the  crumbling  of  his  entire 
policy  and  that  of  the  Chancellor,  which  had  been 
to  make  friends  with  Great  Britain  and  then, 
through  Great  Britain,  to  get  closer  to  France." 
.  .  .  He  said  that  the  step  taken  by  His  Majes- 
ty's Government  was  terrible  to  a  degree;  just 
for  a  word — "neutrality,"  a  word  which  in  war 
time  had  so  often  been  disregarded — just  for  a 
scrap  of  paper,  Great  Britain  was  going  to 
make  war  on  a  nation  who  desired  nothing  bet- 
ter than  to  be  left  alone.  The  German  states- 
man's phrase  will  go  down  to  history,  for  it  in- 
dicates a  frame  of  mind  which  was  not  that  of 
the  first  Chancellor  of  the  German  Empire, 
Prince  Bismarck. 

Manifestly  there  was  a  difference  in  the  cir- 
cumstances of  1870  and  1914.  The  treaty  of 
Belgian  neutrality  was  signed  the  day  after  the  de- 
cisive battle  of  Gravelotte,  when  the  Germans  were 
making  their  way  straight  across  the  eastern 
frontier  of  France;  and  in  1914  that  road  was 
closed  by  powerful  French  forts.  Bismarck  was 
always  a  thrifty  diplomat;  he  had  as  few  scru- 
ples as  any  man  in  Europe,  and  would  have  torn 
up  any  treaty  which  he  thought  was  a  noose 
around  the  neck  of  his  country.  Nevertheless  it 
is  a  question  whether  he  would  have  been  willing 
to  pay  the  price  of  the  loss  of  public  confidence 


184  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

as  to  the  binding  force  of  inconvenient  treaties 
which  were  made  long  in  advance  in  order  to  pre- 
vent the  operation  of  sudden  necessities  or  pas- 
sion. 

Some  defenders  of  Germany  have  characterized 
the  step  as  "a  breach  of  international  good  man- 
ners." A  German  professor  justifies  the  action 
of  his  country  on  the  ground  that  "this  neu- 
trality had  some  time  previously  actually  been 
violated  by  France.  Before  the  war  broke  out 
French  officers  traveled  through  Belgium  and 
Prench  troops  reached  Belgian  territory  before 
the  declaration  of  war.  Por  all  this  there  are 
the  most  convincing  proofs,  and  since  this  was 
known  in  Germany  and  the  danger  of  being  throt- 
tled from  Belgium  by  France  and  England  had  to 
be  met,  nothing  else  remained  for  Germany  but 
on  her  side  to  disregard  the  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium." 

The  "convincing  proofs"  have  not  yet  been  laid 
before  the  world,  and  the  refusal  to  execute  the 
treaties  stands  on  just  the  same  footing  as  the 
invasion  of  Belgium,  which  is  discussed  earlier  in 
this  volume.  Neither  is  justified  under  the  ordi- 
nary principles  of  international  law.  Both  might 
be  justified  by  the  Law  of  National  Existence  if 
necessary  to  save  Germany  from  destruction. 
Neither  can  be  justified  at  all  except  by  showing 
to  the  satisfaction  of  impartial  and  neutral  per- 
sons that  the  continued  existence  of  Germany  was 


QUESTIONS  OF  NEUTRALITY      185 

endangered ;  and  that  the  only  safety  was  by  mak- 
ing war  on  the  nation  that  happened  to  hold  a 
territory  convenient  for  the  invasion  of  France. 
Would  the  English  government  have  protested 
against  the  occupation  of  Belgium  by  the  French 
had  the  French  taken  that  step?  On  July  31 
England  sought  and  received  the  assurance  of 
the  French  that  they  would  not  invade  Belgium; 
and  when  the  question  was  later  raised  in  Parlia- 
ment Sir  Edward  Grey  issued  a  statement  to  say 
that  England  would  unquestionably  have  inter- 
fered to  protect  Belgium's  freedom  against 
France.  In  such  a  crisis  every  nation  must  de- 
clare for  itself  what  sacrifices  it  will  make  and 
what  enmities  it  will  encounter  in  order  to  carry 
out  its  military  plans.  That  decision  remains 
subject  to  the  judgment  of  mankind  as  to  the 
paramount  necessity  of  a  policy  which  involves 
the  ruin  of  an  innocent  third  party.  The  ma- 
terials are  not  yet  at  hand  for  a  final  decision  in 
the  minds  of  neutrals  of  the  bedrock  responsibility 
for  this  undesirable  state  of  things. 


CHAPTER    X 

METHODS    OF    WARFARE 
RECRUITING 

THE  object  of  the  military  systems  of  Con- 
tinental Europe  is  first  of  all  to  put  as 
large  a  part  as  possible  of  the  male 
population  through  a  military  training ;  and  then 
in  case  of  war  to  enroll  as  active  soldiers  as  large 
a  part  of  these  trained  men  as  possible.  The 
first  result  is  brought  about  by  universal  military 
service  which  varies  all  the  way  from  the  Swiss 
method  of  six  months  for  each  man  to  the  ex- 
treme French  service  just  enacted  of  three  years 
for  every  man. 

In  practice  there  are  many  exemptions.  Ger- 
many has  a  system  of  "one-year  volunteers"  which 
means  that  every  youth  who  can  pass  examina- 
tions somewhat  more  serious  than  the  stiffest 
entrance  examinations  to  an  American  college 
is  allowed  to  serve  one  year  at  his  own  expense 
under  favored  conditions.  A  sharp  young  man 
can  carry  on  some  work  in  a  university  while 

186 


METHODS  OF  WARFARE  187 

serving  in  the  same  town  as  a  soldier,  and  young 
doctors  get  off  with  six  months*  service.  For  a 
long  time  clergymen  were  exempted,  till  in  France 
one  of  the  items  in  the  long  struggle  with  the 
Church  was  the  rigid  inclusion  of  theological 
students.  In  practice  no  government  has  been 
able  to  take  care  of  all  the  young  men  who  in  a 
particular  year  arrive  at  the  military  age  of 
twenty  or  thereabouts;  and  a  portion  of  them 
are  excused  for  the  time  being.  Those  physically 
deficient,  as  shown  by  examination,  are  com- 
monly relieved  outright.  , 

At  the  moment  when  war  broke  out  on  an 
unexampled  scale,  a  certain  number  of  men  in 
all  the  great  Continental  countries,  averaging 
about  one  per  cent  of  the  population,  were  "under 
the  colors" ;  that  is,  for  the  time  being  members 
of  the  regular  army.  Even  before  war  broke 
out  the  "reserves"  were  in  some  cases  called. 
These  are  men  who  have  finished  their  immediate 
military  service,  but  remain  on  the  books,  subject 
to  a  call  at  any  moment.  Next  comes  in  Germany 
the  call  for  the  Landwehr ;  that  is,  all  able-bodied 
men  up  to  thirty-nine  years  of  age.  Behind  that 
is  the  Landsturm  of  men  from  thirty-nine  to 
forty-five.  These  clockwork  regulations,  if  car- 
ried out  completely,  would  enroll  all  the  able- 
bodied  men  from  seventeen  to  forty-five,  which  is 
about  between  a  fourth  and  a  fifth  of  the  total 
population;  but  exceptions  are  manifold.  Men 


188  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

in  the  transportation  service  must  stick  to  their 
jobs,  although  they  are  soldiers:  otherwise  the 
army  could  not  be  carried  and  kept  supplied.  No 
government  can  possibly  put  into  the  field  more 
than  six  to  seven  per  cent  of  the  population,  un- 
less to  defend  the  country  for  a  brief  period  from 
invasion;  and  of  these  not  over  half  could  be  on 
the  firing  lines. 

The  levies  take  no  account  of  education  or 
wealth  except  that  the  one-year  volunteers  usually 
become  officers  of  the  reserve  and  Landwehr,  and 
thus  in  case  of  war  see  service  as  officers.  It  is 
told  that  a  German-American  millionaire  who 
had  never  been  naturalized  and  always  pooh- 
poohed  at  American  citizenship  "happened  to  be 
in  Germany  when  the  war  broke  out,  and  was 
immediately  drawn  into  the  ranks  as  a  private. 
In  Great  Britain  for  several  centuries  troops 
have  been  raised  by  volunteering.  Even  in  Ger- 
many the  government  has  announced  that  more 
than  a  million  volunteers  have  offered  themselves. 
This  can  mean  only  that  men  belonging  to  levies 
not  yet  called  have  volunteered  for  immediate 
service;  and  that  those  who  are  physically  inca- 
pable of  serving  in  the  field  volunteer  for  some 
less  exacting  function. 

The  result  of  this  general  liability  to  service 
is  that  the  weight  of  the  war  has  instantly  come 
down  on  every  community  and  almost  every  fam- 
ily. There  are  no  patriots  who  take  upon  them- 


METHODS  OF  WARFARE  189 

selves  the  defense  of  their  country  and  there  are 
also  no  skulkers.  The  German  or  Frenchman 
has  no  claim  to  a  pension  except  for  loss  of 
limb  or  health;  in  those  countries  there  is  no 
class  of  ex-soldiers;  no  soldier  vote.  Going  to 
war  is  like  paying  one's  taxes,  except  that  it 
reachest  the  poorest  in  the  land.  Hence,  any 
sort  of  internal  opposition  to  war  is  almost  im- 
possible. There  can  be  no  peace  party  in  the 
national  or  local  legislatures.  Criticisms  on  the 
conduct  of  the  war  may  be  treated  as  treason. 
The  whole  vitality,  passion,  and  endurance  of 
each  country  are  thrown  into  the  struggle,  under 
the  direction  of  the  military  organization.  The 
result  is  the  marching  to  war  of  the  most  enor- 
mous forces  ever  arrayed  against  each  other. 

INFORMATION 

In  the  old  wars  it  was  nobody's  business  to 
keep  the  public  informed  of  what  was  going  on 
in  the  field  and  accounts  of  disasters  sometimes 
were  weeks  in  leaking  out.  After  the  destruction 
of  Napoleon's  Grand  Army  in  Russia  in  1812 
the  dispatches  to  France  were  encouraging  till 
the  famous  number  of  the  Monlteur  in  which  the 
terrible  truth  was  told,  ending  with  the  phrase 
"the  health  of  the  Emperor  was  never  better." 
From  the  Crimean  to  the  Boer  War  there  was 
half  a  century  of  war  correspondents  who  looked 


190  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

upon  themselves  as  irregular  generals  who  made 
war  by  describing  it.  They  were  the  same  sort 
of  men,  in  some  cases  the  same  men,  as  the  ex- 
plorers in  Africa  and  Central  Asia,  daring  any- 
thing; and  some  of  them,  especially  "Bull  Run 
Russell,"  correspondent  of  the  London  Times, 
had  much  influence  on  public  sentiment  and 
action.  In  our  Civil  War  the  correspondents 
rose  to  the  maximum  of  importance ;  so  much 
so  that  General  Sherman  expressed  the  opinion 
that  the  proper  way  to  deal  with  them  was  to 
stand  them  up  and  shoot  the  lot.  He  was  net- 
tled by  the  fact  that  the  movements  and  plans 
of  his  army  were  printed  within  twenty-four 
hours;  and  those  newspapers  within  forty-eight 
hours  were  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  The  power 
of  the  correspondents  to  make  or  break  com- 
manders in  the  field  was  alarming. 

Nevertheless  in  the  Spanish  War  the  news- 
papermen again  undertook  to  carry  on  the  cam- 
paigns and  one  of  them  modestly  boasted  that  he 
himself  brought  on  the  war.  When  General  Shaf- 
ter,  after  the  surrender  of  Santiago,  sent  an  offi- 
cer to  the  top  of  the  government  building  to  run 
up  the  American  flag  the  officer  found  a  reporter 
there,  and  answered  over  the  parapet,  "Man  here 
already,  sir."  To  which  the  General  replied,  "Tell 
him  to  come  down."  "He  won't  come  down." 
"Throw  him  down!"  But  no  private  citizen  can 
ever  "throw  down"  a  newspaperman. 


METHODS  OF  WARFARE  191 

The  first  people  to  discover  that  an  army 
was  more  likely  to  be  successful  if  its  movements 
were  not  made  known  to  the  world  until  after 
they  had  been  successful,  were  the  Japanese  in  the 
Russian  war  of  1905.  Then  in  1912,  the  Bul- 
garians completed  the  destruction  of  the  founda- 
tions of  modern  civilization  by  corralling  the  cor- 
respondents miles  back  of  the  battlefield,  and  fur- 
nishing them  with  desiccated  items  of  news  which 
of  course  must  be  true  because  they  came  from 
headquarters. 

The  advantage  of  operating  on  plans  unknown 
not  only  to  the  enemy,  but  to  the  armies  of  the 
home  country  were  such  that  almost  the  first 
guns  in  the  campaigns  of  1914  were  opened 
against  the  newspapermen  and  newspapers.  Each 
country  treated  the  war,  not  as  an  international 
event  in  which  all  newspaper  buyers  were  inter- 
ested, but  as  its  private  concern.  Few  regular 
correspondents  were  allowed  from  the  French, 
German,  Austrian,  or  Russian  newspapers.  Even 
Great  Britain,  which  is  little  accustomed  to  such 
restrictions,  recognized  that  the  first  necessity  was 
national  defense,  and  accepted,  in  some  cases 
under  pretty  strong  pressure,  the  muzzling  of  the 
newspapers. 

Correspondents  of  various  nations,  especially 
American  and  English,  have  put  these  restrictions 
to  the  test;  and  so  far  it  does  not  appear  that 
any  of  them  has  been  shot,  although  any  man  who 


192  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

skirmishes  about  in  the  rear  of  a  fighting  army 
picking  up  such  information  as  he  can  from  the 
peasants  and  the  wounded  runs  a  risk  of  fall- 
ing into  the  wrong  hands.  The  result  has  been 
that  the  most  tremendous  battles  in  history  have 
been  fought  without  anything  but  the  most  gen- 
eral and  inevitable  facts  being  made  known  to 
the  world.  The  Germans  got  within  three  days' 
march  of  Paris  without  the  Parisians  knowing  the 
imminence  of  the  danger.  Part  of  the  German 
army  was  then  swept  back  sixty  miles  without  the 
German  people  realizing  that  there  had  been  a 
check. 

This  concealment  is  a  great  relief  to  the  com- 
manders and  enables  them  to  shift  troops  and 
undertake  complicated  movements  without  their 
own  men  knowing  what  is  going  on.  This  is  a 
very  important  point,  because  if  some  of  those 
men  are  captured  they  may  carry  to  the  enemy 
much  desired  information.  It  is  curious  how  ea- 
gerly the  newspapers  and  even  military  author- 
ities seize  upon  such  facts  as  that  since  no  Aus- 
trians  have  been  captured  in  Alsace,  it  must  be 
that  they  are  not  on  the  front.  The  Germans 
take  English  prisoners  on  the  center  of  their 
line;  and  hence  infer  that  troops  are  probably 
being  shifted  from  west  to  east. 

In  battles  raging  along  a  continuous  front  of 
a  hundred  and  twenty  miles  the  Recording  Angel 
could  not  intelligently  set  down  the  movements 


METHODS  OF  WARFARE  193 

of  all  the  different  commands ;  and  even  those  who 
are  on  the  firing  line  are  often  unable  to  com- 
municate with  their  own  friends  at  home  in  re- 
gard to  their  personal  safety.  The  postal  card 
was  invented  for  the  benefit  of  the  German  sol- 
diers in  1870,  but  in  this  war  most  of  the  armies 
seem  to  have  followed  the  Bulgarian  method  of 
forbidding  any  soldier  to  write  home  anything 
that  would  throw  light  on  the  location  of  troops. 
Indeed,  the  Bulgarians  were  forbidden  to  put  a 
date  or  a  place  name  in  their  letters.  Such  a 
thing  as  a  military  or  naval  officer  writing  an 
account  of  a  fight  in  detail,  which  should  after- 
wards appear  in  print,  is  almost  unthinkable  in 
the  present  war.  In  fact  precautions  go  to  the 
extent  of  forbidding  the  circulation  of  English 
newspapers  or  extracts  from  English  newspapers 
in  the  part  of  Belgium  occupied  by  the  Germans. 

ATROCITIES 

Whatever  the  military  advantage  of  getting  out 
from  under  the  correspondents'  searchlight,  the 
process  deprives  the  fighting  powers  of  a  valua- 
ble protection.  So  long  as  correspondents  rode 
in  and  out  of  battles,  hobnobbed  with  officers  on 
the  march,  visited  field  hospitals  and  talked  with 
prisoners,  they  knew  what  the  troops  were  doing 
to  each  other  and  to  the  noncombatant  popula- 
tion. If  they  had  accompanied  the  Greek,  Bui- 


194  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

garian,  and  Servian  armies  in  1913  the  fearful 
barbarities  of  that  war  simply  could  not  have 
happened;  for  neutral  correspondents,  accus- 
tomed to  note  what  was  going  on  and  to  take 
pictures,  would  have  roused  the  civilized  world. 
The  charges  of  atrocities  committed  by  soldiers 
of  one  or  another  army  in  the  present  war  would 
have  much  less  effect  upon  the  world  if  corre- 
spondents were  in  a  position  to  affirm  or  deny 
their  truth.  It  is  a  serious  responsibility  for 
the  military  authorities  to  dry  up  the  sources 
of  information,  or  to  confine  them  entirely  to 
persons  directly  under  their  own  orders.  The 
Austrians  are  reported  to  have  forbidden  their 
wounded  who  return  home  to  tell  the  tale  of 
their  own  experiences  and  sufferings. 

In  the  field  all  the  commanders  accuse  their 
enemies  of  barbarous  and  illegal  practices.  The 
Germans  are  sure  that  the  French  are  using 
dum-dum  or  soft-nosed  bullets ;  the  French  are 
convinced  that  the  Germans  massacre  prisoners. 
In  both  cases  there  is  probably  a  substratum  of 
fact.  It  is  no  answer  to  such  charges  to  say  that 
this  or  that  army  is  comprised  of  men  who  are 
incapable  of  such  outrages.  A  volunteer  army 
may  include  many  bad  men — an  army  of  uni- 
versal military  service  is  bound  to  contain  the 
worst  men  in  the  nation  because  it  takes  them  all. 
A  French  officer  has  recently  written:  "I  found 
myself  quite  a  different  man  when  at  the  front.  I 


METHODS  OF  WARFARE  195 

recognize  savage  instincts.  I  live  like  a  savage." 
In  our  Civil  War  the  newspapers  on  both  sides 
abounded  in  instances  of  cruelty,  many  of  them 
well  founded.  We  learned  then  that  war  bru- 
talizes men,  and  that  Christian  husbands  and 
fathers  in  the  fury  of  battle  will  do  things  that 
would  shock  a  wild  Indian. 

Charges  of  killing  the  wounded  of  the  other 
side  are  made  in  every  war  and  it  often  happens, 
frequently  because  the  wounded  keep  up  the  fight. 
In  some  of  the  Continental  armies  the  non-com- 
missioned officers  strike  and  abuse  their  own  men 
and  prisoners  may  come  in  for  the  same  kind  of 
treatment.  When  the  question  comes  to  be  care- 
fully investigated,  it  will  probably  be  found  that 
the  bullets  and  massacres  were  used  without  or- 
ders and  against  orders.  Though  in  and  near 
the  Balkans  there  seems  to  be  a  kind  of  minus- 
morality  which  makes  war  not  only  hell  but  "be- 
neath the  lowest  deep  a  lower  deep." 

NON  COMBATANTS 

The  same  thing  is  true  in  general  with  regard 
to  the  treatment  of  noncombatants,  except  that 
the  feeling  between  the  civil  population  of  an 
invaded  country  and  the  soldiers  of  an  invading 
army  is  much  more  hostile  than  that  between 
opposing  soldiers.  The  German  looks  on  the  Rus- 
sian private  as  the  representative  of  a  bad  sys- 


196  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

tern,  but  after  all  as  doing  his  job  under  orders: 
the  German  peasant  looks  on  the  Russian  Cossack 
as  a  devil  let  loose  and  sometimes  the  cavalryman 
tries  to  deserve  his  reputation.  In  former  wars, 
even  as  late  as  Napoleon's  time,  the  population 
was  harried,  robbed,  and  sometimes  tortured. 
Milder  principles  now  prevail  and  the  fundamen- 
tal notion  is  that  civilians  in  occupied  territory 
are  entitled  to  be  protected  in  their  lives  and 
property. 

The  Germans  in  1870  initiated  a  system  of  seiz- 
ing supplies  right  and  left  and  giving  certificates ; 
and  at  the  end  of  the  war  the  French  govern- 
ment took  up  and  paid  those  certificates,  on  the 
ground  that  the  loss  was  a  national  one  and  ought 
not  to  fall  solely  on  the  unhappy  residents  of  an 
occupied  district.  The  same  system  seems  to  be 
now  in  use  by  the  German  army.  It  may  be  laid 
down  as  a  certainty  that  the  Germans  in  France 
or  Russia,  the  French  in  Germany  and  the  Rus- 
sians in  Austria  will  take  possession  of  all  the 
food  and  supplies  that  they  can  lay  their  hands 
on;  though  a  humane  commanding  general  will 
not  bring  the  population  to  a  starvation  point 
within  his  lines.  Such  rights  of  seizure  seem  to 
be  recognized  by  The  Hague  Convention  of  1899, 
and  however  harsh  they  must  be  they  are  not  an 
infraction  of  the  laws  of  nations  or  the  practice 
of  civilized  war,  provided  compensation  is  made. 

War  involves  from  first  to  last  a  fearful  de- 


METHODS  OF  WARFARE  197 

struction  of  property.  The  energies  of  nine  na- 
tions are  just  now  directed  toward  supporting 
millions  of  their  men  whose  sole  business  is  to 
destroy.  Railroads  carry  heavy  guns  to  the 
frontier  which  are  to  be  used  in  tearing  to  pieces 
railroads  beyond  the  frontier.  Any  town  or  city 
is  subject  to  attack;  and  for  a  great  many  years 
a  favorite  method  has  been  to  throw  shells  which 
demolish  and  set  on  fire  the  buildings.  Under  the 
laws  of  war  this  is  allowable  only  in  case  of  cities 
which  resist  attack  or  are  fortified;  but  every 
bombshell  means  the  killing  of  noncombatants. 
"If  you  object,"  the  military  authorities  answer, 
"very  well,  then  evacuate  the  town.  We  shall  not 
destroy  it,  if  you  will  give  it  up  without  a  fight." 
Grant  before  Vicksburg  and  Gillmore  outside  of 
Charleston  deliberately  threw  shells  into  the  in- 
habited portions  of  those  cities. 

It  is  generally  regarded  as  inhumane  to  fire 
upon  hospitals,  museums,  churches,  and  like  build- 
ings which  are  not  used  for  military  defense,  and 
it  was  strongly  forbidden  by  The  Hague  treaties. 
In  the  siege  of  Strassburg  in  1870,  the  Germans 
avoided  the  Cathedral  which  came  through  the 
siege  intact.  In  1914  the  Germans  shelled  Rheims 
which  was  practically  unfortified,  and  according 
to  their  own  account  deliberately  fired  on  the 
Cathedral,  a  marvel  of  Gothic  art  which  had 
escaped  damage  in  numerous  sieges  and  captures 
during  seven  hundred  years.  The  act  was  ex- 


198  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

cused  on  the  ground — denied  by  the  French — that 
the  Cathedral  towers  were  used  for  signaling. 
The  same  argument,  if  valid,  would  of  course 
apply  if  the  French  got  within  range  of  Cologne 
Cathedral. 

The  state  of  things  in  Belgium  brings  back 
some  of  the  worst  passions  of  old-fashioned  war- 
fare. The  Belgians  knew  that  the  Germans  were 
likely  to  march  by  their  right  flank  if  they  ever 
got  into  war  with  France,  but  they  hoped  that 
day  was  far  off  and  expected  that  France  and 
Great  Britain  would  come  to  their  aid  if  the 
Germans  crossed  their  boundary.  When  on 
August  4  the  German  armies  arrived  in  front  of 
Liege,  they  expected  that  the  Belgians  would 
give  way,  perhaps  with  a  little  show  of  force. 
They  could  not  hope  to  repulse  the  Germans,  and 
it  seemed  to  the  German  mind  inevitable  that  they 
would,  after  a  few  hours,  be  able  to  press  on  to 
their  invasion  of  France. 

Mankind  was  astonished  that  the  Belgians,  who 
had  previously  had  no  special  military  reputa- 
tion, should  for  many  days  block  the  road.  They 
looked  on  the  invaders  not  simply  as  enemies,  but 
as  monsters;  just  as  the  Germans  looked  on  the 
Huns  in  ages  past;  as  western  Europe Jooked  on 
the  Croatian  horsemen  who  served  Austria  and 
harried  the  territory  of  the  Prussians  till  mothers 
frightened  their  children  to  sleep  with  threats  of 
the  Croats.  The  Belgian  population  was  nerved 


METHODS  OF  WARFARE  199 

with  the  intensest  national  hatred.  On  the  other 
side  this  disturbance  of  their  plans  seemed  to  the 
Germans  a  futile  proceeding  which  would  cause 
great  loss  of  time  and  men  without  saving  Bel- 
gium. To  their  minds  the  Belgians  were  engaged 
in  a  kind  of  civil  war,  and  were  almost  traitors. 

Under  these  conditions  of  exasperation  the  Ger- 
mans spread  over  the  Belgian  territory,  occu- 
pying villages  and  cities.  From  the  first  they 
exacted  the  severest  penalties  against  noncom- 
batants  who  joined  in  the  fray.  The  Belgians 
were  disposed  to  do  as  their  ancestors  did  un- 
der like  circumstances — to  call  on  the  whole 
population  to  resist — but  the  freedom  of  non- 
combatants  from  being  attacked  depends  on 
their  willingness  to  keep  their  hands  off  the  guns. 
In  1862  when  the  Union  troops  were  fired  upon, 
"under  cover  of  the  houses"  of  Fredericksburg, 
General  Sumner  simply  announced  that  unless  a 
satisfactory  answer  was  received,  he  would  "bom- 
bard" the  town.  On  the  promise  of  Longstreet 
that  the  Confederates  would  not  make  use  of  the 
town,  Sumner  respected  the  place.  The  civilian 
who  takes  up  arms  is  liable  to  be  captured 
and  then  treated  not  as  a  prisoner  but  as  a 
brigand.  The  house  which  harbors  "snipers"  is 
liable  to  be  destroyed. 

There  most  authorities  think  the  penalty  stops. 
If  a  peasant  fires  at  a  German  soldier,  that  is 
a  reason  for  shooting  him,  but  not  his  family 


200  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

and  his  neighbors.  If  a  house  keeps  up  the 
fight,  that  does  not  give  the  right  to  destroy  the 
village.  Hence,  in  neutral  nations  there  was  a 
feeling  of  horror  when  it  was  announced  that 
the  city  of  Louvain  had  been  given  over  to  the 
flames  by  the  Germans  because  shots  were  fired 
from  some  of  the  houses.  The  German  defense 
of  this  act  is  briefly  set  forth  in  a  letter  from 
Emperor  William  to  President  Wilson,  dated  Sep- 
tember 4: 

"Some  villages,  and  even  the  old  town  of  Lou- 
vain,  with  the  exception  of  its  beautiful  town  hall, 
had  to  be  destroyed  for  the  protection  of  my 
troops. 

"My  heart  bleeds  when  I  see  such  measures  in- 
evitable, and  when  I  think  of  the  many  innocent 
people  who  have  lost  their  houses  and  property 
as  a  result  of  the  misdeeds  of  the  guilty." 

This  is  another  of  the  cases  in  which  the  moral 
responsibility  can  be  affixed  only  in  the  light  of 
actual  circumstances.  The  Belgian  government 
and  the  German  government  have  radically 
divergent  beliefs  as  to  what  actually  happened. 
If,  as  the  Germans  insist,  there  was  a  deliberate 
and  systematic  plan  to  take  advantage  of  the 
temporary  absence  of  a  part  of  the  German 
troops  to  attack  the  other  part  by  the  civilians, 
men  and  women,  firing  from  houses  on  a  pre- 
arranged signal, — that  was  an  act  of  bad  faith 
which  would  justify  the  severest  measures  toward 


METHODS  OF  WARFARE  201 

those  who  are  actually  concerned.  It  would  not 
justify  a  destruction  of  buildings  which  were  the 
heritage  of  mankind,  or  of  men,  women  and  chil- 
dren who  had  no  part  or  responsibility  in  the 
outbreak.  Both  Belgians  and  Germans  produce 
testimony  which  seems  unimpeachable  that  the 
other  side  has  been  guilty  of  fearful  excesses. 
Some  German  wounded  were  blinded,  or  mutilated. 
Some  German  officers  were  shot  in  the  houses  in 
which  they  had  been  billeted,  but  politely  received. 
On  the  other  side  the  Belgian  Commission  and 
correspondents  describe  the  maiming  and  murder 
of  men,  women,  and  some  children  and  the  destruc- 
tion and  loot  of  buildings,  villages,  towns,  and 
cities  which  the  Belgians  assert  had  not  been 
guilty  of  any  hostile  acts. 

Up  to  October  the  people  of  the  United  States 
were  not  provided  with  even  such  conflicting  state- 
ments as  to  the  treatment  of  the  civil  population 
in  enemies'  countries  occupied  by  the  various 
armies  in  the  East.  To  judge  from  the  accounts 
of  the  behavior  of  the  Russian  contingent  in  China 
in  1900,  and  from  the  undeniable  reports  of  the 
Commission  on  the  atrocities  in  the  Balkans  last 
year,  we  shall  by  and  by  have  a  new  crop  of  hor- 
rors from  that  part  of  the  world.  There  race 
hatreds  are  accented  and  savage  methods  of  war- 
fare are  traditional.  The  Russians  are  reported 
to  be  on  the  point  of  declaring  that  they  will  give 
no  quarter  to  Germans.  That  principle  is  con- 


202  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

trary  to  the  recognized  laws  regulating  civilized 
warfare,  and  to  the  plain  principles  of  humanity. 
The  object  of  modern  warfare  is  not  to  destroy 
a  country,  or  a  city,  or  a  village,  but  to  break  up 
military  resistance.  A  wounded  man,  a  prisoner, 
or  a  noncombatant  who  does  not  attack  the 
troops,  is  not  in  a  position  to  affect  military 
operations,  and  common  humanity  demands  that 
his  life  shall  be  spared. 

FORCED  CONTRIBUTIONS 

An  incident  of  wars  as  late  as  Napoleon's  time 
was  the  "Brandschatzung,"  or  payment  by  a  city 
of  a  ransom  in  cash  or  valuables,  to  avoid  being 
burned  by  a  victorious  army.  The  system  was 
based  on  the  idea  that  burning  a  captured  city 
was  the  righteous  and  normal  thing.  With  the 
disappearance  of  the  notion  that  the  private 
property  of  the  people  in  a  conquered  area  is 
the  lawful  spoil  of  the  conquerors,  the  Brand- 
schatzurig  had  almost  died  out  in  civilized  coun- 
tries. It  was  revived  by  Germany  in  Belgium  and 
France  by  the  laying  of  a  penalty  upon  provinces 
and  cities  which  they  occupied.  According  to  news- 
paper accounts,  Liege  was  assessed  50,000,000 
francs  for  the  privilege  of  being  knocked  to 
pieces ;  Brussels  was  assessed  200  million  francs 
and  the  money  was  paid  by  four  wealthy  citizens 
who  of  course  look  to  their  government  to  reim- 


METHODS  OF  WARFARE  80S 

burse  them.  Smaller  amounts  were  laid  on  other 
towns  and  districts.  There  seems  to  have  been  no 
statement  as  to  what  would  happen  if  these 
amounts  were  not  paid:  presumably  the  Germans 
would  seize  private  property  on  their  own  respon- 
sibility to  the  amount  of  the  levy,  and  refer  the 
former  owners  to  their  own  government  for  relief. 
In  the  case  of  the  city  of  Ghent  an  agreement  was 
made  by  civic  authorities  to  pay  over  50,000,000 
francs  in  supplies  if  the  Germans  would  keep  their 
troops  out  of  the  city,  but  the  Belgian  govern- 
ment did  not  carry  it  out. 

Such  levies  during  the  campaign  are  a  con- 
venient way  of  getting  at  part  of  the  resources  of 
occupied  territory  without  overthrowing  the  civil 
government.  Somewhat  similar  levies  were  made 
on  a  few  of  the  French  towns;  but  in  the  first 
phase  of  the  campaign  few  of  them  were  occupied 
long  enough  to  secure  a  systematic  payment.  It 
seems  to  be  accepted  that  in  case  any  of  the 
powers  is  laid  prostrate  by  the  war  a  huge  money 
indemnity  will  be  exacted  from  it,  like  the  5,000 
million  francs  paid  by  France  to  Germany  in 
1871 ;  the  purpose  being  partly  to  repay  the  ex- 
penses of  the  war  and  partly  to  cripple  the  power 
upon  which  such  immense  sums  are  assessed. 

AIRSHIPS 

For  the  first  time  the  air  has  been  the  scene 
of  contests  for  supremacy  among  nations.  Per- 


204  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

haps  with  some  premonition  of  what  was  going 
to  happen,  nearly  all  the  European  countries 
within  the  last  two  years  have  been  busy  con- 
structing fleets  of  air  vessels,  partly  of  the  aero- 
plane type  which  depends  on  its  own  power  to 
keep  it  up,  and  partly  of  the  dirigible  type  which 
is  kept  up  by  the  inflation  of  gas  bags.  Interna- 
tional law  was  not  prepared  for  this  new  kind 
of  weapon  and  there  have  been  no  general  inter- 
national agreements  on  the  subject.  A  conven- 
tion of  The  Hague  Conference  in  1907  provided 
that  "the  contracting  powers  agree  to  prohibit 
for  a  period  extending  to  the  close  of  the  Third 
Peace  Conference  the  discharge  of  explosives  and 
projectiles  from  balloons  or  by  other  new  methods 
of  a  similar  nature."  But  this  treaty  was  not 
to  bind  in  any  war  participated  in  by  a  non- 
signatory  power. 

Hence,  all  the  belligerents  have  used  aeroplanes, 
first  of  all  for  scouting ;  and  they  have  proved  of 
great  service  in  detecting  the  positions  of  the 
enemy,  pointing  out  their  lines  of  defense  and 
giving  notice  of  movements  of  troops.  Rival 
aeroplanes  have  occasionally  fought  battles  over- 
head and  numbers  of  them  have  been  brought 
down  by  firing  from  the  earth. 

A  second  use  has  been  to  skirmish  over  hostile 
territory.  The  French  claim  that  one  of  their 
aeroplanes  passed  over  the  German  city  of  Nurem- 
berg the  first  day  of  the  war  (the  Germans  say 


METHODS  OF  WARFARE  205 

it  was  previous  to  the  war)  and  the  French  have 
dropped  bombs  on  some  of  the  German  airship 
stations.  On  their  side  the  Germans  have  dropped 
bombs  into  Antwerp,  Brussels,  Ghent  and  Paris. 
The  aeroplanes  carry  very  little  weight  and  ap- 
parently have  to  descend  to  within  gunshot  in 
order  to  make  sure  of  their  mark.  The  Zeppelins 
can  hover  over  a  place  for  an  indefinite  time. 
The  German  method  is  for  them  to  take  a  posi- 
tion out  of  range,  then  let  down  a  man  hundreds 
of  feet  on  a  wire  cable,  who  drops  the  bomb.  A 
Zeppelin  can  carry  a  ton  of  explosives  and  has 
a  range  of  hundreds  of  miles.  Hence  it  is  known 
to  be  a  part  of  the  German  plan  of  offense  to  send 
a  fleet  of  Zeppelins  some  night  to  range  over 
London. 

Upon  the  face  of  it,  a  bomb  dropped  by  an 
airship  is  not  morally  different  from  a  bomb  pro- 
pelled by  a  mortar.  Down  to  October  no  serious 
destruction  was  caused  by  any  airship,  but  the 
wrecking  of  hospitals  and  other  private  buildings 
in  Antwerp  by  bombs  dropped  from  a  Zeppelin 
raised  the  question  of  the  right  under  interna- 
tional law  to  drop  bombs  on  anything  but  for- 
tresses. Perhaps  a  fortified  city  may  be  considered 
as  one  fortress  and  the  terror  of  the  civil  popu- 
lation has  always  been  counted  on  as  a  desirable 
thing  for  the  besiegers.  The  German  theory  is 
that  women  and  children  and  other  noncombat- 
ants  ought  to  be  sent  out  of  a  fortified  place 


206  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

before  the  enemy  begins  his  attack.  The  diffi- 
culty is  that  nobody  knows  at  first  whether  the 
fall  of  a  shell  means  simply  a  threat  or  the 
beginning  of  a  bombardment  that  may  last  for 
days;  and  it  is  a  serious  matter  to  turn 
thousands  of  people  out  of  their  homes  and 
into  a  country  which  is  already  devastated  by 
war. 

H.  G.  Wells  in  one  of  his  novels  pictures  the 
effect  upon  the  United  States  of  an  invasion  by 
aircraft  which  systematically  destroys  the  towns, 
camps,  and  other  points  where  troops  are  trying 
to  collect,  till  they  have  uprooted  civilization. 
The  thing  is  physically  possible  in  Europe,  if  an 
enemy  can  only  get  complete  control  of  the  air. 
The  only  defense  is  to  fight  the  devil  with  fire, 
the  aeroplane  with  another  airship.  This  makes 
a  fearful  kind  of  warfare  in  which  there  are  no 
wounded,  but  every  man  or  craft  that  is  hit 
goes  to  instant  destruction.  The  percentage  of 
loss  in  any  well-contested  air  fight  would  not  be 
less  than  half  of  all  the  crews,  which  is  about 
ten  times  the  risk  of  the  ordinary  infantryman 
engaged  in  a  land  battle. 

SUBMARINES  AND  MINES 

Land-fighting  is  safer  also  than  sea-fighting 
under  present  conditions,  for  the  losses  of  men 
per  thousand  engaged  in  a  fleet  action  would 
probably  be  about  as  great  as  in  a  land  battle, 


METHODS  OF  WARFARE  207 

and  the  sailor  is  exposed  to  the  additional  dan- 
ger that,  though  up  to  that  moment  unhurt,  he 
is  likely  to  be  drowned  if  the  ship  goes  down. 
A  still  more  terrible  danger  comes  from  the  tor- 
pedoes. In  our  Civil  War  Lieutenant  Gushing 
drove  a  steam  launch  over  a  boom  and  got  near 
enough  to  torpedo  and  destroy  the  Confederate 
ironclad  Albemarle.  That  kind  of  open  attack 
can  no  longer  be  made,  because  the  quick-firing 
guns  would  destroy  any  torpedo  craft  afloat  be- 
fore it  could  get  within  torpedo  range ;  but  what 
of  the  new  submarines  which  creep  up  to  within 
a  few  thousand  feet  and  drive  home  their  ter- 
rible weapon?  This  is  the  first  war  in  which  sub- 
marines have  played  any  part  and  several  cruis- 
ers, most  of  them  British,  have  been  sunk.  Here 
again  there  is  no  protection  in  international  law. 
If  it*  is  good  morals  to  shoot  an  enemy  above 
water  it  is  good  morals  to  shoot  under  water. 
Just  before  the  war  broke  out,  Scott,  the  English 
naval  expert,  wrote  an  article  to  prove  that  sub- 
marines would  henceforth  decide  naval  war;  and 
Sir  Conan  Doyle  published  a  lurid  tale  based  on 
the  supposed  extermination  of  the  British  mer- 
chant fleet  by  a  pair  of  bold  submarines.  The  de- 
struction of  three  British  cruisers  within  an  hour, 
apparently  by  the  same  German  submarine,  late  in 
September,  showed  that  this  apprehension  was  not 
a  dream;  but  all  the  naval  powers  engaged  have 
submarines  and  an  equal  opportunity  to  use  them. 


208  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

When  Farragut  attacked  the  forts  below 
Mobile  in  1864  one  of  his  ships  was  sunk  by  a 
"torpedo."  That  was  the  same  kind  of  infernal 
machine  that  we  now  call  a  mine.  It  is  the  right 
of  every  power  in  time  of  war  to  protect  its 
own  harbors  and  coasts  by  anchoring  these  in- 
fernal machines,  some  of  which  go  off  when 
touched  by  a  passing  vessel  and  others  can  be 
fired  by  electricity  from  watchers  on  the  shore. 
All  the  harbors,  French,  English,  German,  Rus- 
sian, and  Austrian,  are  doubtless  protected  by 
mines,  through  which  there  are  lanes  available 
•for  the  home  vessels  of  war  and  commercial  ships. 
In  addition,  mines  have  in  several  recent  wars 
been  sown  in  the  open  sea.  The  Japanese  were 
accused  of  doing  it  in  1905.  The  Turks  did  it 
in  1912,  and  several  merchantmen  were  blown 
up  in  entering  or  leaving  the  port  of  Smyrna.  A 
German  mine-layer  was  destroyed  by  an  English 
ship  which  shortly  after  was  blown  up,  proba- 
bly by  a  submarine.  In  October  the  British  gave 
notice  of  the  laying  of  a  mine  field  in  a  specified 
region  of  the  North  Sea.  The  English  later 
warned  all  comers  that  a  certain  arm  of  the  North 
Sea  was  mined  by  them.  This  sowing  of  mines  on 
the  high  seas  and  in  the  track  of  neutral  vessels 
is  contrary  to  international  law  and  common- 
sense.  Russia,  for  instance,  has  no  right  to  make 
it  dangerous  for  Swedish  ships  to  traverse  the 
open  Baltic. 


METHODS   OF  WARFARE  209 

RIGORS  OF  WAR 

Submarines  and  mines  are  only  part  of  the  evi- 
dence of  a  determination  by  all  the  powers  en- 
gaged to  push  the  war  with  every  energy,  even 
at  the  expense  of  loss  and  suffering  to  neutrals 
and  noncombatants.  The  day  has  long  passed 
when,  as  at  the  Battle  of  Fontenoy  in  1745,  the 
English  commander  rode  forward,  drank  to  the 
health  of  the  French  and  called  on  his  troops  for 
a  cheer.  Germany,  by  its  marvelous  training, 
discipline,  and  power  over  the  national  resources, 
has  set  an  example  of  fierce  and  unrelenting  war 
which  the  other  powers  do  their  best  to  recipro- 
cate. It  is  this  spirit  which  seems  to  have  caused 
most  of  the  trouble  in  Belgium,  the  feeling  of  the 
invaders  that  the  war  must  be  fought;  that  all 
obstacles  must  be  overcome;  that  any  nation, 
army,  fortress,  or  people  who  stand  in  the  way 
must  be  crushed.  It  is  the  spirit  of  the  old-fash- 
ioned football;  the  teams  are  sent  out  to  win  and 
not  to  give  examples  of  the  restrictions  laid  down 
by  the  rules. 

One  unusual  element  in  the  war  is  the  appear- 
ance of  cavalry  far  beyond  the  armies.  This 
method  of  warfare  was  apparently  suggested  by 
the  Cossacks,  long  known  as  the  finest  cavalry  in 
Europe,  and  the  German  Uhlans  who  both  in  the 
war  of  1870  and  1914  have  shown  amazing  bold- 
ness. Troops  and  squads  of  them  have  appeared 


210  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

fifty  miles  beyond  their  lines,  taking  villages,  cut- 
ting telegraphs,  living  on  the  country  and  filling 
whole  provinces  with  terror.  Should  the  French 
and  English  armies  move  into  an  enemy's  coun- 
try, they  would  doubtless  try  the  same  adven- 
turous tactics.  The  only  remedy  seems  to  be  a 
patrol  of  armored  automobiles. 

The  use  of  heavy  artillery  in  the  field  adds  much 
to  the  din  and  something  to  the  destruction  of 
war.  The  Servians  two  years  ago  were  the  first 
to  prove  to  the  world  that  large  guns  could  be 
carried  anywhere  with  an  army,  guns  that  would 
drop  their  missiles  four  miles  from  the  point  of 
departure.  All  the  present  large  armies  are 
equipped  with  similar  large  cannon,  many  of  them 
using  high  explosives.  Then  the  Germans  have 
for  the  first  time  in  war  brought  into  the  field 
big  guns  with  a  caliber  of  fourteen  inches,  send- 
ing a  shot  weighing  a  ton,  which,  if  it  strikes  the 
earth,  will  blow  out  a  hole  in  which  five  horses 
can  be  entombed.  Such  a  shot  striking  the  con- 
crete or  steel  roof  of  a  fort  may  smash  it  into  a 
rubbish  heap.  The  use  of  these  guns  brought 
about  the  capture  of  the  great  ring  fortress  of 
Liege  and  Namur  in  Belgium  and  Maubeuge  in 
France;  while  the  French  evacuated  the  powerful 
fort  of  LaFere  without  a  stand  because  they  were 
satisfied  it  was  untenable. 

All  the  armies  have  learned  the  art  of  bur- 
rowing, which  was  first  practised  on  a  large  scale 


METHODS   OF  WARFARE 


in  our  Civil  War  and  was  used  with  much  effect 
in  the  Boer,  Japanese,  and  Balkan  wars.  A 
straight,  open  trench  can  be  located  by  airships 
and  cleared  out  with  shrapnel;  but  troops  in  the 
field  build  practical  bombproofs  which  protect 
great  numbers  of  the  men  even  from  artillery  fire. 
This  must  be  the  reason  why  the  reported  losses 
are  so  low  in  proportion  to  the  men  engaged. 
General  Grant  in  1864  started  into  the  Wilder- 
ness with  about  125,000  men  and  added  50,000 
more  by  reinforcement  during  the  next  six  weeks, 
but  out  of  these  he  lost  70,000  dead,  wounded, 
and  missing.  If  the  Allies  had  suffered  losses 
in  this  proportion^  they  would  have  sacrificed 
500,000  men  during  August  and  September,  but 
there  is  no  evidence  of  an  actual  loss  of  half  that 
number.  In  spite  of  the  terrific  hardships  of 
marching  every  day  for  weeks  and  then  fighting 
every  day  for  a  fortnight,  neither  army  seems  in 
October  to  be  worn  down.  Perhaps  when  the  offi- 
cial returns  are  made  after  the  war  we  shall  find 
out  that,  like  the  Japanese  in  1905,  the  officials 
have  made  remarkable  mistakes  in  their  totals. 
In  a  two  months'  campaign  in  fine  weather  there 
has  been  no  opportunity  for  disease  to  set  in; 
but  in  most  previous  wars  twice  as  many  men 
have  died  without  a  wound  as  have  been  killed  or 
disabled  by  bullets  or  shells. 


CHAPTER    XI 

EFFECT  OF  THE  WAR  ON  THE  UNITED 
STATES 

NATIONAL   SYMPATHIES 

THE  neutral  powers  of  Europe  watch  the 
progress  of  the  war  with  some  preju- 
dices. The  Turks,  who  are  much  influ- 
enced by  Germany,  at  one  time  seemed  on  the 
point  of  going  in  as  an  ally  on  that  side.  The 
Italians  show  symptoms  of  taking  up  the  cud- 
gels against  Austria-Hungary.  The  Spaniards 
would  probably  sympathize  with  their  Latin 
neighbors,  the  French.  Rumania  is  pro-Russian, 
for  if  Russia  is  victorious,  there  may  be  a  chance 
to  incorporate  into  Rumania  part  of  the  3,- 
300,000  Rumanians  who  live  at  present  in  the 
Austrian  Empire. 

The  United  States  as  a  nation  is  sympathetic 
with  all  of  the  contestants ;  we  have  nothing  to 
ask  from  any  of  them;  whichever  group  is  suc- 
cessful, that  group  has  nothing  to  give  which 
the  United  States  desires.  Our  people  is  made 


EFFECT  ON  UNITED  STATES      213 

up  of  race  strains  which  include  every  religion, 
race,  and  nationality  now  engaged  in  the  war. 
The  President  issued  on  August  5  a  proclama- 
tion of  absolute  neutrality  and  on  August  18 
sent  out  another  proclamation  urging  his  fellow- 
countrymen  not  to  take  sides  even  among  them- 
selves. The  war  is  a  cause  of  grief  not  only  to 
the  9,000,000  people  who  have  come  to  this  coun- 
try from  Austria,  Servia,  Russia,  and  all  the  other 
countries  now  fighting,  but  also  to  the  78,000,000 
who  were  born  in  America  and  who  are  appalled 
at  the  woe  which  has  fallen  upon  the  world. 

These  ties  of  interest  and  sympathy  are 
stronger  because  of  the  great  number  of  Ameri- 
cans who  in  recent  years  have  visited  Europe. 
There  were  a  hundred  thousand  in  1914,  and 
there  have  been  nearly  as  many  every  summer 
during  some  years.  Over  a  million  American 
citizens  have  set  foot  upon  the  mother  continent. 
Hundreds  of  men  and  women  have  been  students 
in  the  universities,  technical  and  art  schools  of 
France,  Germany,  Austria,  Italy,  Russia,  and 
England.  Exchange  professors  have  gone  from 
the  United  States  to  Germany,  France,  and  Eng- 
land; and  Germans,  Frenchmen,  and  Englishmen 
have  in  return  come  over  here.  Every  nation 
at  war  is  a  sister  nation  of  this  country. 

The  United  States  has  been  interested  in  every 
European  war  for  a  century ;  first  came  the  revo- 
lutions of  1830  and  1848,  which  drove  to  this 


THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 


side  of  the  water  some  of  the  best  citizens  that 
we  have  ever  had;  then  the  Crimean  War  of  1854 
which  led  to  a  controversy  about  British  enlist- 
ments in  the  United  States.  The  four  succeed- 
ing wars  from  1859  to  1871  were  overshadowed 
for  us  Americans  by  our  own  Civil  War.  The 
battle  of  Tilden  against  the  Tweed  Ring  in  1870 
was  at  the  time  more  absorbing  than  the  bat- 
tles of  Worth  or  Gravelotte  between  the  Prus- 
sians and  the  Frenchmen.  Of  the  powers  con- 
cerned in  those  four  wars,  Austria,  Denmark, 
Italy,  and  France  sent  us  at  that  time  few  immi- 
grants ;  and  the  numerous  German-  Americans 
turned  the  sympathies  of  the  public  toward  the 
Germans.  Americans  felt  that  their  own  experi- 
ence of  war  might  be  useful  to  these  foreign 
armies.  The  chief  way  in  which  war,  the  war 
spirit,  and  preparations  for  war  abroad  were 
pressed  upon  the  attention  of  this  country  was 
the  discovery  about  1867  that  several  foreign 
governments  had  introduced  a  system  of  univer- 
sal military  service;  and  that  therefore  Germans 
or  others  who  had  lived  years  in  this  country  and 
even  some  who  were  naturalized,  were  seized  if 
they  returned  to  their  native  country,  and  com- 
pelled to  perform  their  service  or  to  suffer  the 
penalty  of  evading  it. 

The  war  of  1877  in  the  Balkans,  the  Russian 
campaigns  in  central  Asia,  the  Boer  War  in  1899, 
the  Tripolitan  war  of  1911,  and  even  the  two 


EFFECT  ON  UNITED  STATES      215 

fierce  and  dreadful  Balkan  wars  of  1912  and 
1913,  all  passed  over  us  as  a  tale  that  is  told, 
a  spice  in  the  morning  newspaper,  a  vague  notion 
that  "those  fellows  away  out  there  are  waking 
up."  The  first  distant  war  that  really  came  home 
to  the  American  people  was  that  between  the 
Japanese  and  the  Russians  in  1904-1905;  and 
part  of  the  interest  arose  from  the  fact  that 
Japan  was  a  near  neighbor  to  our  insular  posses- 
sions in  the  Philippines.  It  never  seems  to  have 
occurred  to  anybody  that  a  European  war  could 
ever  take  place  which  would  tremendously  concern 
and  alarm  the  people  of  North  America.  We 
hardly  realize  now  that  we  are  next  neighbors 
along  a  frontier  of  3,000  miles  to  one  of  the 
great  military  powers  engaged  in  this  struggle. 
It  is  rather  an  agreeable  bit  of  excitement  that 
German  and  English  cruisers  stop  vessels  going 
in  or  out  of  New  York,  as  the  English  used  to  do 
a  century  ago.  The  terrific  thunders  of  a  world 
contest  are  still  so  distant  that  we  look  upon  our- 
selves as  happily  outside  the  field  of  conflict. 
Whatever  happens,  a  broad  and  blessed  ocean  is 
our  entrenchment.  And  have  we  not  an  army  and 
navy  that  can  protect  us  from  any  accident? 

All  these  notions  of  remoteness  from  Europe, 
of  living  in  "our  own  sphere,"  of  never  interfering 
in  foreign  relations,  of  expecting  foreign  nations 
to  keep  out  of  our  hemisphere,  are  blown  to  the 
winds  by  the  actualities  of  this  tremendous  war. 


216  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

First  of  all,  the  hundred  thousand  Americans  who 
were  enjoying  their  holiday  in  all  parts  of  Eur- 
ope, have  been  caught  as  people  are  caught  by 
a  cloudburst.  Modern  military  mobilization  lays 
its  hands  upon  the  whole  transportation  system  of 
central  Europe.  Think  of  our  Civil  War,  when 
from  the  firing  on  Sumter  to  the  first  attempt  to 
move  on  Richmond,  a  whole  year  elapsed !  Think 
of  our  leisurely  movements  in  the  Spanish  War! 
Compare  them  with  the  colossal  engine  of  mob- 
ilization which  catches  between  its  cogs  the  trav- 
eler and  sojourner,  whether  native  or  foreigner! 
European  travel  is  no  longer  a  pastime !  It  is  a 
business  necessity — a  part  of  the  world's  com- 
merce of  which  we  have  been  so  proud:  yet  it 
is  liable  to  paralysis  at  any  moment  so  far  as 
the  tourist  and  the  business  man  are  concerned. 

TRADE  AND  TRANSPORTATION 

Aside  from  personal  sympathies,  the  United 
States  is  mightily  moved  by  the  disturbance  of 
commerce.  There  has  been  nothing  like  it  since 
modern  commerce  arose,  for  even  in  the  Napo- 
leonic wars  when  Napoleon  attempted  to  close 
the  coasts  of  Europe  to  English  trade,  just  as 
England  is  now  attempting  to  close  it  to  German 
trade,  neutral  vessels  plied  from  port  to  port. 
No  coast  was  completely  closed  and  the  United 
States  as  the  principal  neutral  power  possessing 


EFFECT  ON  UNITED  STATES      217 

a  large  shipping,  had  special  advantages  and 
special  profits  in  the  European  trade.  To-day  the 
United  States  has  for  the  time  being  lost  a  com- 
merce to  Germany  and  Russia  which  mounted  up, 
out  and  in  together,  to  575  million  dollars  a 
year.  In  certain  lines  very  important  to  Ameri- 
can manufacturers,  such  as  dyestuffs,  the  Ger- 
mans have  close  to  a  monopoly.  Some  American 
steel  works  are  closed  down  because  they  can 
no  longer  get  a  mineral  from  Austria  which  was 
necessary  for  their  product.  Predictions  are 
made  that  southern  states  next  year  will  raise 
only  half  a  cotton  crop  because  of  the  lack  of 
kainite,  the  German  potash  product  used  as  a 
basis  for  the  necessary  fertilizers. 

In  the  other  direction,  American  exports  are 
heavily  hit,  first  by  the  lack  of  communication 
with  Germany,  Austria,  and  Russia,  and  second, 
by  the  weakening  of  demand  caused  by  the  stop- 
ping or  short  time  of  foreign  factories  which 
use  our  raw  material.  There  is  bound  to  be  a 
strong  demand  for  food,  for  any  one  of  the  great 
armies  now  in  the  field  would  perish  if  its  ene- 
mies could  cut  off  its  food  supply  for  six  con- 
tinuous days;  but  Europe  can  get  on  a  year  or 
two  with  half  the  cotton  fiber  that  it  has  been 
using.  This  gap  can  be  filled  in  part  by  selling 
to  those  world  markets  which  can  no  longer  be 
reached  by  the  great  Continental  powers.  The 
English  trade  to  Africa  and  Asia  and  South 


218  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

America  is  disturbed  but  can  probably  about  hold 
its  own  unless  the  Germans  decisively  defeat  the 
British  fleet  and  thus  get  command  of  the  sea. 
It  is  not  enough  for  them  to  let  loose  additional 
cruisers,  though  those  random  vessels  have  sunk 
a  respectable  number  of  British  merchantmen  all 
over  the  world.  Germany  can  destroy  English 
trade  only  by  destroying  the  fleet.  That  is  the 
great  principle  of  Mahan's  theory  of  Sea  Power. 

The  difficulty  in  the  way  of  the  United  States 
taking  up  the  slack,  so  to  speak,  of  the  German 
trade  is  that  South  Americans  and  Chinese  and 
other  nations  can  only  buy  to  about  the  amount 
which  they  can  sell.  It  will  take  years  to  read- 
just the  great  currents  of  world  trade,  for  inter- 
national commerce  depends  upon  the  physical 
fact  that  most  nations  have  a  staple  which  they 
can  raise  to  better  advantage  than  their  neigh- 
bors and  with  that  product  they  buy  the  surplus 
from  other  countries.  The  United  States  cannot 
absorb  all  the  Brazilian  coffee  or  Chilean  nitrates 
or  Peruvian  rubber  or  Argentine  wool  and  meat. 

On  the  other  hand,  can  the  United  States  make 
South  African  diamonds,  Honduras  mahogany, 
Indian  opium,  or  fine  Limoges  china,  while  the 
production  of  those  articles  is  disturbed  by  the 
war?  If  not,  this  country  stands  to  lose  a  large 
segment  of  its  international  trade;  and  though 
only  about  one-tenth  of  the  goods  used  in  the 
United  States  are  produced  outside  of  the  coun- 


EFFECT  ON  UNITED  STATES     219 

try,  and  though  we  could  get  along  without 
those  imports  which  may  be  classed  as  luxuries, 
we  must  also  get  on  without  the  profits  and  the 
employment  which  has  gone  to  make  our  exports : 
for  if  we  do  not  buy  we  cannot  sell. 

All  the  theories  of  international  trade  are  much 
disturbed  by  international  loans.  When  New 
York  City  bonds  to  the  amount  of  over  $100,- 
000,000  fell  due  in  September  and  were  found 
to  be  owned  abroad,  the  banks  had  to  hustle 
about  to  make  arrangements  for  taking  them  up ; 
and  in  the  course  of  a  few  months  hundreds  of 
millions  of  American  securities  will  be  sent  over 
from  Europe,  either  to  raise  cash  on  them  or  to 
settle  balances  of  trade.  If  only  two  or  three 
countries  were  involved  in  the  war  and  all  the  rest 
were  neutral  and  had  their  ordinary  purchasing 
power,  the  United  States  would  suffer  very  little; 
but  when  all  Europe  is  disturbed  and  most  of  it 
engaged  in  war,  the  United  States  is  bound  to 
lose  trade.  That  means  to  give  up  also  any 
large  schemes  for  capturing  German  or  English 
or  French  trade;  because  there  must  be  an  end 
to  war  some  time  and  then  our  new  customers  are 
likely  to  drift  back  to  their  old  connection. 

THE  AMERICAN  ARMY  AND  NAVY 

The  war  cannot  fail  to  change  the  point  of 
view,  both  of  military  men  and  of  statesmen,  with 
regard  to  the  nature  and  size  of  our  military 


220  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

force.  In  comparison  with  the  figures  given  in 
earlier  chapters  for  foreign  armies  our  regular 
force  is  a  bagatelle.  The  Continental  United 
States  has  a  population  of  over  100,000,- 
000,  which  is  about  that  of  Germany  and  Italy 
together,  but  those  two  powers  keep  up  peace 
forces  which  together  amount  to  about  1,000,000 
men  while  the  United  States  army  has  an  enlisted 
strength  of  80,000  rank  and  file  besides  5,000 
officers.  Our  army  is  less  than  one-tenth  of  one 
per  cent  of  the  population;  we  had  fewer  soldiers 
ready  for  service  in  July,  1914,  than  Belgium 
with  its  7,000,000  people. 

This  does  not  mean  that  the  American  army 
is  at  present  too  small  for  the  tasks  that  are 
put  upon  it.  It  is  ample  for  garrisoning  the 
forts,  for  police  duty  in  states  which  have  not 
the  public  spirit  and  sand  to  take  care  of  them- 
selves, and  for  small  expeditions  outside  the  coun- 
try, like  that  to  Cuba  in  1906  and  to  Vera  Cruz 
in  1914.  The  United  States  is  prodigal  in  the 
amount  it  spends  for  this  force.  The  military 
appropriations  for  the  last  complete  year  were 
$110,000,000,  which  is  almost  as  much  as  was 
spent  by  Austria-Hungary  in  the  same  year.  If 
disarmament  can  be  secured  with  a  good  prospect 
of  world  peace  the  army  need  not  be  greatly  en- 
larged for  present  purposes,  but  the  campaigns 
in  the  Balkans  and  still  more  in  central  Europe 
show  that  any  future  war  is  likely  to  be  fought 


EFFECT  ON  UNITED  STATES     221 

by  big  units.  General  von  Moltke,  General  Joff re, 
General  Rennenkampff  before  entering  into  actual 
warfare  handled  in  maneuvers  or  otherwise  forces 
considerably  larger  than  the  whole  army  of  the 
United  States.  If  we  can  come  to  some  agreement 
for  a  "Pax  Americana"  among  all  the  western 
powers  we  shall  not  need  to  take  account  of  these 
enormous  numbers,  because  none  of  the  powers 
engaged  except  England  has  ever  carried  any  con- 
siderable number  of  soldiers  across  the  sea;  but 
if  European  wars  are  to  be  as  numerous  in  the 
future  as  they  have  been  in  the  past,  the  United 
States  will  have  to  enlarge  its  army. 

This  country  is  not  likely  to  adopt  the  idea 
that  it  can  afford  to  give  or  need  give  two  or 
three  years  out  of  the  most  productive  part  of 
a  young  man's  life  to  learn  the  art  of  war;  but 
there  is  much  to  be  said  for  the  Swiss  system  of 
universal  service  for  brief  periods,  counting  to- 
gether to  about  six  months,  and  more  for  the 
officers.  The  Swiss  are  very  like  the  Americans 
in  their  individuality  and  democracy  and  neither 
of  those  qualities  has  been  cut  down  by  such  serv- 
ice. In  spite  of  the  undesirable  side  of  barrack 
life,  which  is  a  severe  test  of  a  young  man's 
morals,  such  a  universal  service  would  do  much 
to  set  up  American  youth,  to  push  back  their 
shoulders,  inflate  their  lungs,  train  their  leg  mus- 
cles, teach  them  to  do  what  they  are  told,  make 
them  aware  that  every  man-child  in  the  world  is 


222  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

born  to  perform  service  at  the  behest  of  older 
people.  It  will  take  the  boys  out  of  the  slums 
and  the  schools  and  the  farms  and  the  shops 
for  a  few  months,  show  them  how  large  their  own 
country  is,  give  them  the  feeling  that  they  are 
responsible  for  its  welfare  and  defense.  If  the 
European  war  directs  the  United  States  toward 
that  course,  it  will  not  have  been  altogether  evil. 

Upon  the  navy  the  effect  of  the  war  must  be 
much  more  immediate  and  startling.  There  has 
been  no  ironclad  fighting  of  much  significance 
since  the  Civil  War  except  in  the  Russo-Japanese 
war;  and  this  is  the  first  opportunity  to  test  the 
new  naval  engines  of  destruction.  Whatever  the 
United  States  builds  henceforth  must  be  deter- 
mined by  the  results  of  the  war.  If  the  heavy 
first  line  of  powerful  ships  wins  in  the  naval  bat- 
tles that  are  impending,  then  we  must  build  dread- 
noughts or  nothing.  If  the  submarines  play  the 
havoc  that  many  naval  critics  expect  from  them, 
we  must  build  submarines.  If  the  fast,  light- 
armored  cruiser  can  dodge  about  its  heavier  op- 
ponents and  run  away  from  the  submarines,  then 
that  is  the  type  to  build.  There  are  some  almost 
comical  cross-bracings  in  the  naval  warfare. 
For  instance  an  airship  can  see  a  submarine  below 
the  surface;  and  perhaps  in  future  every  great 
cruiser  will  carry  a  nest  of  detective  aeroplanes. 

Again  if  Europe  settles  down  to  partial  dis- 
armament and  Japan  is  included,  the  United 


EFFECT  ON  UNITED  STATES 


States  will  naturally  accommodate  itself  to  that 
system;  but  if  Germany  or  England  comes  out 
of  the  struggle  with  a  powerful  and  permanent 
navy  there  will  be  nothing  for  it  but  that  the 
United  States  should  build  ships  enough  to  main- 
tain its  power  and  dignity.  It  is  not  in  the 
least  necessary  to  pay  attention  to  Hobson's 
clamor  that  the  United  States  should  have  the 
most  powerful  navy  in  the  Atlantic  and  another 
most  powerful  navy  in  the  Pacific  ;  but  the  ex- 
perience of  this  war  shows  that  the  most  peace- 
ful nations  may  suddenly  wake  up  to  find  an 
enemy  within  their  borders  ;  that  henceforth  every 
power  that  makes  war  will  aim  to  strike  with  the 
intensity  and  suddenness  with  which  Austria  and 
Russia  have  struck.  Politeness,  consideration, 
willingness  to  listen  to  explanations  are  not  a 
part  of  modern  war  and  the  United  States  must 
govern  itself  accordingly.  A  world  organization 
for  keeping  the  peace  is  the  only  other  thing  that 
can  protect  peaceful  nations. 

AMERICAN   DEMOCRACY 

It  is  necessary  for  the  United  States  to  think 
about  its  defense,  because  a  failure  to  provide 
for  the  future  would  be  a  terrible  calamity  for 
the  cause  of  popular  government.  We  have  put 
all  our  money  into  the  bank  of  free  government; 
we  have  assumed  that  the  voter  is  bound  to  look 


THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

out  for  the  interests  of  the  whole  community ;  that 
the  taxpayer  will  cheerfully  make  sacrifices  to 
maintain  a  government  which  he  in  part  controls. 
That  confidence  has  been  justified  in  the  history 
of  the  American  Republic,  and  particularly  in 
the  Civil  War  where  both  sides  showed  a  splendid 
power  of  combination  and  ability  to  organize  on 
a  great  scale,  and  a  patriotic  spirit  which  gave 
immense  aid  to  democracy  throughout  the  world. 

Nevertheless  the  Civil  War  in  comparison  with 
the  war  to-day  seems  wasteful  of  treasure  and 
life.  It  took  us  a  year  to  enlist  and  drill  armies 
such  as  appeared  in  Germany  and  France  within 
three  days  of  the  mobilization  order.  In  the  fol- 
lowing twelve  months  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
four  times  advanced,  delivered  its  blow,  and  re- 
tired to  the  shelter  of  field  works ;  while  the 
French  army  went  on  fighting  in  line  for  thirty 
days  out  of  thirty  and  still  held  its  ground.  It 
was  three  years  before  the  Eastern  Army  found 
in  General  Grant  a  general  who  could  utilize  it: 
the  German  commanders  were  designated  and 
proved  in  maneuvers  years  before  the  crash  came. 
Both  North  and  South  had  to  make  generals  out 
of  middle-aged  civilians:  there  is  not  an  officer 
in  any  one  of  the  European  armies  holding  an 
important  command  who  has  not  had  a  lifetime 
of  military  experiences. 

The  English  democracy  is  showing  its  capacity 
to  deal  with  tremendous  problems,  and  its  first 


EFFECT  ON  UNITED  STATES 

military  line  is  showing  splendid  stuff;  but  mili- 
tary critics  are  extremely  anxious  about  the  sec- 
ond line  of  volunteers  who  have  never  before  han- 
dled a  musket,  who  are  short  of  trained  officers, 
and  yet  who  must  shortly  take  the  field  against 
the  most  highly  trained  and  best  equipped  armies 
that  have  ever  marched.  The  United  States  might 
as  well  awake  to  the  fact  that  we  shall  be  ruined 
if  we  have  nothing  better  than  the  organization 
of  1861,  or  the  organization  of  1898,  when  a 
nation  of  eighty  millions  was  able,  after  seven 
weeks'  delay,  to  send  a  military  force  of  17,000 
men  to  take  Cuba,  in  a  state  of  confusion  and 
disharmony. 

Otherwise  the  day  of  our  great  democracy  will 
pass ;  for  either  some  centralized  monarchy  will 
descend  upon  us  with  its  battalions  of  infantry 
and  squadrons  of  ships,  aeroplanes,  and  sub- 
marines, every  detail  thought  out  beforehand, 
every  contingency  considered,  and  teach  us  the 
cost  of  poor  preparation;  or  else  the  Ameri- 
can people  will  rise  and  create  a  dictator  who 
may  save  them  from  destruction.  Whatever  the 
American  force,  large  or  small,  whatever  the  war- 
ships and  forts  and  regiments,  we  must  learn 
the  lesson  that  in  war  or  in  peace  the  great  re- 
sults are  accomplished  by  those  who  think  before- 
hand, make  preparations,  accumulate  materials, 
develop  commanders  and  submit  to  the  guidance 
of  experts  in  all  technical  matters. 


THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

This  does  not  mean  that  the  people  shall  have 
less  voice  in  their  own  government,  but  that  they 
shall  aim  to  keep  in  public  life  those  who  show  a 
capacity  to  serve  their  country.  It  means  longer 
terms  for  members  of  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives, more  cooperation  between  Congress  and  all 
the  departments  of  government;  more  carefully 
planned  expenditure  and  less  appropriation  for 
the  improvement  of  Higgle-Piggledy  Creeks  and 
military  posts  in  the  Wyoming  Mountains.  It 
means  a  more  intelligent  public  interest  in  the 
use  of  the  national  resources  for  national  pur- 
poses. Germany  is  an  imperial  country  in  which, 
we  Americans  think,  a  few  people  have  far  too 
great  power;  but  Germany  is  the  schoolmaster 
of  the  world  in  the  honest,  frugal,  and  intelligent 
application  of  a  nation's  means  to  the  nation's 
weal.  Germany  would  be  stronger  still  if  it 
called  more  upon  the  knowledge,  public  spirit, 
and  patriotism  of  the  average  man.  The  United 
States  will  be  stronger  when  it  looks  the  future 
squarely  in  the  face  and  instructs  its  public  men 
to  justify  democracy  by  showing  that  it  knows 
how  to  take  care  of  itself  in  the  midst  of  the 
tremendous  forces  of  our  time. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  United  States  is  in  the 
most  favorable  situation  to  urge  some  kind  of 
international  agreement,  which  shall  depend  not 
only  on  solemn  treaties  but  on  a  world-police  of 
some  sort.  The  problem  is  almost  unsolvable,  but 


EFFECT  ON  UNITED  STATES 


the  country  can  lead  the  way,  when  the  war  is 
over,  if  other  nations  will  join. 

MONROE   DOCTRINE 

Whatever  the  outcome  of  the  war,  it  is  certain 
to  have  a  serious  effect  upon  the  relations  of 
the  United  States  with  Latin-American  neighbors. 
It  is  for  a  moment  a  relief  because  it  gives  to  the 
government  at  Washington  free-hand  for  months 
to  come  in  Mexico  and  any  other  storm  centers  ; 
but  when  the  peace  is  made  there  is  certain  to 
be  a  redistribution  of  power  in  Europe  which 
will  react  upon  the  rest  of  the  world.  If  the 
Allies  are  victorious  they  may  carve  up  the  Ger- 
man African  colonies,  and  presumably  will  put 
Germany  for  a  long  time  out  of  condition  to  take 
part  in'  the  politics  of  the  western  hemisphere. 
Should  Germany  win,  she  may  take  Jamaica  from 
Great  Britain,  or  some  of  the  French  West  India 
Islands.  This  is  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  but  the  United  States  would 
hardly  be  in  a  position  to  test  that  doctrine 
against  a  power  which  had  just  beaten  Great 
Britain,  France,  and  Russia. 

In  either  case  sooner  or  later  some  European 
power  will  cast  desirous  eyes  on  South  America. 
Sooner  or  later,  probably  through  some  well- 
founded  quarrel  with  a  Latin-American  state, 
some  European  power  will  send  a  military  expedi- 


228  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

tion,  and  even  a  punitive  squadron  would  come 
under  the  ban  of  President  Roosevelt's  corre- 
spondence with  Germany  in  1901.  Any  prospect, 
even  remote,  of  more  official  colonies  in  America 
would  lead  to  an  understanding  between  the 
United  States  and  its  neighbors  to  the  southward. 
If  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  to  be  given  up,  the  end 
of  this  war  will  be  a  good  time  to  take  that  step. 
If  it  is  to  be  maintained,  it  must  be  maintained 
in  the  teeth  of  new  circumstances  and  a  new  dis- 
tribution of  the  world's  forces. 

In  this  as  in  all  other  matters  we  must  look 
in  the  face  the  new  dangers  revealed  by  the  out- 
break and  conduct  of  this  war.  If  Austria  can 
invade  a  neighboring  country  which  six  days 
before  supposed  itself  at  perfect  peace  with  its 
neighbor,  Russia  might  conceivably  do  the  same 
thing  some  time  with  the  United  States.  If  it 
would  be  justifiable  for  the  English,  having  occu- 
pied the  Austrian  coast  province  of  Dalmatia,  to 
shoot  women  because  other  women  had  fired  on  the 
troops,  any  enemy  which  might  reach  the  United 
States  would  have  the  right  to  shoot  our  innocent 
sisters  under  like  conditions.  If  the  Russians 
would  be  justified  in  bombarding  and  destroying 
a  church  in  Breslau  on  the  ground  that  a  military 
use  might  be  made  of  it,  then  it  is  equally  justifi- 
able for  any  power  that  has  the  military  force,  to 
land  on  the  Jersey  coast  and  bombard  the  Cathe- 
dral of  St.  John  the  Divine  in  New  York.  If  the 


EFFECT  ON  UNITED  STATES     229 

Servians  capture  Temesvar  and  demand  a  "con- 
tribution of  200,000  crowns,"  some  day  the  East 
Indians  may  put  the  city  of  New  York  to  a  ran- 
som of  2,000  million  dollars.  If  Germans  make 
war  on  Belgium  on  the  ground  that  it  is  "a  mat- 
ter of  life  or  death"  to  use  Belgian  territory, 
they  have  an  equal  military  right  to  cross  Switzer- 
land in  order  to  get  at  Italy,  or  to  cross  New 
England  in  order  to  invade  Canada.  Such  ex- 
treme uses  of  war  power  are  controlled  only  by 
the  discretion  of  the  strongest  party.  The  United 
States  and  all  other  powers  must  take  notice  that 
their  neutrality  in  great  world  wars  is  dependent 
upon  their  ability  to  protect  themselves.  The 
rights  of  war  are  now  defined  not  so  much  by  in- 
ternational law,  or  by  previous  treaties,  as  by  the 
extent  to  which  a  great  and  victorious  power 
deems  it  desirable  to  push  its  physical  powers,  and 
wise  nations  will  take  precautions  that  these  ex- 
treme principles  of  civilized  warfare  are  not  put 
into  practice  within  their  boundaries. 


CHAPTER  XII 

OUTCOME  OF  THE  WAR 

NUMBERS    AND    LOSSES 

NO  prophet  is  sufficiently  daring,  after  two 
or  three  months  of  such  a  war,  to  risk 
his  reputation  on  a  statement  of  what 
the  final  result  will  be.  The  first  element  in  that 
problem  is  the  number  of  soldiers  engaged  on 
each  side ;  and  no  mortal  man  knows  what  are  the 
forces  actually  on  foot  at  any  given  time,  and 
still  less  what  is  the  size  of  the  armies  which  de- 
ploy against  each  other  in  the  field.  AH  we  know 
is  that  Germany  and  France  have  the  machinery 
and  organization  to  put  under  the  colors  for  the 
first  series  of  battles  something  like  three  per  cent 
of  their  whole  population,  which  would  be,  rough- 
ly speaking,  2,000,000  Germans  and  1,200,000 
French;  but  these  figures  lost  their  relation  as 
soon  as  the  Germans  invaded  France,  for  it  takes 
not  less  than  twenty-five  per  cent  more  men  to 
230 


OUTCOME  OF  THE  WAR  231 

carry  on  war  on  something  like  equal  terms  in  an 
enemy's  country.  Then  arises  the  question  of 
what  proportion  of  the  second  line  can  be  raised, 
transported,  and  made  available. 

The  other  three  great  powers  are  not  so  well 
organized  for  getting  out  their  men.  The  Aus- 
trian regular  army  is  smaller  in  proportion  than 
the  German.  England  had  only  100,000  troops 
available  at  the  first  send-off,  and  in  the  first 
three  months  Great  Britain  could  not  have  raised 
more  than  400,000  serviceable  men  in  all.  The 
Servians  and  Belgians  have  been  fighting  at  very 
close  range  and  must  have  been  able  to  use  not 
less  than  200,000  men  apiece.  The  great  mys- 
tery is  Russia,  which  probably  pushed  500,000 
men  to  the  frontiers  in  the  first  month  and  an- 
other 500,000  in  the  second  month;  but  Russia 
is  a  giant  which  gets  new  strength  every  time  he 
touches  the  ground.  Out  of  that  far-extended 
soil  spring  levy  after  levy,  and  the  final  result  of 
the  war  depends  more  upon  the  capacity  of  Rus- 
sia to  feed,  clothe,  arm,  and  transport  the  mil- 
lions of  available  men  than  on  any  other  element 
of  the  conflict. 

Another  main  element  is  the  capacity  and  in- 
telligence of  the  soldiers ;  and  it  is  on  this  that; 
Germany  builds  her  hopes  of  success.  The  Ger- 
man armies  have  in  three  previous  wars  driven 
their  enemies  before  them  like  chaff  before  the 
wind,  partly  because  of  their  superior  quality; 


THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

quite  as  much  because  their  highly  organized 
transport  makes  it  possible  for  them  to  concen- 
trate and  outnumber  their  foes  at  critical  points. 
That  superiority  now  seems  threatened.  A  thou- 
sand men  against  a  thousand  men,  the  Belgians 
seem  to  have  given  a  good  account  of  themselves ; 
and  the  French,  regiment  for  regiment,  and  army 
corps  for  army  corps,  seem  to  have  been  about 
as  good  as  the  Germans.  An  element  in  the  con- 
test which  was  apparently  quite  unexpected  to 
Continental  critics  has  been  the  dash  and  success 
of  the  British.  So  far  as  can  be  judged,  it  seems 
probable  that,  without  their  aid,  the  French  would 
have  been  forced  back  of  Paris  within  the  first 
month,  which  would  have  probably  caused  the 
caving  in  of  their  line  of  defense  on  the  German 
frontier.  • 

In  the  Boer  War  and  Balkan  Wars  it  was 
proved  that  the  crude  and  uneducated  Cape 
Dutchman  or  Servian  when  properly  handled 
might  be  about  as  good  a  soldier  as  the  best.  He 
is  accustomed  to  hard  work  and  simple  fare;  he 
is  a  good  marcher,  will  stand  cannon  fire,  and 
has  learned  the  art  of  "digging  himself  in."  The 
two  rival  weapons  of  modern  warfare  are  the 
heavy  field  gun  and  the  trench.  It  is  not  an  acci- 
dent that  there  appears  to  have  been  neither  in 
the  east  nor  west  a  complete  defeat  of  any  army 
by  any  other  army.  Good  armies  with  even  an 
irregular  supply  of  food  cannot  be  broken  up, 


OUTCOME  OF  THE  WAR  233 

crumpled  up,  and  reduced  to  fragments  as  they 
were  in  1866  and  1870. 

Apparently  the  modern  long-range  rifles  and 
cannon  do  less  killing  than  the  old-fashioned, 
near-at-hand  weapons.  One  may  guess  that  the 
Germans  have  had  500,000  men  engaged  in  bat- 
tles on  the  eastern  frontier  and  1,000,000  on  the 
western  frontier  during  the  campaign;  but  down 
to  September  1,  the  official  reports  of  killed, 
wounded  and  missing  aggregated  only  about 
100,000,  or  less  than  seven  per  cent  of  the 
troops — only  one  in  fourteen.  This  is  nothing 
like  the  similar  losses  in  the  battles  of  our  Civil 
War,  and  is  less  than  the  total  losses  of  little 
Bulgaria  during  the  campaigns  of  1912  and  1913. 
There  is  no  lack  of  bravery  in  the  almost  con- 
tinuous fighting,  and  hand  to  hand  attacks  with 
cold  steel  have  occurred,  though  nothing  like  as 
often  as  the  correspondents  would  have  us  believe. 
The  fighting  is  very  hard  for  both  sides  because 
the  men  have  to  stand  terrible  cannonading  di- 
rected by  aeroplanes ;  but  with  any  sort  of  deep 
protection  they  hold  their  ground  tenaciously,  or 
yield  slowly  and  in  order. 

The  newspapers  have  been  filled  with  accounts 
of  the  disruption  of  the  Austrian  armies,  and 
nothing  but  bad  defeat  could  account  for  the  cap- 
ture of  a  place  like  Lemberg;  but  the  Germans 
pressed  back  the  French  through  half  a  dozen 
important  towns,  and  then  yielded  the  ground 


234  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

gained.  The  air  is  full  of  flying  reports  of  tre- 
mendous numbers  of  killed  and  prisoners,  going 
so  far  as  an  assertion  that  the  Germans  had  cap- 
tured 92,000  Russians  and  killed  250,000 !  That 
sort  of  abject  and  overwhelming  defeats  have  not 
been  seen  in  modern  warfare,  except  over  such 
adversaries  as  the  Turks  in  1912 ;  and  it  is  doubt- 
ful whether  any  considerable  army  throughout 
the  war  will  be  put  to  flight  and  thus  destroyed 
as  a  tactical  unit. 

TRANSPORTATION   AND   SUPPLIES 

Another  factor  is  the  relative  ease  and  in- 
genuity of  transportation.  The  French  and 
British  have  been  operating  on  very  short  lines 
of  communication:  probably  no  British  soldier 
has  been  more  than  two  hundred  and  fifty  miles 
from  London,  and  no  French  division  more  than 
a  hundred  and  fifty  miles  from  Paris.  This  ad- 
vantage of  closeness  to  supplies,  reinforcements, 
and  headquarters  is  much  diminished  by  the  Ger- 
man transport.  In  the  first  place  the  railroads 
have  been  constructed  with  a  view  to  the  concen- 
tration of  troops  upon  the  frontiers.  In  the  cen- 
ter of  Germany  you  find  a  railroad  line  which 
seems  to  have  no  commercial  reason  and  are  told, 
"Oh,  yes.  That  is  a  War  Road."  Not  only  are 
there  lines  radiating  from  Berlin,  Bremen,  Frank- 
fort, Munich,  Leipzig,  and  other  centers,  but 


OUTCOME  OF  THE  WAR  235 

throughout  the  Empire  the  stations,  junctions, 
and  sidings  are  arranged  to  allow  the  easiest  and 
least  interrupted  passage  from  one  line  to  An- 
other. The  Germans  have  made  every  provision 
against  a  congestion  of  traffic  or  rolling  stock. 

All  the  contestants  in  central  Europe  are  mak- 
ing great  use  of  modern  methods  of  transit.  The 
cavalry,  which  a  few  years  ago  was  thought  to  be 
superseded,  has  recovered  its  prestige  as  a  scout- 
ing and  covering  force,  and  there  have  been  some 
cavalry  charges  as  parts  of  pitched  battles. 
There  are  also  bicycle  regiments,  motor  cycles, 
armored  automobiles  carrying  quick-firing  guns, 
and  a  great  use  of  motors  for  transporting  both 
men  and  supplies.  That  is  the  reason  why  thou- 
sands of  private  automobiles,  including  those  in 
use  by  foreign  tourists,  were  commandeered  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war.  The  killing  fatigue  of 
the  march  is  lightened  by  loading  men  upon  ma- 
chines;  motors  tow  provision  and  ammunition 
wagons ;  powerful  motors  draw  the  heavy  guns, 
and  particularly  the  siege  guns  which  have  been 
so  significant  in  the  war.  No  horse  teams  could 
have  been  depended  upon  to  do  the  work.  The 
automobile,  like  the  horse,  requires  fodder,  and 
one  of  the  serious  questions  of  the  war  is  whether 
the  gasoline  supply  of  the  various  nations  is  going 
to  be  sufficient  for  their  needs.  Russia  and  Ru- 
mania are  the  only  European  countries  that  have 
a  large  production  of  their  own. 


236  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

Quite  as  important  as  the  number  and  efficiency 
of  soldiers  is  the  question  of  their  food,  for  if 
any  of  the  nations,  as  is  the  case  of  Great  Britain, 
does  not  regularly  raise  food  enough  for  its  peo- 
ple, it  must  get  supplies  from  other  countries  or 
yield.  Russia,  Austria,  and  Servia  raise  their 
own  food  supplies,  and  if  Austria  has  succeeded 
in  harvesting  her  magnificent  grain  crop  she  will 
probably  have  a  surplus  to  send  over  to  Germany. 
No  wheat  can  get  out  of  Russia  while  the  Turks 
hold  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Germans  control  the 
Baltic.  France,  England,  and  Italy  all  have 
good  sea  connections  to  grain-  and  meat-produc- 
ing countries,  such  as  the  United  States  and  the 
Argentine.  The  doubtful  quantity  is  the  actual 
condition  of  the  German  food  supply;  that 
country  has  imported  considerable  quantities 
regularly  from  over-sea,  and  may  have  been 
laying  up  a  store;  though  it  is  incredible  that 
there  should  be  enormous  warehouses  full  of 
grain  kept  for  emergencies  without  so  many 
people  knowing  it  that  everybody  would  know 
it. 

As  for  military  material,  all  the  countries  have 
their  own  factories,  except  Servia.  So  long  as 
the  Creusot  Works  in  France,  the  Armstrong 
Works  in  London,  and  the  Krupp  Works  near  the 
Rhine  are  in  the  hands  of  their  friends,  that  sup- 
ply will  be  kept  up;  still  it  takes  an  immense 
amount  of  ammunition  to  supply  the  modern 


OUTCOME  OF  THE  WAR  237 

quick-firers ;  some  authorities  declare  that  two 
to  three  tons  of  projectiles  are  fired  off  for  every 
man  that  is  hit. 


COMMAND   OF  THE   SEA 

All  calculations  and  predictions  of  the  relative 
force  and  efficiency  of  the  various  nations  are 
touched  by  the  great  issue  of  sea  power.  When 
the  war  broke  out  Great  Britain  had  about  as 
much  ship  tonnage  as  all  the  rest  of  Europe  to- 
gether, four  times  as  much  as  Germany,  and  a 
navy  which  was  equal  to  that  of  Germany  and 
France  combined.  In  number  of  ships,  experience 
in  building,  tradition  of  naval  discipline,  and 
record  of  naval  successes  Great  Britain  is  the 
most  powerful  naval  nation  that  the  world  has 
ever  seen.  While  the  Continental  powers  have 
spent  their  energies  on  armies,  with  side  allow- 
ance for  navies,  the  British  have  made  the  navy 
for  years  their  principal  care.  Further,  the 
British  have  their  own  coaling  stations  all  over 
the  world — for  instance,  Esquimalt  on  Van- 
couver's Island  in  British  Columbia;  a  number  of 
Pacific  Islands ;  Weihaiwei  in  north  China,  and 
Hongkong  in  south  China;  Aden;  Port  Said; 
Malta;  and  Gibraltar.  That  means  that  the 
British  can  easily  recoal  and  supply  their  ships 
in  all  seas,  while  their  enemies  are  compelled  to 
resort  to  the  difficult  expedients  of  sending  out 


238  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

ships    with    coal    and    provisions    to    meet    their 
cruisers  at  sea. 

Sea  power  depends  on  the  ability  to  maintain  a 
fleet  which  can  move  at  its  will;  and  that  means 
that  it  must  either  destroy  any  large  hostile  fleet 
on  the  ocean  or  shut  it  in  by  blockade.  The  Ger- 
mans have  shown  themselves  bold  and  skilful 
sailors,  for  only  one  or  two  of  their  vessels  of 
war  have  been  captured  on  the  open  sea.  One  of 
them,  the  Emden,  succeeded,  two  months  after 
the  war  broke  out,  in  sinking  eleven  British  ships 
on  the  coast  of  India.  Others  have  ranged  up  and 
down  the  Pacific.  The  actual  position  of  the 
main  fleet  is  probably  not  known  to  the  German 
people,  but  has  doubtless  been  reported  by  British 
spies,  for  you  cannot  hide  a  first-class  modern 
fighting  ship  behind  a  warehouse. 

So  long  as  the  German  fleet  remains  in  its  own 
ports  or  the  Kiel  Canal  it  is  safe,  because  it  is 
practically  impossible  for  a  fleet  to  attack  a  coast 
which  is  protected  by  mines.  Therefore  the  old- 
fashioned  attacks  on  a  coast  or  river,  like  that  of 
Farragut  on  New  Orleans  in  1862,  are  now  almost 
impossible.  The  only  way  actually  to  reach  the 
German  fleet  would  be  to  land  an  army  at  some 
distance  which  was  powerful  enough  to  march 
overland  and  seize  the  canal  or  harbor,  thus  cap- 
turing the  warships  or  forcing  them  to  sea. 

Of  course  the  English  fleet  could  in  the  same 
way  take  refuge  in  the  English  estuaries,  but  that 


OUTCOME  OF  THE  WAR  239 

would  mean  to  let  loose  a  fleet  of  hornet  ships 
which  would  sting  Great  Britain  all  over  the 
world.  No  ironclad  fleet  has  ever  kept  the  sea 
during  the  winter  storms  such  as  rage  in  the 
North  Sea.  The  English  fleet  is  the  stopper  in 
the  bottle,  a  stopper  very  likely  to  be  loosened 
by  too  much  motion.  If  the  blockade  is  once 
raised  for  a  single  day  the  Germans  can  get  out, 
though  once  out  they  take  the  risk  of  being  cut 
off  from  the  very  narrow  stretch  of  home  coast 
to  which  they  have  access. 

The  real  naval  contest,  apparently,  is  to  be 
fought  in  the  air  and  under  water.  The  Germans 
are  the  only  power  that  have  a  considerable  num- 
ber of  Zeppelin  dirigible  airships,  and  without 
doubt  they  are  building  more  with  all  their  might. 
Their  hope  is  that  those  craft  will  be  able  to  soar 
above  the  English  fleet,  out  of  range  of  its  guns 
and  yet  able  to  drop  pitiless  bombs  among  the 
ships.  The  only  protection  would  seem  to  be  a 
fleet  of  English  aeroplanes  which  should  fire  or 
ram  the  bigger  craft.  Any  day  may  bring  the 
news  that  the  feat  of  destroying  the  English  sea 
power  has  been  accomplished;  on  the  other  hand 
the  war  may  pass  without  such  a  battle ;  the  Zep- 
pelins cannot  operate  in  stormy  weather  and  have 
shown  little  offensive  power  on  land. 

If  that  fails,  there  is  still  the  opportunity  of 
the  submarine.  The  English  have  more  sub- 
marines and  more  submarine  experience  than  the 


240  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

Germans,  but  they  cannot  do  execution  in  the 
shallow  coast  waters  protected  by  mines ;  while 
the  Germans  can  send  their  submarines  out  at 
any  time  in  good  weather.  These  underwater 
ships  cannot  operate  in  rough  seas,  for  they  must 
use  their  periscopes  to  get  an  occasional  outlook. 
Nobody  outside  the  service  quite  knows  what  pre- 
cautions have  been  taken.  All  large  modern  war- 
ships have  booms  and  use  torpedo  nettings  and 
searchlights,  watch  every  moment  for  the  peri- 
scopes ;  and  very  likely  surround  themselves  with 
a  curtain  of  floating  mines.  In  such  a  long-con- 
tinued struggle,  lasting  for  months,  the  advan- 
tage of  position  is  on  the  side  of  the  blockaded 
country. 

VARIED   FIELDS  OF  WARFARE 

No  war  has  ever  been  fought  upon  so  many 
fields  and  in  so  many  complications  at  the  same 
time.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  following  cam- 
paigns are  being  waged: 

(1)  Germans   with  Allies   in   France   and   Ger- 

many. 

(2)  Germans  with  British,  naval  warfare  on  the 

North  Sea  and  all  over  the  globe. 

(3)  Germans  with  Belgians  aided  by  English. 

(4)  Germans   with   Russians   in   East    Prussia, 

Posen,  and  Poland. 


OUTCOME  OF  THE  WAR 

(5)  Austrians  with  Russians  in  Poland,  Galicia, 

and  Hungary. 

(6)  Austrians  with  Servians  in  Servia  and  the 

neighboring  Austrian  provinces. 

(7)  Austrians  with  Servians  and  Montenegrins 

in  Bosnia. 

(8)  Austrians  with  French  and  perhaps  British 

in  the  Adriatic  and  on  its  coast. 

(9)  Germans  with  Japanese  and  some  English 

aid  in  China. 

(10)  Germans  and  Australians  and  New  Zealand- 

ers  in  the  Pacific. 

(11)  Germans  with  French  and  English  in  Africa. 
To  these  may  perhaps  be  added  at  any  time: 

(12)  a  land  campaign  between  the  Italians  and 
Austrians  along  their  common  frontier;  (13)   a 
naval  attack  by  Italian,  French,  and  British  ships 
against  the  Austrian  vessels  and  coasts;  (14)  an 
attack  by  Rumanians  and  Bulgarians  on  the  Aus- 
trians;  (15)   war  between  the  Turks   and   Rus- 
sians on  the  Black  Sea;    (16)    a   corresponding 
fight  between  the  Greeks  and  Turks  by  land  and 
sea. 

Manifestly  these  various  campaigns  affect  each 
other,  particularly  as  most  of  the  belligerents 
and  possible  belligerents  are  in  a  ring  around 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary.  This  leaves  it 
possible  for  the  central  contestants  to  shift  ar- 
mies on  the  inside  line,  and  it  appears  to  have 


THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

been  the  original  German  campaign  to  smash 
France  in  a  few  weeks,  leave  an  occupying  force 
there,  and  then  transfer  the  bulk  of  the  army  to 
the  Russian  frontier.  As  matters  now  stand  it 
is  entirely  possible  that  the  Germans  might  win  a 
decisive  victory  over  the  English  fleet  or  the 
Allies'  army,  and  almost  at  the  same  moment  be 
crushed  in  by  the  Russians ;  or  Austria  might  be 
quite  overwhelmed  by  the  Servians  and  Russians, 
while  her  ally,  Germany,  was  everywhere  able  to 
hold  her  ground. 

Warfare  in  the  Far  East  is  in  a  curious  con- 
dition. The  English  and  their  colonies  have  eas- 
ily picked  up  most  of  the  German  islands  in  the 
Pacific  Ocean,  and  the  Japanese  are  besieging 
Kiao-Chao,  the  one  German  colony  on  the  conti- 
nent of  Asia.  The  Chinese  are  eager  to  have  the 
Germans  turned  out  of  that  colony,  but  stand 
helpless  while  the  Japanese  march  through  their 
neutral  territory  to  reach  the  German  posses- 
sions. The  case  is  in  many  respects  like  the  dis- 
regard of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  The  Ger- 
mans hold  China  responsible  for  this  invasion, 
and  announce  that  in  due  time  they  will  claim 
an  indemnity  from  China,  besides  the  return  of 
the  colony.  The  only  indemnity  that  China  could 
possibly  pay  would  be  more  territory.  There 
seems  every  likelihood  that  the  greatly  superior 
force  of  the  Japanese  will  take  Kiao-Chao,  and 
the  Japanese  government  has  notified  the  powers 


OUTCOME  OF  THE  WAR 

that  the  territory  will  be  restored  to  China.  In 
acknowledging  this  information  Secretary  Bryan 
took  pains  to  intimate  that  the  United  States 
expected  that  promise  to  be  kept. 

FORTUNE  OF  WAR 

For  such  a  conflict  between  two  powerful 
groups  of  nations  there  is  hardly  any  precedent 
except  the  coalition  against  Napoleon,  from  18l£ 
to  his  final  downfall  in  1815.  When  that  strug- 
gle began,  France  controlled  the  subordinate 
kingdoms  of  Italy,  Naples,  Holland,  Westphalia, 
and  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Warsaw  (Poland)  be- 
sides several  German  kingdoms  which  Napoleon 
had  created.  Gradually  there  was  formed  against 
him  a  coalition  of  Russia,  Prussia,  Austria,  and 
England.  It  required  three  terrible  years  to  de- 
cide the  strife,  including  the  battles  of  Leipzig 
and  Dresden  in  1818 ;  the  campaign  of  1814  in 
France  over  much  of  the  ground  now  again 
plowed  up  by  armies,  and  the  Waterloo  campaign 
of  1815. 

None  of  those  campaigns  was  so  destructive  of 
the  industry  and  wealth  of  the  countries  con- 
cerned as  in  the  few  months  of  the  present  war. 
Europe  cannot  now  carry  on  war  for  three  years 
or  for  two  years,  simply  because  it  has  not  the 
means  to  keep  on  foot  so  long  the  kind  of  armies 
that  alone  can  hope  to  win.  Abraham  Lincoln 


244  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

was  deeply  concerned  because  the  Civil  War  was 
costing  the  Federal  government  a  million  dollars 
a  day.  The  western  campaign  in  France  must 
require  a  consumption  of  food,  munitions  and  cost 
of  transportation  amounting  for  both  parties  to- 
gether to  not  less  than  seven  millions  a  day,  and 
the  eastern  campaigns  require  almost  as  much. 
This  is  a  rising  expenditure,  for  there  will  be 
constant  increase  in  the  expense  for  care  of  the 
sick  and  wounded;  and  the  more  soldiers  that 
are  raised,  the  more  money  must  be  provided  to 
support  them.  Victory  will  be  almost  as  costly 
as  defeat  and  there  is  no  likelihood  that  the  war 
will  stop  before  10,000  million  dollars  have  gone 
into  the  chasm. 

Of  course  the  governments  will  all  borrow. 
During  the  last  half -century  of  wars  there  was 
always  some  neutral  power  which  had  cash  for  the 
contestants.  Japan  and  Russia  were  fighting 
each  other  in  1905  with  money  derived  from 
French  and  English  capitalists.  Of  whom  shall 
the  contesting  countries  borrow  now?  The  only 
neutral  which  has  large  sums  to  lend  is  the  United 
States,  which  has  no  desire  to  invest  in  support  of 
the  war.  The  only  resource  of  the  European 
powers  is  their  own  people,  and  the  Germans  have 
shown  the  splendid  pluck  of  subscribing  1,000 
million  dollars  to  a  new  national  war  loan.  There 
is,  however,  only  one  place  from  which  such  a  loan 
can  be  taken  and  that  is  the  savings  of  the  people. 


OUTCOME  OF  THE  WAR  245 

In  a  hundred  and  fifty  or  two  hundred  days 
that  thousand  million  dollars  will  have  dis- 
appeared in  pay,  rations,  forage,  ammunition, 
care  of  sick  and  wounded,  and  support  of  desti- 
tute families  of  the  soldiers.  And  then  what? 
Another  loan  or  an  enormous  war  tax,  perhaps 
in  the  end  forced  contributions,  all  of  which  will 
absorb  more  and  more  of  the  movable  capital  in 
the  country.  Germany  and  France  are  frugal 
nations  except  for  the  modern  class  of  rich  mer- 
chants and  manufacturers,  but  they  can  save 
something,  perhaps  a  third,  on  their  annual  cost 
of  living.  That  saving  also  is  bound  to  go  into  the 
national  treasury  or  else  the  war  must  flag  and 
eventually  stop.  If  it  goes  on  long  enough,  every 
nation  that  holds  out  will  have  squeezed  away  the 
quick  capital  of  its  people.  Farms,  buildings, 
mines,  cities,  railroads,  wharves,  factories,  vessel 
property,  will  remain  so  far  as  that  particular 
country  has  not  been  actually  crossed  and  rav- 
aged by  hostile  armies;  but  stocks  of  goods,  raw 
materials  and  the  cash  of  the  country  will  be  gone. 

Among  the  various  powers  Austria  is  likely  to 
be  the  first  to  come  to  this  state  of  exhaustion, 
because  it  is  poorer  than  its  western  neighbors 
and  because  it  stands  more  chance  of  invasion  and 
capture  of  its  capitals  than  any  other  power. 
Germany,  though  a  very  rich  nation,  has  the  most 
expensive,  because  the  most  efficient,  army;  and 
unless  it  can  get  control  of  the  sea  has  the  least 


246  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

chance  of  relief  from  outside.  France  has  great 
accumulated  capital,  but  very  large  sums  have 
been  lent  to  Russia.  Still  the  French  peasants' 
traditional  stocking  may  furnish  means  to  keep 
on  when  other  nations  are  exhausted.  Great 
Britain  has  enormous  productive  industries  in  all 
parts  of  the  world;  but  if  her  fleet  should  be 
crippled,  would  collapse  sooner  than  any  Conti- 
nental country,  because  the  United  Kingdom 
could  not  then  feed  or  defend  itself.  Russia  alone 
of  all  these  countries  can  keep  up  war  for  several 
years  without  ruin;  because  while  several  million 
men  are  fighting,  140  million  people  will  be  work- 
ing to  support  them. 

POSSIBLE  TERMS   OF   PEACE 

Whatever  the  sufferings  and  losses  of  the  peo- 
ple, in  the  end  the  war  must  come  to  one  of  three 
results : 

(1)  It  is  possible,  though  unlikely,  that  the 
whole  of  warring  Europe  may  be  brought  into 
the  pitiable  condition  of  Germany  in  1648,  when 
gaunt  and  starving  bands  of  men,  calling  them- 
selves armies,  passed  to  and  fro  across  the  coun- 
try, eating  up  the  scanty  supplies  of  food  and 
leaving  the  inhabitants  to  starve.  In  that  time 
of  horror  a  poor  Protestant  pastor  relates  that 
he  was  in  such  misery  that  he  felt  sure  the  good 
Lord  would  cause  some  rich  man  to  die,  so  that 


OUTCOME  OF  THE  WAR 

he  might  have  a  rex-daller  for  performing  the 
funeral  services;  and  the  Almighty  answered  his 
prayer. 

In  such  a  case  the  probable  result  would  be 
that  Europe  would  make  a  peace  restoring,  as 
nearly  as  possible,  the  conditions  of  July,  1914. 
The  boundaries  would  be  little  disturbed;  trade 
and  commerce  would  be  again  opened  to  all  na- 
tions on  about  the  same  terms  as  before.  The 
surplus  of  a  hundred  years'  labor  would  be  swept 
away,  and  Europe  would  begin  a  process  of  hard 
work  and  saving,  rebuilding,  slow  rising  in  popu- 
lation. That  task  might  not  be  so  long  as  it  was 
after  the  Napoleonic  wars.  The  example  of 
France  after  1871  shows  what  a  nation  can  do  by 
"sitting  tight"  for  a  few  years,  earning  much  and 
spending  little.  The  control  of  the  forces  of  na- 
ture and  the  use  of  machinery  would  perhaps  en- 
able Europe  in  thirty  years  to  come  back  to  its 
previous  wealth  and  population. 

(£)  The  Allies  may  win  a  general  and  decisive 
victory;  and,  on  the  doctrine  of  chances,  that  is 
the  most  probable  result.  For  in  a  wearing-down 
process  the  maritime  nations  and  Russia  have  a 
decided  advantage;  and  if  the  Allies  should  be 
worsted,  it  is  not  unlikely  that  Italy  would  come 
to  their  aid.  If  the  time  comes  when  resistance 
by  Germany  and  Austria  is  no  longer  possible, 
what  terms  will  probably  be  meted  out  to  the 
vanquished  ? 


248  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

Austria  by  that  time  would  presumably  be  so 
crushed  and  the  unity  of  the  Empire  so  affected 
that  no  further  punishment  need  be  inflicted, 
except  that  Italians  might  take  Trieste  and  the 
Trentino;  and  Servia  might  take  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  with  a  sea-front  on  the  Adriatic; 
probably  Montenegro  would  voluntarily  come  into 
this  combine.  If  the  Rumanians  joined  in  the 
war  they  might  perhaps  get  the  province  of  Buko- 
wina,  which  includes  so  many  of  their  people. 
The  Russians  would  undoubtedly  claim  Constan- 
tinople with  the  control  of  both  banks  of  the  Bos- 
phorus  and  Dardanelles,  and  perhaps  Western 
Asia  Minor;  they  would  also  probably  expect 
Galicia.  At  that  point,  however,  there  might  well 
be  so  much  squabbling  over  fragments  of  the  Em- 
pire, and  so  much  objection  on  the  part  of  the 
people  of  the  Austrian  provinces  to  being  shuffled 
out  like  a  deck  of  cards,  that  by  common  consent 
Austria  would  be  left  with  a  territory  not  much 
diminished;  but  would  be  compelled  to  reorganize 
so  as  to  give  the  Slavs  an  opportunity  of  self- 
development. 

As  for  Germany,  Alsace-Lorraine  is  practically 
already  mortgaged  by  the  Allies  to  France;  and 
Russia  might  claim  Posen  and  perhaps  east  Prus- 
sia. There  is  just  the  same  objection  to  taking 
that  territory  that  there  was  to  slicing  off  Al- 
sace-Lorraine from  France :  it  would  leave  a  per- 
manent scar  in  the  consciousness  of  the  German 


OUTCOME  OF  THE  WAR  249 

people.  Neither  the  Germans  nor  the  Austro- 
Germans  nor  the  Magyars  can  be  removed  from 
their  land,  and  they  will  stay  as  neighbors,  pre- 
sumably friends  and  probably  more  anxious  than 
ever  for  a  political  union  of  all  the  German-speak- 
ing people,  to  which  union  the  Magyars  would 
have  to  adhere  or  be  submerged. 

Germany  would  lose  in  such  a  peace  all  or 
nearly  all  her  colonies;  and  probably  the  Allies 
with  their  colonies  would  thereafter  lay  discrim- 
inating duties  on  German  ships  for  the  purpose 
of  keeping  down  their  carrying  trade.  Such  a 
peace,  imposed  by  the  will  of  conquerors,  would 
probably  bind  Germany  to  keep  up  none  but  a 
greatly  reduced  army.  It  does  not  seem  likely, 
in  view  of  the  terrible  passions  of  the  war,  that 
the  Allies  would  take  the  broad  and  states- 
manlike view  that  a  hundred  million  people  of  like 
views  and  aspirations  are  bound  to  occupy  a 
place  in  the  world;  and  that  it  is  better  for  the 
conquerors  to  treat  them  as  equals  rather  than 
as  subjects. 

One  possibility  is  that  the  Allies  will  quarrel 
over  the  division  of  the  spoils,  and  that  Germany 
will  be  admitted,  as  France  was  admitted  in  1814, 
as  a  power  which  must  be  reckoned  with  in  the 
settlement. 

(3)  The  third  alternative  is  that  the  German- 
Austrian  combination  may  win  a  decided  victory. 
If  another  Frederick  the  Great  should  unexpect- 


250  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

edly  arise,  he  might  double  the  forces  of  the  coun- 
try by  adding  his  genius ;  and  there  is  always  the 
chance  of  getting  complete  command  of  the  sea, 
which  would  probably  mean  the  invasion  of  Eng- 
land. That  would  nearly  destroy  France's  ally, 
and  if  France  were  then  conquered  there  would 
be  more  than  an  equal  chance  of  defeating  Russia. 
Allowing  that  Germany  comes  out  possessed  of 
sufficient  power  to  dictate,  what  would  probably 
be  her  will?  As  to  European  territory,  Austria 
might  receive  Servia  and  Macedonia  with  the  sea- 
port of  Salonika;  but  would  hardly  wish  either 
German  or  Russian  territory.  Germany  would 
certainly  annex  Belgium  and  not  unlikely  Hol- 
land, but  would  probably  leave  the  boundaries  of 
France  about  as  they  were.  The  Scandinavian 
powers  might  be  untouched  if  they  had  not  joined 
in  the  war.  Germany  would  probably  take  such 
of  the  English  colonies  as  pleased  her  fancy,  espe- 
cially any  in  which  Germans  might  like  to  settle. 
This  would  not  include  Canada  or  Australia,  but 
not  unlikely  would  include  South  Africa.  If  Eng- 
land were  brought  to  her  knees  she  would  have  to 
give  up  her  chain  of  fortresses  from  Gibraltar  to 
India;  Hongkong  and  the  Straits  Settlements 
would  go;  probably  not  India,  for  it  would  be  a 
serious  thing  for  Germany  to  take  on  300  mil- 
lion unwilling  subjects.  Restrictions  and  special 
taxes  would  be  laid  on  English  commerce.  Eng- 
land would  be  obliged  to  keep  down  her  navy  be- 


OUTCOME  OF  THE  WAR  251 

low  any  danger  to  the  Germans.  The  Germans 
would  not  be  likely  to  keep  their  hands  off  Asia 
Minor,  which  in  climate,  productions  and  markets 
would  be  a  good  field  for  German  colonization. 

BASIS  OF  A  TRUE   PEACE 

If  Europe  is  wise  it  will,  whoever  is  the  victor, 
avoid  these  harsh  terms,  because  they  would  sim- 
ply mean  a  truce.  The  defeated  and  humbled 
party  would  simply  wait  for  an  opportunity  to 
get  its  revenge,  just  as  Napoleon's  cruel  and  con- 
temptuous treatment  of  Prussia  from  1806  to 
1812  led  to  his  overthrow.  Passions  calm  down 
after  the  greatest  war;  nations  recognize  the 
right  of  other  nations  to  be.  Slav  and  Teuton 
have  dwelt  side  by  side  without  much  interference 
with  each  other  for  half  a  thousand"  years  and 
they  can  live  in  harmony  again.  Among  the 
things  that  ought  to  be  done  to  make  the  peace 
permanent  are  the  following: 

(1)  Europe  must  recognize  the  blood  kinship 
of  people  of  the  same  race,  and  must  cease  to  try 
to  destroy  the  language  and  traditions  of  race 
groups.  Here  in  the  United  States  we  have  pur- 
sued the  other  policy  with  great  success  because 
the  race  elements  are  so  scattered  over  the  whole 
country  that  we  can  make  English  the  common 
language  of  courts  and  commerce ;  but  the  Mag- 
yars cannot  impose  their  language  upon  the  Slav 


252  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

fractions  of  their  Empire.  Perhaps  the  most 
serious  cause  of  the  war  is  the  feeling  of  wrath 
due  to  these  attempts  to  destroy  national  lan- 
guages, traditions,  and  religions.  A  European 
peace  ought  to  offer  not  only  toleration  of  re- 
ligions but  of  race  existence. 

(2)  Europe  must  also  give  up  the  idea  of  com- 
pelling large  racial  units  to  accept  a  government 
which  is  hateful  to  them.    The  German  accusation 
of  the  Russians  finds  an  echo  in  other  parts  of  the 
world,  because  of  the  stupid  cruelty  of  the  Rus- 
sian government  toward  Finland,  Poland,  and  the 
Baltic   provinces.      Somewhere    there   must   be   a 
limit  to  the  right  of  a  group  within  a  country  to 
demand   independence.      The   United    States   has 
within  half  a   century  compelled   a   third  of  its 
members  to  remain  in  the  Union  with  the  other 
two-thirds,  and  there  is  now  no  more  loyal  part 
of  the  country  than  the  once  hostile  section.     We 
have  found  the  solution  of  our  questions  in  fed- 
eration.    So  have  Switzerland,  Germany,  Canada, 
Australia,  and  South  Africa.    Perhaps  that  is  the 
solution  for  countries  like  Austria-Hungary  and 
Russia  in  which  there  are  large  separate  racial 
units. 

(3)  Europe   must    admit   a   larger   and   more 
effective   share   of   the   whole    community   to   de- 
cisions as  to  their  own  destiny.     It  is  a  fearful 
thing  for  any  nation   to   allow  half  a  dozen   or 
half  a  hundred  persons  to  decide  upon  peace  or 


OUTCOME  OF  THE  WAR  253 

war,  and  to  put  their  country  into  a  position 
where  it  must  fight,  without  discussion  or  vote,  or 
the  opportunity  for  public  opinion  to  make  itself 
felt.  Even  in  England  war  was  decided  upon  by 
the  Cabinet  before  Parliament  was  allowed  to 
discuss  it.  In  Germany  the  Reichstag  acquiesced, 
with  a  few  negative  Socialist  votes.  In  Austria- 
Hungary  there  is  no  federal  parliament.  In  Rus- 
sia the  Duma  has  no  voice  in  such  an  important 
matter.  In  a  sense  popular  government  is  on 
trial  in  this  war.  If  the  British  and  French 
armies  are  beaten  the  militarists  will  all  assert 
that  it  was  because  their  power  was  weakened  by 
their  popular  governments. 

(4)  Above  all  no  peace  can  be  durable  that 
does  not  provide  in  some  way  against  the  causes 
which  have  brought  about  the  present  war.  Chief 
among  them  is  the  feeling,  fostered  by  great 
armaments,  that  war  is  a  proper  and  a  manly 
way  of  settling  national  differences.  War  and 
more  war  is  inevitable  so  long  as  there  is  any 
power  or  group  of  powers  which  keeps  war  always 
in  the  foreground.  If  you  have  paid  a  million 
dollars  for  an  automobile  of  the  biggest,  most 
complicated,  fastest,  strongest,  most  durable 
type,  you  will  not  be  satisfied  to  leave  it  in  the 
garage  year  after  year.  You  will  want  to  mount 
it,  ride  it,  and  show  the  world  that  you  have  an 
unapproachable  automobile.  No  nation  with  an 
army  and  navy  can  help  thinking  that  they  ought 


254  THE  WAR  IN  EUROPE 

to  be  used,  or  concluding  that  at  last  the  time  has 
come  to  use  them. 

(5)  The  only  remedy  is  to  prohibit  fast  death- 
dealing  automobiles  and  armies  to  everybody. 
The  coming  on  and  course  of  the  present  war  are 
absolute  proofs  that  war  can  only  be  prevented  by 
some  sort  of  world  federation  in  which  every  na- 
tion shall  have  an  armed  force  upon  a  fixed  pro- 
portion, to  be  used  as  part  of  a  contingent  of  a 
world  police  force.  That  must  be  provided,  for 
mankind  can  never  be  free  from  two  dangers :  the 
first  is  the  possible  rise  of  a  barbaric  power  which 
recognizes  no  law,  like  the  hordes  led  by  Attila  and 
Tamerlane;  the  second  is  the  danger  from  some 
highly  civilized  power  which  may  suddenly  adopt 
the  barbarians'  method  of  ruthless  warfare.  No 
human  kindness,  no  treaties,  can  prevent  those 
dangers;  and  unless  Europe  can  find  some  way 
of  creating  a  public  force  which  shall  in  no  coun- 
try be  sufficient  to  destroy  a  neighbor  and  yet 
for  all  countries  shall  be  strong  enough  to  provide 
against  the  ungovernable  forces  of  the  world,  the 
greatest  war  of  history  will  after  a  few  years  be 
followed  by  a  greater  one.  Perhaps  Macaulay's 
New  Zealander  may  yet  have  the  opportunity  to 
muse  over  the  broken  arch  of  London  Bridge. 


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